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Procedure - Civil Procedure -
Judicial review - Certiorari -
Capacity - 1992 Constitution -
Article 132 - Whetheror not the
interested party had not been
served with the writ of summons
- Whether or not interested
party’s could have entered
appearance without being served
with writ of summons -
Whether or not High Court,
committed non-jurisdictional but
patent errors of law so
substantial to rendered the
entire proceedings a complete
nullity.
HEADNOTES
The progeny of the first
application that preceded this
one was that the 1st
interested party herein
initiated an action at the
Winneba High Court against the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties herein as respondents by
an Originating Notice of Motion
seeking as many as ten (10)
Declaratory reliefs and three
(3) Orders. The 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties challenged the procedure
employed in seeking the reliefs
The trial High Court refused
their application and thereafter
granted an injunction
application then pending before
it against the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties pending the hearing of
the Originating Motion. The 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties herein appealed against
the decisions of the trial High
Court, Winneba to the Court of
Appeal but failed or refused to
pursue the appeals. The
University Teachers Association
of Ghana (UTAG) Winneba Chapter,
then applied to join in the
action before the Winneba High
Court to protect the interest of
its members, which included the
applicant herein, but the trial
High court refused the
application for joinder. When
the trial court refused the
application for joinder, the
then President of UTAG, Winneba
Chapter, applied to this Court
for judicial review seeking to
quash the ruling of the Winneba
High Court dated 10/07/2017 in
which it dismissed the motion by
the 2nd and 3rd
interested parties herein
challenging the propriety of
commencing the action by an
Originating Notice of Motion.
This Court granted the
application and quashed the
ruling of the Winneba High Court
dated 10/07/2017. The Court,
speaking through Pwamang, JSC,
after analyzing the submissions
before it, held as follows: “In
the circumstances, we grant the
application for certiorari,
quash the decision of the High
Court, Winneba dated 10/07/2017
and set aside the 1st
interested party’s Originating
Motion filed on 23/05/2017 with
liberty to him to issue a writ
of summons to have his
grievances redressed”. Following
the liberty granted him in our
ruling as quoted above, the 1st
interested party went back to
the trial High Court, Winneba
and instituted a fresh action
against the 2nd and 3rd
interested parties herein as 1st
and 2nd defendants
respectively by Writ of Summons.
On the 2nd day of May
2018, the High Court, Winneba,
upon application by the 1st
interested party that the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties herein had failed to
enter both appearance and
defence to his action, entered
ex-parte judgment in default of
defence against them in respect
of all the four declaratory
reliefs recalled above. The 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties did nothing about the
ex-parte judgments entered
against them. Instead, the
applicant who is a stranger to
the action in the Winneba court
has brought a certiorari
application before us urging us
to quash the judgment of the
High Court, Winneba, for
fundamental errors apparent on
the face of the record. This is
the reason why we term the
instant application before us as
a re-play of a similar one
determined by this Court on 20th
December 2017 in which UTAG,
Winneba Chapter, which was a
stranger to the action, was the
applicant.
HELD :-
Having failed to take evidence
and/or legal arguments from the
1st interested party
in proof of his declaratory
reliefs before entering judgment
against the 2nd and 3rd
interested parties in his favour
on same in default of both
appearance and defence, the
trial court seriously erred for
which its decision must not be
made to stand. This is a clear
case where certiorari must lie.
In the circumstances, we grant
the application for certiorari
and order that the judgment of
the High Court dated 2nd
May 2018 be brought before this
Court for the purpose of it
being quashed and same is hereby
quashed.
DISSENTING OPINION
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Supreme
Court Rules 1996 (C.I.16) .
High Court Civil Procedure
Rules, 2004 [C.I.47]
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
In Re Appenteng {decd); Republic
v High Court, Accra; Ex-parte
Appenteng [2005-2006] SCGLR 18;
Republic v High Court; Ex-parte
Charge D’Affairs, Bulgarian
Embassy (Unreported judgment in
civil motion No. J5/34/2015
dated 24th February
2016)
Republic v High Court, Ex-parte
Naa Otua Swayne (Unreported
civil motion No J5/8/2015 dated
17th February 2016)
The Republic v High Court,
Winneba; Ex-parte University
Teachers Association of Ghana
(UTAG)–Winneba Chapter; And Supi
Kofi Kwayera and 2 Others
(Interested Parties); Suit No
J5/65/2017 dated 20th
December 2017
REPUBLIC v COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY
INTO NUNGUA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL
AFFAIRS; EX-PARTE ODAI 1V
[1996-97] SCGLR 401;
THE REPUBLIC v HIGH COURT,
ACCRA; EX-PARTE CHRAJ (Addo
Interested Party) [2003-2004]
SCGLR 312;
REPUBLIC v HIGH COURT, KUMASI;
EX-PARTE BANK OF GHANA (NO.1)
[2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 477;
THE REPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEAL;
EX-PARTE TSATSU TSIKATA
[2005-2006] SCGLR 612.
IN RE; NUNGUA CHIEFTAINCY
AFFAIRS; ODAI AYIKU IV v THE
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (BORKETEY
LARWEH XIV-APPLICANT) [2010]
SCGLR 413
REPUBLIC v HIGH COURT, ACCRA;
EX-PARTE OSAFO [2011] 2 SCGLR
966
REV. DE-GRAFT SEFA & Others v
BANK OF GHANA (Unreported
Judgment of this Court in Civil
Appeal No. J4/51/2014 dated 19th
November 2015).
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Halsbury’s Laws of England
Volume 37 edition
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
YAW APPAU
COUNSEL
PROF. RAYMOND ATUGUBA WITH HIM
HAROLD ATUGUBA FOR THE
APPLICANT.
ALEXANDER AFENYO MARKIN FOR THE
1ST INTERESTED PARTY.
PAA KWESI ABAIDOO FOR THE 2ND
INTERESTED PARTY.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RULING
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
YAW APPAU
This is the second time within a
year that this Court is being
called upon to determine the
propriety or otherwise of
proceedings conducted by the
High Court, Winneba involving
issues concerning the University
of Education, Winneba. The
application before us now can be
described as the second episode
of an unending story about the
University that began in 2017
and it would not be out of place
if a brief narration of events
is given before we proceed to
determine the substance of the
application. This would help to
present a clearer picture of the
matters in issue and lead to a
better appreciation of our
decision.
The application before us is a
judicial review application
brought under article 132 of the
Constitution, 1992 and rule
61(1) of the rules of this
Court, 1996 [C.I.16]. The prayer
of the applicant who used to be
the Vice-Chancellor of the 2nd
interested party until recently,
is for an order of certiorari
directed at the High Court,
Winneba, to bring up into this
Court for purposes of being
quashed, the ruling of the court
dated 2nd May, 2018
in the case intituled SUPI KOFI
KWAYERA v UNIVERSITY OF
EDUCATION, WINNEBA & Another,
Suit No. E12/30/18. The
application is in fact, a
re-play of a similar one
determined by this Court on 20th
December 2017 between the
University Teachers Association
of Ghana (UTAG), Winneba Chapter
as applicant (of which the
applicant herein was a member)
and the very interested parties
in this application also as
interested parties therein.
The progeny of the first
application that preceded this
one was that the 1st
interested party herein
initiated an action at the
Winneba High Court against the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties herein as respondents by
an Originating Notice of Motion
seeking as many as ten (10)
Declaratory reliefs and three
(3) Orders. The 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties challenged the procedure
employed in seeking the reliefs.
They accordingly, applied to the
High Court to dismiss the action
on two grounds:
i.
that the action ought to have
been commenced by a writ of
summons but not a motion and
ii. that the 1st
interested party had no capacity
to institute the action against
them.
The trial High Court refused
their application and thereafter
granted an injunction
application then pending before
it against the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties pending the hearing of
the Originating Motion. The 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties herein appealed against
the decisions of the trial High
Court, Winneba to the Court of
Appeal but failed or refused to
pursue the appeals. The
University Teachers Association
of Ghana (UTAG) Winneba Chapter,
then applied to join in the
action before the Winneba High
Court to protect the interest of
its members, which included the
applicant herein, but the trial
High court refused the
application for joinder. When
the trial court refused the
application for joinder, the
then President of UTAG, Winneba
Chapter, applied to this Court
for judicial review seeking to
quash the ruling of the Winneba
High Court dated 10/07/2017 in
which it dismissed the motion by
the 2nd and 3rd
interested parties herein
challenging the propriety of
commencing the action by an
Originating Notice of Motion.
This Court granted the
application and quashed the
ruling of the Winneba High Court
dated 10/07/2017. The Court,
speaking through Pwamang, JSC,
after analyzing the submissions
before it, held as follows:
“In the circumstances, we
grant the application for
certiorari, quash the decision
of the High Court, Winneba dated
10/07/2017 and set aside the 1st
interested party’s Originating
Motion filed on 23/05/2017 with
liberty to him to issue a writ
of summons to have his
grievances redressed”.
Following the liberty granted
him in our ruling as quoted
above, the 1st
interested party went back to
the trial High Court, Winneba
and instituted a fresh action
against the 2nd and 3rd
interested parties herein as 1st
and 2nd defendants
respectively by Writ of Summons.
In this fresh action, the 1st
interested party prayed for four
declaratory reliefs, namely;
i.
A declaration that the extension
of the mandate of the Governing
Council of the 1st
defendant by the 2nd
defendant to stay in office to
perform such functions as
properly appointed council was
in breach of section 8 of Act
672.
ii.
A declaration that no authority
or institution of state has any
power to extend the tenure of a
member of the Governing Council
of the 1st defendant
unless such extension is in
accordance with Act 672.
iii.
A declaration that all
appointments made by the defunct
Governing Council which
constituted themselves as the
Governing Council of the 1st
defendant by virtue of the
directives of the 2nd
defendant are null and void and
of no legal effect.
iv.
A declaration that all decisions
taken by the de facto body of
persons who constituted
themselves as Governing Council
is null and void and of no
effect.
On the 2nd day of May
2018, the High Court, Winneba,
upon application by the 1st
interested party that the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties herein had failed to
enter both appearance and
defence to his action, entered
ex-parte judgment in default of
defence against them in respect
of all the four declaratory
reliefs recalled above. The 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties did nothing about the
ex-parte judgments entered
against them. Instead, the
applicant who is a stranger to
the action in the Winneba court
has brought a certiorari
application before us urging us
to quash the judgment of the
High Court, Winneba, for
fundamental errors apparent on
the face of the record. This is
the reason why we term the
instant application before us as
a re-play of a similar one
determined by this Court on 20th
December 2017 in which UTAG,
Winneba Chapter, which was a
stranger to the action, was the
applicant.
REASONS FOR THE APPLICATION
The applicant formulated two
reasons why he thought the High
Court judgment was amenable to a
quashing order.
1.
The first was that
notwithstanding the indication
in the search report attached to
the motion for judgment in
default of defence that the 3rd
interested party had not been
served with the 1st
interested party’s writ of
summons and therefore could not
have entered appearance to the
writ, the trial High Court went
ahead and entered ex-parte
judgment in default of defence
against both the 3rd
interested party who had not
been served with the writ and
then the 2nd
interested party, contrary to
the requirements of the rules.
This, according to the
applicant, was a breach of the
natural justice rule of audi
alteram partem as the 3rd
interested party was denied the
opportunity to be heard.
2.
The second was that since the
reliefs sought by the plaintiff
were all declaratory, the rules
of the High Court [C.I. 47] and
settled authorities of this
Court do not permit the trial
court to enter default judgment
in such claims without any legal
arguments and/or testimony from
the plaintiff in proof of the
reliefs. For entering judgment
in default of defence in respect
of declaratory claims, the trial
court had committed a
fundamental error of law for
which the decision complained of
must be quashed on certiorari.
The 1st interested
party opposed the application.
His first challenge was against
the capacity of the applicant.
According to the 1st
interested party, the applicant
had long been sacked as the
Vice-Chancellor of the
University and therefore was
fighting a personal interest
battle for which his remedy was
in the High Court but not in the
Supreme Court. He contended that
aside of the personal interest
applicant had in the case, there
was no public interest element
in the matter and therefore the
applicant had no business in
this Court. His second was that,
the 3rd interested
party was served with the writ
on the 26th day of
March 2018, just three days
after filing the motion for
default judgment and several
weeks before the motion itself
was heard. The 3rd
interested party could not
therefore cry foul for
non-service of the writ on it
before the motion was heard. The
third point raised by the 1st
interested party was that the
trial High Court did not commit
any fundamental error in
granting the default judgment
because the 2nd and 3rd
interested parties were given
the opportunity to be heard but
they failed to appear before the
court so the trial court was
justified in doing what it did.
He contended further that the
reliefs he sought were in
connection with breach of
statutes, as such, the law was
in the bosom of the judge. It
was therefore for the judge to
interpret the law and come to
the right conclusion but not to
invite the parties to advance
legal arguments as suggested by
the applicant. He concluded by
contending that the application
was brought in bad faith as the
applicant should have joined the
action in the Winneba High Court
to defend his personal interest
which he failed to do. Having
failed to do so, he could not
come to this Court as a busybody
to contest a matter that did not
concern him.
CAPACITY
The issue of capacity with
regard to the role of a stranger
to a judgment, ruling or
decision in judicial review
applications, particularly with
regard to prohibition and
certiorari, has been over
flogged in this Court and given
final judicial blessing. The
authorities are legion that the
remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are not restricted
by the notion of locus standi
and that every citizen of the
land has a standing to invite
the Court to prevent some abuse
of power. There is no need for
such an applicant to show a
personal interest or grievance
in the matter brought for
consideration. The only
criterion is that the public
must be interested in the
matter. See In Re Appenteng
{decd); Republic v High Court,
Accra; Ex-parte Appenteng
[2005-2006] SCGLR 18; Republic v
High Court; Ex-parte Charge
D’Affairs, Bulgarian Embassy
(Unreported judgment in civil
motion No. J5/34/2015 dated 24th
February 2016); Republic v High
Court, Ex-parte Naa Otua Swayne
(Unreported civil motion No
J5/8/2015 dated 17th
February 2016) and our
recent unreported decision in
the case of The Republic v
High Court, Winneba; Ex-parte
University Teachers Association
of Ghana (UTAG)–Winneba Chapter;
And Supi Kofi Kwayera and 2
Others (Interested Parties);
Suit No J5/65/2017 dated 20th
December 2017, which was
referred to earlier on in
this judgment.
We wish to re-echo the dictum of
this Court on this question of
capacity per Pwamang, JSC in the
unreported judgment involving
the University of Education,
Winneba referred to supra, which
case, incidentally, was
conducted by the same lawyers in
the instant application before
us: “This Court has held
repeatedly that applications for
prerogative writs have a special
public aspect to them and are
therefore not restricted by
notions of locus standi, i.e.
one does not need to show that
some legal right is at stake.
They may be granted to a total
stranger… Our opinion is that
since the issues in this
application are in respect of
the proper administration of
justice in conformity with the
rules of court, a stranger to
the proceedings in the High
Court and an incorporated group
of persons would have capacity
to raise them since it is in the
interest of the public that the
machinery of the administration
of justice works properly”.
The 1st interested
party should have taken cue from
the above decision to which he
is not a stranger and not wasted
precious time in re-arguing the
question of capacity since the
facts in that application are on
all fours with the instant
application before us. The issue
involved in this application has
to do with the proper
administration of justice in
conformity with the rules of
court, which is of public
importance. We therefore dismiss
the 1st interested
party’s challenge to the
capacity of the applicant as
having no merits whatsoever
since the applicant, though a
stranger in the action before
the High Court, Winneba, has
every right to pursue the
instant application before us.
JURISDICTION
This Court exercises its
supervisory jurisdiction
whenever: (i) there is
want or excess of jurisdiction;
(ii) there is an error of
law on the face of the record;
(iii) there is failure to
comply with the rules of natural
justice and finally (iv)
on the Wednesbury Principle.
This position has been expressed
in various authoritative
decisions of this Court
including but not limited to the
following: 1. REPUBLIC v
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO NUNGUA
TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AFFAIRS;
EX-PARTE ODAI 1V [1996-97] SCGLR
401; 2. THE REPUBLIC v HIGH
COURT, ACCRA; EX-PARTE CHRAJ
(Addo Interested Party)
[2003-2004] SCGLR 312; 3.
REPUBLIC v HIGH COURT, KUMASI;
EX-PARTE BANK OF GHANA (NO.1)
[2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 477; and
4. THE REPUBLIC v COURT OF
APPEAL; EX-PARTE TSATSU TSIKATA
[2005-2006] SCGLR 612.
In the Ex-parte Tsatsu
Tsikata case supra, this
Court per Wood, JSC (as she then
was) held at page 619 as
follows: “The clear
thinking of this Court is that,
our supervisory jurisdiction
under article 132 of the 1992
Constitution, should be
exercised only in those
manifestly plain and obvious
cases, where there are patent
errors of law on the face of the
record, which errors either go
to jurisdiction or are so plain
as to make the impugned decision
a complete nullity. It stands to
reason then that the error(s) of
law alleged must be fundamental,
substantial, material, grave or
so serious as to go to the root
of the matter. The error of law
must be one on which the
decision depends. A minor,
trifling, inconsequential or
unimportant error, or for that
matter an error which does not
go to the core or root of the
decision complained of; or
stated differently, on which the
decision does not turn, would
not attract the court’s
supervisory intervention”.
It was the case of the applicant
that the High Court, Winneba
committed non-jurisdictional but
patent errors of law on the face
of the record which were so
substantial or fundamental that
they rendered the entire
proceedings held before the
court a complete nullity. Since
there is no doubt to the fact
that an error of law on the face
of the record is a ground for
invoking the supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court, what
the applicant was expected to
establish in this application
was to show that the error or
errors of law complained of,
were fundamental, grievous and
so patent on the face of the
record that they go to the very
root of the decision complained
of thus rendering it a complete
nullity.
In his submissions, the
applicant contended that at the
time the 1st
interested party filed his
motion for judgment in default
of defence against the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties, the 3rd
interested party had not been
served with 1st
interested party’s writ of
summons so the application was
premature and improper under the
circumstances. According to the
applicant, the trial court could
not have entered judgment in
default of defence against a
defendant who had not been
served with any writ of summons
so the whole proceedings leading
to the entry of the default
judgment was a nullity.
The 1st interested
party who appeared to have
admitted to this fact tried
vainly to explain why he thought
the court below was right in
determining the motion for
default judgment. Under
paragraphs 8 and 9 of his
affidavit in opposition to this
application filed on 13th
July 2018, the 1st
interested party contended that
when the search report on the
search he made on the very day
he filed the motion for judgment
in default of defence (i.e. 23rd
March 2018) revealed that the 3rd
interested party had then not
been served with the writ of
summons, he personally
accompanied the bailiff to serve
the writ on the 2nd
interested party in Accra on 26th
March 2018. The hearing of the
motion, which had been slated
for 29th March 2018,
was therefore adjourned to 27th
April with a further adjournment
to 2nd May 2018 to
enable the interested parties
respond to same but they all
failed to do so. The trial court
did not therefore err when it
determined the motion on 2nd
May 2018 and granted the
application for default
judgment.
We find this argument quite
interesting but unwholesome. We
want to emphasize with clarity
that before a plaintiff can
invoke the jurisdiction of the
High Court under Order 13 of the
High Court Civil Procedure
Rules, 2004 [C.I.47] for
judgment in default of defence,
the defendant or the party
against whom the order is
invoked should have been served
with the writ of summons,
entered appearance to the writ
but failed to file a statement
of defence afterwards within the
time provided for under the
rules. Where a defendant or a
party has not been served with
any writ of summons, no motion
for judgment in default of any
kind could be filed and heard by
the court and any such exercise
would be one in futility and
thus a nullity. Again, where
after service of a writ of
summons on a defendant or a
party, the defendant or party
fails to enter appearance within
the time provided under the
rules; the plaintiff cannot
proceed with a motion for
judgment in default of defence.
The only motion a plaintiff can
pursue against a defendant who
has been served with a writ of
summons but has failed to enter
appearance is motion for
judgment in default of
appearance under Order 10 of
C.I.47 but not motion for
judgment in default of defence
under Order 13.
The affidavit in support of the
motion filed by the 1st
interested party for judgment in
default of defence on 23rd
March 2018 stated expressly
under paragraph 4 that the
defendants who were the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties had not entered
appearance to the writ of
summons. The said paragraph
reads:
“4. That on the 23rd
March 2018, I caused a search to
be conducted at the registry of
this Honourable Court to
ascertain whether or not the
defendants had entered
appearance or filed their
defence. The search results
show that the defendants have
neither entered appearance nor
filed any defence. Annexed
and marked as Exhibit ‘SKK’ is
the search result”.
{Emphasis ours}
The above deposition by the 1st
interested party in the
affidavit in support of the
motion for judgment in default
of defence should have put the
trial judge on his guard that he
was dealing with an improper
application; an application that
was not warranted under the
rules of court. But it appeared
the trial judge did not read the
application and its attachments
before granting same. Whilst 1st
interested party’s affidavit in
support said none of the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties had entered appearance
to the writ, the search report
attached to the application said
2nd interested party
had entered appearance but the 3rd
had not because he had not been
served with the writ. The trial
court nevertheless went ahead to
grant same in contravention of
the rules of court by
indicating, albeit erroneously
that the 2nd and 3rd
interested parties had been
served with the writ but had
failed to file defence.
Again, the 1st
interested party’s admission
that the 3rd
interested party was served with
the writ of summons on 26th
March 2018 was indicative that
at the time he filed the motion
for judgment in default of
defence on 23rd March
2018, the 3rd
interested party had not been
served with the writ. It was
therefore a patent error; (i)
on the part of the 1st
interested party to apply for
default judgment against a
defendant at a time the said
defendant had not been served
with any writ of summons and
(ii) on the part of the
trial court to welcome such a
process that was not recognized
under the rules, notwithstanding
the fact that the 3rd
interested party was later
served with the writ before the
determination of the motion. The
fact is that, the motion was
dead from birth so in reality,
there was no motion pending.
The second and final point or
argument the applicant canvassed
was that the rules of the High
court do not lend support to the
grant of a default judgment in
respect of a declaratory relief
as the trial High court judge
did in this case. According to
the applicant, since the reliefs
claimed by the 1st
interested party in his writ of
summons were declaratory ones,
the trial judge could not have
entered default judgment
simpliciter against the 2nd
and 3rd interested
parties either in default of
appearance or defence without
calling on the plaintiff to
establish his claim, even
granted they were all served
with the writ of summons but
failed to enter appearance or
file defence. In our view, this
argument of the applicant is
inviolable and the 1st
interested party could not
provide any answer to it.
Aside of the fact that Order 11
rule 6 and Order 13 rule 6 of
C.I. 47 on judgments in default
of appearance and defence
respectively make this point
clear, this Court has settled
this very issue with regard to
the entry of default judgments
in declaratory reliefs in the
cases of IN RE; NUNGUA
CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS; ODAI AYIKU
IV v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
(BORKETEY LARWEH XIV-APPLICANT)
[2010] SCGLR 413 @ 416; REPUBLIC
v HIGH COURT, ACCRA; EX-PARTE
OSAFO [2011] 2 SCGLR 966 and
REV. DE-GRAFT SEFA & Others v
BANK OF GHANA (Unreported
Judgment of this Court in Civil
Appeal No. J4/51/2014 dated 19th
November 2015).
In the Rev. De-Graft Sefa
case supra, Gbadegbe, JSC
expressed the sentiments of the
Court in the following words:
“the settled practice of the
courts is that a declaratory
relief cannot be obtained by a
motion in the cause but after
hearing the parties either by
way of legal argument or a full
scale trial”. This was
an affirmation of the Court’s
earlier decisions in the Odai
Ayiku and Ex-parte Osafo
cases supra, which is a
re-statement of the procedure
stated in the Volume 37 edition
of Halsbury’s Laws of England
that; “a declaratory
judgment or order should be
final, in the sense of finally
determining the rights of the
parties, but should not be
granted in the course of
interlocutory proceedings or by
way of an interim declaration”.
Having failed to take evidence
and/or legal arguments from the
1st interested party
in proof of his declaratory
reliefs before entering judgment
against the 2nd and 3rd
interested parties in his favour
on same in default of both
appearance and defence, the
trial court seriously erred for
which its decision must not be
made to stand. This is a clear
case where certiorari must lie.
In the circumstances, we grant
the application for certiorari
and order that the judgment of
the High Court dated 2nd
May 2018 be brought before this
Court for the purpose of it
being quashed and same is hereby
quashed.
Y. APPAU
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
V. J.M DOTSE
JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT
V. AKOTO-BAMFO (MRS)
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
A.A. BENIN
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
G. PWAMANG
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL
PROF. RAYMOND ATUGUBA WITH HIM
HAROLD ATUGUBA FOR THE
APPLICANT.
ALEXANDER AFENYO MARKIN FOR THE
1ST INTERESTED PARTY.
PAA KWESI ABAIDOO FOR THE 2ND
INTERESTED PARTY.
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