Practice and Procedure -
Certiorari - Order of Mandamus -
interpretation of Articles 127
and 161 of the 1992 Constitution
- Whether
Plaintiff is not liable to any
action or suit for any act or
omission by her in the exercise
of judicial power vested in her
as a Registrar - Whether the
High Court Judge lacked
jurisdiction to interpret
articles 127 (3) and 161 of the
1992 Constitution -
HEADNOTES
The facts appear to be devoid of
any controversy. An application
for contempt intituled as The
Republic v Anas
Aremeyaw Anas & 4 Others,
Ex-Parte Justice Paul Uute
rDery was filed at the registry
of the High Court, Accra The
Applicant herein was at the time
material to these proceedings
the Registrar of the Fast Track
Court Division of the High Court
when the process above referred
to was filed. As usual, the
Applicant as the Registrar fixed
a date for hearing of the
application and gave 12th and
13th of October 2015
as the return date. The
applicant herein, however
changed the return date to 28th September
2015. The Applicant however,
failed to notify the Presiding
Judge of the change of date for
the moving of the motion for
committal. As the Presiding
Judge was unaware of the change
in date, from the original date
of 12th& 13thOctober
2015 she proceeded to hear the
application and dismissed same
on 28thSeptember 2015
without recourse to the
Applicants who had filed the
application (i.e. Justice Dery
and the others).The applicants,
therein feeling naturally
aggrieved by the dismissal of
the motion resorted to placing
the matter in the public domain
The presiding reported to the
Chief Justice the conduct of the
Registrar. The Applicant was
given the opportunity to respond
to the report
the Applicant complied with.
However, her explanation
appeared not to be satisfactory
and she was subsequently
interdicted and invited to
appear before a Disciplinary
Committee purposely set up to
investigate the Applicant’s
conduct. The Applicant did not
appear before the Committee but
resorted to file a motion for
judicial review before the High
Court (Human Rights Division)
HELD :-
We are therefore of the
considered views that the
applicant has not made a case to
invoke our supervisory
jurisdiction to quash the
proceedings of the learned High
Court Judge. It was therefore
upon the basis of the above
reasons that we dismissed the
application as unmeritorious on
the 10th day of April
2017.
STATUTES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
1992 Constitution, Articles 127
and 161
CASES REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
Okofo Estates Ltd. v Modern
Signs Limited & Others
[1996-1997] SCGLR 124
Adumoah II v Twum II [1999-2000]
2 GLR 409 SC
Judicial Service Staff
Association of Ghana (JUSAG) v
The Attorney General and 2
Others, Suit No. JI/5/2015
BOOKS REFERRED TO IN JUDGMENT
DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT
YEBOAH, JSC:-
COUNSEL.
AUGUSTINE OBOUR FOR THE
APPLICANT
STELLA BADU (CHIEF STATE
ATTORNEY) FOR THE 2NDRESPONDENT
RULING
YEBOAH, JSC:-
On the 10th
April, 2017 we dismissed this
application and reserved our
reasons which we hereby proceed
to deliver.
The applicant herein has
invoked our supervisory
jurisdiction to quash the
judgment of the High Court,
Accra dated the 26th
October 2016.
To appreciate the basis
for invoking our supervisory
jurisdiction the facts giving
rise to this application must be
stated for a full and proper
understanding of the case.
The facts appear to be
devoid of any controversy. An
application for contempt
intituled as The Republic v
Anas Aremeyaw Anas & 4 Others,
Ex-Parte Justice Paul Uuter Dery
was filed at the registry of the
High Court, Accra by law firm of
Addo, Addo (Legal Attorney) on
the 18th day of
September 2015.
The Applicant herein was
at the time material to these
proceedings the Registrar of the
Fast Track Court Division of the
High Court when the process
above referred to was filed. As
usual, the Applicant as the
Registrar fixed a date for
hearing of the application and
gave 12th and 13th
of October 2015 as the return
date. The applicant herein,
however changed the return date
to 28th September
2015. The Applicant however,
failed to notify the Presiding
Judge of the change of date for
the moving of the motion for
committal. As the Presiding
Judge was unaware of the change
in date, from the original date
of 12th & 13th
October 2015 she proceeded to
hear the application and
dismissed same on 28th
September 2015 without recourse
to the Applicants who had filed
the application (i.e. Justice
Dery and the others).
The applicants, therein
feeling naturally aggrieved by
the dismissal of the motion
resorted to placing the matter
in the public domain which
attracted unimaginable
proportions in the press and
social media condemning the
Presiding Judge and the
Judiciary as a whole. The Chief
Justice was not spared. The
presiding Judge Torkornoo JA
(sitting as additional High
Court Judge) reported to the
Chief Justice the conduct of the
Applicant herein as the
Registrar who had caused such
embarrassment to the entire
Judiciary. The Applicant was
given the opportunity to respond
to the report of Justice
Torkornoo to the Chief Justice.
This the Applicant
complied with. However, her
explanation appeared not to be
satisfactory and she was
subsequently interdicted and
invited to appear before a
Disciplinary Committee purposely
set up to investigate the
Applicant’s conduct.
The Applicant did not
appear before the Committee but
resorted to file a motion for
judicial review before the High
Court (Human Rights Division)
presided over by Her Ladyship
Gifty Agyei Addo on 9th
June 2016 seeking the following
reliefs:
i. An order of
Certiorari to bring up and quash
the interdiction letter dated 4th
January 2016 served on the
Applicant by the 1st
Respondent on 12th
January 2016 as well as the
invitation to appear before a
disciplinary committee dated 6th
May 2016.
ii. An order of Mandamus
compelling the Judicial Service
to restore and pay the benefits,
arrears, allowances and
entitlements due the Applicants
from 1st January 2016
which were withheld and only
half paid to her from January to
date.
iii. An order of
injunction against the
Respondents, their agents,
privies, workmen and assigns
restraining them from
investigating the same issues
raised in the report by
Torkornoo J.A.
iv. A declaration that on
a true and proper interpretation
of Articles 127 and 161 of the
1992 Constitution, the Plaintiff
is not liable to any action or
suit for any act or omission by
her in the exercise of judicial
power vested in her as a
Registrar of the Superior Court
of Ghana. Consequently, the
interdiction letter dated 4th
January 2016 from the office of
the Judicial Secretary is null
and void of no legal effect as
it contravened Articles 127 and
161 of the 1992 Constitution and
therefore unconstitutional.
v. A declaration that
the petition or report by Her
Ladyship Justice Gertrude
Torkornoo dated 1st
December 2015 as contained in a
letter signed by one Bernard
Bentil dated 8th
December 2015 is also null and
void since her evidence in
support of her petition, is in
violation of Articles 127 and
161 of the 1992 Constitution and
therefore unconstitutional.
vi. A declaration that
the letter written on behalf of
the 1st Respondent
dated 6th May 2016
inviting the Applicant to appear
before a disciplinary committee
is also null and void since same
is in contravention of Articles
127 and 161 of the 1992
Constitution and therefore
unconstitutional.
vii. A declaration that
all proceedings however and
whatsoever described arising out
of the contents of the Petition
of Her Ladyship Justice Gertrude
Torkornoo JA is null and void.
viii. A perpetual
injunction against any
adjudicating body however or
whatsoever described restraining
them from determining any issues
arising out of the contents of
the Petition by Her Ladyship
Justice Gertude Torkornoo.
ix. An order restraining
any adjudicating body howsoever
described from determining any
issues arising out of the
content of the said Petition
filed by Her Ladyship Justice
Gertrude Torkornoo during the
pendency of the instant suit.
The learned High Court
Judge dismissed the application
as unmeritorious and held among
other things that the applicant
herein could not seek refuge
under those constitutional
provisions in issue, precisely
articles 127 and 161 of the
1992 Constitution.
The applicant by this
application is praying this
court to quash by certiorari the
judgment of the learned High
Court Judge dated 26th
October 2016 on the following
grounds:-
1.
That in the judgment dated
26th October 2016,
Her Ladyship Gifty Agyei Addo, a
Justice of the High Court,
sought to interprete Articles
127 (3) and 161 of the
Constitution which power is
reserved only for the Supreme
Court under the Constitution.
2.
That in her judgment dated
26th October 2016,
Her Ladyship Gifty Agyei Addo
stated as follows:- “I called in
aid the definition inferred to
me by the Respondent in respect
of the definition of judicial
power per the Black’s Law
Dictionary 8th
Edition see page 6 of Exhibit”.
It is abundantly clear that the
learned trial Judge interpreted
a provision in the Constitution
instead of applying same to the
facts.
3.
The learned trial Judge
pronounced and declared that if
Article 125 (3) of the 1992
Constitution stated that the
judicial power shall be vested
in the judiciary and those who
constitute the Judiciary are the
ones listed in Article 126 (1)
of the 1992 Constitution, then
the irresistible conclusion
that can be drawn is that
although the Registrar of the
Superior Court is a judicial
officer, to that extent she is
not one of the persons mentioned
in Article 126 (1) as exercising
judicial power, she cannot find
protection in Article 127 of the
1992 Constitution. It is not for
nothing that the Constitution
specifically addressed the
position of the Registrar of the
Superior Court.
A careful reading of the
processes filed by the applicant
herein revealed several
procedural lapses which as a
final court of the land it
should not be allowed to pass
without our comments.
First, the title of this
application which is for
Certiorari under our supervisory
jurisdiction is plainly wrong.
This application is to quash the
judgment of Her Ladyship Gifty
Agyei Addo J, sitting at the
High Court, Accra. It is not
directed to quash the decision
of the Judicial Service of Ghana
and the Attorney-General as the
title of the application seeks
to indicate. From a careful
reading of all the processes
filed, Judicial Service of Ghana
and the Attorney-General have
done nothing wrong which should
make them respondents to the
application under consideration.
Indeed from the affidavit in
support of this application
there is nothing to establish
that the two parties should be
the respondents as they had not
made any underlining decree or
judgments sought to be quashed.
The application under
consideration as apparent on the
motion paper seeks to quash the
judgment of Her Ladyship Gifty
Agyei Addo J delivered on 26th
October 2016. If the application
is indeed mounted against
Judicial Service and Attorney
General, this court’s
supervisory jurisdiction could
not be invoked, in that the
Supreme Court does not exercise
supervisory jurisdiction over
the Judicial Service and
Attorney-General but have under
Article 132 of the Constitution
and section 5 of the Courts Act,
Act 459 of 1993, such
jurisdiction is exercisable over
adjudicating bodies.
We however, think that the
procedural inadequacies
notwithstanding, we should
proceed to assume jurisdiction
and determine this application
on the merit as this court with
the case of Okofo Estates
Ltd. v Modern Signs Limited &
Others [1996-1997] SCGLR 124
cautions against resort to
declining jurisdiction when such
patent procedural errors could
be treated as mere
technicalities.
On the merits, Counsel for
the applicant attacked the
judgment of the learned High
Court Judge on the grounds that
she lacked jurisdiction to
interpret articles 127 (3) and
161 of the 1992 Constitution as
such jurisdiction is exclusively
reserved for the Supreme Court.
This argument if sustained,
could have warranted our
interference by quashing the
judgment on lack of or excess of
jurisdiction. However, that
appears not to be the case. The
learned Judge had to refer to
those constitutional provisions
as the applicant herein sought
indemnity on the grounds that
she was at the time material to
her interdiction a judicial
officer and could not have been
subjected to the Disciplinary
proceedings which eventually
culminated in these
proceedings. From the judgment
of the learned Judge it is clear
that she did not subject any of
the constitutional provisions to
any interpretation whatsoever
and indeed in any manner or
form. It was the applicant who
sought refuge as a Judicial
Officer under those provisions
referred to in the judgment
sought to be quashed. As a court
of law, she was bound to
consider the effect of those
constitutional provisions.
We think a distinction
should be drawn between
interpreting a constitutional
provision and applying
constitutional provisions to a
set of facts in a case before a
court of law for adjudication.
This point was adequately
considered in the case of
Adumoah II v Twum II [1999-2000]
2 GLR 409 SC when Acquah JSC
(as he then was) said at page
414 as follows:-
“Article 130 (2) of the
Constitution, 1992 therefore
empowers any court below to
refer to the Supreme Court for
determination of any issues
relating to article 130 (1)
thereof. Now it is very
important to understand and
appreciate that the Constitution
1992 is the fundamental and
supreme law of the land, the
provisions of which no other law
is permitted to contradict. As
stated in article 1 (2) thereof.
(2) This Constitution shall be
the supreme law of Ghana and any
other law found to be
inconsistent with any provisions
of this Constitution shall to
the extent of the inconsistency
be void. Therefore all courts,
tribunal institutions including
the Government, and all
individuals are bound by its
provisions. Accordingly all
courts, tribunals and indeed all
adjudicating authorities in
Ghana are obliged to apply the
provisions of the Constitution,
1992 in the adjudication of
disputes before them”
It would certainly be a
denial of justice to parties if
constitutional provisions
referred to in the course of
litigation are not considered by
a court of law or any
adjudicating authority for that
matter.
It is only when the issue
of interpretation arises that a
court must stay its proceedings
and refer same to the Supreme
Court. As it happened in these
proceedings, the learned trial
Judge did not attempt to
interpret any provisions of the
Constitution, she did not go
contrary to law and denied
herself the jurisdiction to
determine the issues before
her. The learned Judge was
merely called upon to ascertain
whether the applicant as a
Registrar of the Supreme Court
was a holder of a judicial
office. This she did and placing
reliance on the case of
Judicial Service Staff
Association of Ghana (JUSAG) v
The Attorney General and 2
Others, Suit No. JI/5/2015
unreported decision of this
Court, proceeded to adopt the
judgment of our worthy brother
Dotse JSC and held that the
Applicant was a Judicial
Officer. We think that beyond
this holding the trial Judge did
not proceed to interpret the
provisions of the Constitution
referred to in the judgment.
The next ground for this
application is the issue of
definition of judicial power by
the learned trial Judge. Counsel
has strongly contended that as
the learned Judge placed a
meaning on judicial power, she
sought to interpret the
Constitution.
We think that a court like
the High Court being a court of
law and superior court for that
matter may call in aid any
recognized means of ascertaining
the meaning of a word if the
statute in which that word (s)
was used does not offer any
statutory meaning. This in our
respectful views would not
amount to any interpretation of
the Constitution.
It is clear from Article
161 of the Constitution that the
framers of the Constitution did
not define judicial power.
Equally so, article 295 of the
Constitution does not define
judicial power. We think that
the trial Judge did not destroy
her jurisdiction to warrant our
intervention when she in her
judgment resorted to the Black’s
Law Dictionary for
interpretation of it. From the
definition, a Registrar of a
superior court like the
applicant cannot in anyway
whatsoever claim to exercise
judicial power. The fact that
she was a judicial officer does
not clothe her with judicial
power. We think that not all
judicial officers exercise
judicial power. The learned High
Court Judge therefore did not
commit any error or destroy her
jurisdiction to warrant our
supervisory jurisdiction.
The last ground which was
based on the judge’s reference
and application of articles 126
(1) and 127 (2) was well argued
by learned counsel for the
applicant who contended that as
a judicial officer the applicant
was not amenable to the
disciplinary proceedings. Indeed
article 127 read as a whole
seeks to establish the
independence of the judiciary
and the indemnity offered to
those exercising judicial power.
We find it unacceptable for
learned counsel to press on us
that as a judicial officer the
applicant could not be taken
through disciplinary
proceedings. We declare that,
the class of persons who are
exempted or indemnified under
articles 125 (3) of the
Constitution are limited to
those exercising judicial power.
We are therefore of the
considered views that the
applicant has not made a case to
invoke our supervisory
jurisdiction to quash the
proceedings of the learned High
Court Judge. It was therefore
upon the basis of the above
reasons that we dismissed the
application as unmeritorious on
the 10th day of April
2017.
SGD. ANIN
YEBOAH
(JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT)
SGD. J. ANSAH
(JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT)
SGD. V. J. M
DOTSE
(JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT)
SGD. N. S.
GBADEGBE
(JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT)
SGD. A. A.
BENIN
(JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT)
COUNSEL
AUGUSTINE OBOUR FOR THE
APPLICANT
STELLA BADU (CHIEF STATE
ATTORNEY) FOR THE 2ND
RESPONDENT |