RULING
AIKINS, J.S.C.:
I have had occasion to read
beforehand the opinion about to
be read by my learned brother
Acquah, J.S.C. I agree with the
views expressed by him together
with his conclusion on the
matter.
C. HAYFRON-BENJAMIN, J.S.C.:
On the 23rd July, 1997, I took
my stand against the decision of
this Court to permit the
“Applicants to regularise his
affidavit”. As happened there
was in fact nothing on the
record which even remotely
qualified to earn the title
“affidavit”. An affidavit is of
course as written document
signed by a deponent and sworn
to by him before a Commissioner
of Oaths or some other person
duly authorized by Statute to
exercise such function. In the
instant application the document
was thumb printed but it was
clearly unsworn. I think the
essential characteristic of an
affidavit is that it is sworn.
The Appellant herein has
consequently upon the order of
the 23rd July, 1997 applied to
this Court for a review of that
order. The Applicant contends
that an unsworn document cannot
pass for an affidavit and in any
case also that by the Rules of
this Court a sworn affidavit
should have accompanied the
application. In the absence of a
sworn affidavit so accompanying
the application the same was
avoid or incompetent. Applicant
further contended that it was
contrary to public policy for
this Court to admit an unsworn
affidavit for use in the
processes of this or any other
Court. This Court ought not
therefore to lend its aid to the
use of such unsworn affidavit.
The Respondents to this
application for review while
admitting that their “affidavit”
was unsworn nevertheless stake
their stand on the analogous
rule in the High Court
Rules—Order 38 rule 14 of L.W.
140A—and contend that similarly
this court may correct lapses in
any Civil proceedings. Quite
apart from the fact that this
Court is not bound by the Rules
of the High Court, that order
deals with Affidavits and the
rule 14 deals with corrections
in the jurat and any other
matter in an affidavit. As I
have said the essential
prerequisite of an affidavit is
that it is sworn. To order an
affidavit to be sworn is not the
same as to order the supply or
correction of a defect in a
jurat. The Learned Editors of
OSBORN’S CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY
(8th Edition) define a jurat as:
“A memorandum at the end of
affidavit stating where and when
the affidavit was sworn,
followed by the signature and
description of the person before
whom it is sworn".
Now in the High Court when a
judge orders an affidavit to be
so corrected or amended, such an
order must be supported by a
certificate of the judge that it
has been so done.
In the present application, the
document was unsworn and there
was no jurat. In my respectful
opinion this Court had no
jurisdiction to correct or amend
an unsworn document let alone do
likewise to a non-existent
jurat. In the circumstances to
request a party to swear to a
new and fresh affidavit would be
tantamount to ignoring the
dictates of time in the
application of our Rules of
procedure. A defective affidavit
is a sworn document which
contains errors or omissions
which may be corrected or
amended. As I said in KWABENA
BOAKYE VRS. FRANCIS MANU (Ch. A
3/96 date 16/4/97) on my view of
the requirements of Section 4 of
Cap 262,
“It is only when the statutory
requirements of form have been
satisfied that a Court or
Tribunal may examine the
contents thereof’. I hasten to
say that the above test may be
applied with equal force to
affidavits. For if a document
which should be presented in the
form of an affidavit is unsworn
a court of Tribunal cannot take
countenance of it”.
Reference has been made in this
application to the decision of
this Court in the Boakye case,
supra. In my respectful opinion
save for the quote of principle
adverted to in this opinion, I
think there is a distinction
between that case and the
present matter at Bar. In the
BOAKYE case this Court was
dealing with letters and
documents which did not require
to be sworn. The matter was
concerned with whether the
requirements of Section 4 of Cap
262 had been complied with, and
I said, and in my view rightly,
that the requirements of that
Section were mandatory and “must
appear on the face of the letter
or documents”.
In the application for review
one of the mandatory
requirements of rule 61 (1) and
(2) of C.I. 16 is an affidavit—a
sworn document. The Respondents
contend that the Applicant's
affidavit lacks a jurat and
suffers from the same defect and
therefore by the same token the
Applicants cannot maintain their
review application. I think the
Respondents are in grave error.
It is trite learning that a
sworn affidavit may be corrected
or amended as I have already
premised. But an unsworn
document cannot be amended or
corrected as if it were an
affidavit. Nor can Respondents
fault the Applicant on this
ground. The principle is clearly
laid down that in Civil matters
the Plaintiff or Applicant must
lose where no evidence is led by
either party. Fir it is the
Plaintiff or Applicant who is
seeking relief from the Court or
Tribunal. The lack of a jurat on
an otherwise sworn affidavit
will not avail an applicant
whose application is not
supported by an affidavit as
required by law.
It was conceded that there was
non-compliance with the rules.
The present issue however is
whether the non-compliance could
be waived. Rule 79 of C.I. 16 is
explicit on the effect of
non-compliance—“shall be a bar
to further prosecution of
proceedings”. There is however a
rider to this provision which
gives this Court the discretion
to waive the non-compliance.
However, the discretion must be
exercised judicially and the
party who seeks the exercise of
such discretion in his favour
must demonstrate how the
situation arose by inadvertence.
On the contrary the Respondent
has not treated this Court with
candour. In his “APPLICANT’S
STATEMENT OF CASE IN OPPOSITION
TO REVIEW MOTION” the Respondent
states:
“The Filing Clerk and the
Applicants alike failed to
observe at the time of filing,
that one out of the 10 copies of
the said affidavit was NOT
stamped by the Commissioner for
Oaths as having been sworn. The
remaining 9 copies of that
affidavit has all been stamped
as duly sworn”. (sic).
With all due respect to Counsel
that statement was incorrect and
did not furnish appropriate
excuse for non-compliance of the
Rules of this Court. Clearly
with only the minimum
constitutional panel of 5
members sitting to hear the
application, if indeed there
were 9 sworn affidavits in the
Registry, there would have been
no necessity for this Court to
order the Applicants “to
regularise his affidavit”.
I refrain from commenting on the
matters which transpired in
chambers and which have provoked
this application. My concern in
this application has been to
diffuse any notions which may be
the Respondent states:
“The Filing Clerk and the
Applicants alike failed to
observe at the time of filing,
that one out of the 10 copies of
the said affidavit was NOT
stamped by the Commissioner for
Oaths as having been sworn. The
remaining 9 copies of that
affidavit has all been stamped
as duly sworn”. (sic).
With all due respect to Counsel
that statement was incorrect and
did not furnish appropriate
excuse for non-compliance of the
Rules of this Court. Clearly
with only the minimum
constitutional panel of 5
members sitting to hear the
application, if indeed there
were 9 sworn affidavits in the
Registry, there would have been
no necessity for this Court to
order the Applicants “to
regularise his affidavit”.
I refrain from commenting on the
matters which transpired in
chambers and which have provoked
this application. My concern in
this application has been to
diffuse any notions which may
gain currency abroad that this
Court may be throwing caution to
the wind in approving the use of
unsworn documents as affidavits
in situations where the law
requires that only affidavits
may be used. I would grant the
Order for Review as prayed.
AMPIAH, J.S.C.:
I have had the privilege of
reading beforehand, the opinion
of my brother Acquah JSC. It is
my considered opinion that in
the particular circumstances of
the case, it would be in the
interest of justice that the
application be refused to enable
the substantive application
before the court to be heard,
would however like to make a few
observations or comments on the
issue of the admissibility of
“defective” affidavits.
An affidavit may be “defective”
in many ways. For our purpose I
would like to touch only on two
namely:—
(i) an unsworn affidavit
(ii) a sworn affidavit without a
jurat where the deponent is
either an illiterate, a blind
person or a person who suffers
from such a disability as would
require the contents of the
document read and explained to
him in a language he
understands.
The Supreme Court Rules, 1996
(C.I. 16) does not specifically
deal with such ‘defects’ in
affidavits, save that the
Supreme Court is empowered to
deal with such situations by
applying the Court of Appeal,
and High Court Rules or any
other Rules of the Court
established by the Constitution.
To this end, Article 129(4) of
the Constitution provides—
“129 (4) For the purpose of
hearing and determining a matter
within its jurisdiction and the
amendment, execution or the
enforcement of a judgment or
order made on any matter,
and for the purposes of any
other authority, expressly or by
necessary implication given to
the Supreme Court by this
Constitution or any other law,
the Supreme Court shall have all
the powers, authority and
jurisdiction vested in any court
established by the Constitution
or any other law".
Order 38 of the High Court Rules
provides for dealing with
“defective” affidavits.
Rule 14 states,
“14 The Court or a judge may
receive any affidavit sworn for
the purpose of being used in any
cause or matter, notwithstanding
any defect by misdescription of
parties o otherwise in the title
or jurat, or any other
irregularity in the form
thereof, and may direct a
memorandum to be made on the
document that it has been so
received”. (emphasis mine).
Since it is permissible ‘to
affirm’, where it is contrary to
one’s religious belief to swear,
‘to swear’ would include “to
affirm”. An “affidavit” by
definition is “a written
statement in the name of a
person, called the deponent, by
whom it is voluntarily signed
and sworn
to or affirmed”. (See The
Dictionary of English Law by
Earl Jowitt). It is my
considered opinion that unless
an “affidavit” is sworn to or
affirmed, it is no affidavit and
cannot be used for any purpose;
it is not one of the defects
that can be cured under Order 38
rule 14, though the court may
ask that a valid affidavit be
filed in substitution. That
would be subject to whatever
objection parties may raise
against the filing of the
affidavit. On the other hand an
affidavit sworn to or affirmed
but which is without a proper
jurat can be corrected under
Order 38 rule 14. Rule 13 (1),
(2) and (3) provides—
(1) Where an affidavit is sworn
by any person who appears to the
officer taking the affidavit to
be illiterate or blind, the
officer shall certify in the
jurat that the affidavit was
read in his presence to the
deponent, that the deponent
seemed perfectly to understand
it, and that the deponent made
his signature in the presence of
the officer. No such affidavit
shall be used in evidence in the
absence of this certificate,
unless the court or a judge is
otherwise satisfied that the
affidavit was read over to and
appeared to be perfectly
understood by the deponent.
(2) Where the witness makes a
mark instead of signing, the
jurat shall state that fact, and
that the work was made in the
presence of the officer.
(3) When an affidavit is made in
any language not understood by
the deponent the officer shall
certify in the jurat that the
affidavit was interpreted to the
deponent in his own language;
that he seemed perfectly to
understand the nature and
purports thereof and that he
approved the contents of the
affidavit” (emphasis supplied).
The affidavit in support of the
application for review filed on
28th July, 1997, is said to have
been sworn to by Abusuapanin
Kofi Nsiah, an illiterate,
without the jurat containing the
fact of his being an illiterate;
the affidavit is therefore
defective. In the Appellant/
Respondent's affidavit in
support of application for
certiorari, the ‘affidavit’ was
not sworn to or affirmed. As I
have already commented on, such
a document cannot be taken as an
affidavit at all. It means
therefore that the application
for certiorari was filed without
the required accompanying
affidavit. This offends against
Rule 61 of the Supreme Court
Rules, 1996 (CI 16). As stated
before, subject to any objection
that the parties may arise this
court has power to ask that a
new affidavit be sworn to or
affirmed, out of time.
An impression has been created
that since the two affidavits
referred to above are equally or
similarly defective, this court
can, under Order 38 of the High
Court Rules correct the defects.
This is not correct! Since the
“affidavit” accompanying the
application for certiorari was
not sworn to, or affirmed, it
failed to be an affidavit; it
could not be corrected; it must
be thrown out. It would mean
that there was no affidavit
accompanying the application and
under normal circumstances, the
application should be struck
out. The court however in its
discretion may grant leave for a
fresh affidavit to be filed.
This is exactly what the court
did in this case.
On the other hand, the affidavit
in support of the application
for Review was sworn to; only
the jurat did not state that the
deponent was an illiterate. This
is what has been catered for by
Order 38 rule 13 of the High
Court Rules.
The Supreme Court judgment of
Opanin Kwaku Boakye etc. vs.
Manu in—Suit No. Ch. A 3/96
dated 16th April, 1997 of which
I had the privilege of
supporting the majority decision
read by Charles Hayfron-Benjamin
JSC., has been criticised. It
has been argued that since the
court held that a document
(including an affidavit) which
has been made by an illiterate
must contain in the jurat a
statement that the person making
the document was an illiterate,
otherwise it could not be used
in evidence, this court in the
instant case must deal in the
same manner with the affidavit
in support of the application
for review. It is rather
unfortunate that such an
interpretation should be put on
the statement by His Lordship,
Mr. Justice Hayfron-Benjamin.
In his opinion, Mr. Justice
Hayfron-Benjamin observed,
“In the instant appeal Exhibits
“A” and “B” did not satisfy the
requisite form and therefore
they could not be used in
evidence. In this category must
also be placed Exhibit “D” which
though written for a largely
illiterate group of persons did
not comply with the provision of
section 4 of Cap. 262. The
plaintiff contends that there
was evidence offered by his
witness that the requirements of
section 4 of Cap. 262 were
complied with. I have examined
the evidence of Mr. John Yaw
Gyamfi the writer of the
exhibits and I find nothing in
his evidence which indicates
that there was even any attempt
on the part of the plaintiff to
the effect that the witness was
aware of the requirements of
section 4 of the Ordinance”.
What does section 4 of Cap. 262
say? It states:
"4. Every person writing a
letter or other document for or
at the request of an illiterate
person, whether gratuitously or
for a reward, shall—
(1) Clearly and correctly read
over and explain such letter or
document or cause the same to be
read over and explained to the
illiterate person;
(2) Cause the illiterate person
to write his signature or make
his mark at the foot of the
letter or other document or to
touch the pen with which the
mark is made at the foot of the
letter or other document;
(3) Clearly write his full name
and address on the letter or
other document as writer
thereof; and
(4) State on the letter or other
document the nature and amount
of the reward, if any, charged
or taken or to be charged or
taken by him for writing the
said letter or other document,
and shall give a receipt for the
same and keep a counterfoil
thereof to be produced at the
request of any of the officers
named in section 6”.
On this statutory provision,
Justice Hayfron Benjamin said,
“Cap. 262 enjoins the writer on
behalf of an illiterate person
to comply with the formal
requirements on the face of the
letter or document. Thus a
person who receives or comes
across such letter or document
must on the face of letter or
document appreciate that the
provisions of the Ordinance have
been complied with. It is only
when the statutory requirements
of form have been satisfied that
a court or Tribunal may examine
the contents thereof. In my
respectful opinion a law for the
protection of an illiterate must
be strictly complied with
unless, in their absence, oral
evidence is admitted in proof of
due compliance. Whether or not
there has been substantial
compliance with the ordinance
must be dependent upon the view
which the Judge takes of the
relevant evidence after
examining the letter or
document”.
It is therefore not correct
that, His Lordship Justice
Hayfron-Benjamin, rejected those
exhibits merely because the
jurat or for that matter the
exhibits did not comply with the
requirements of Cap. 262. Cap.
262 like Order 38 rule 13
requires that where on the face
of the letter or document, the
jurat is defective, there must
be satisfactory evidence that
the affidavit was read over to
and appeared to be perfectly
understood by the deponent
otherwise, the letter or
document should be rejected.
This is exactly how His
Lordship, treated the said
documents; but he found no
satisfactory evidence that the
requirements have been complied
with; he therefore rejected the
documents. In the particular
circumstances of that case,
there was justification for the
rejection, since the documents
were being tendered against the
alleged author of those
documents. In the instant case,
the affidavit in support of the
application for review was being
used by the illiterate deponent
himself! It could therefore be
reasonably presumed that he knew
and understood the contents of
the affidavit before using it in
support of his own application.
There was thus some satisfactory
evidence upon which the court
could rely to correct the
defective affidavit. This cannot
be said of the unsworn
‘affidavit’!
The court has not taken kindly
to the conduct of the appellant
in bringing his application for
review on the ground that his
counsel having consented to the
filing of the fresh affidavit in
support of the application for
certiorari, it was not open to
the applicant to resile from
that consent and file an
application for review. I am not
unaware of the decisions of our
courts to hold fast to decisions
obtained from counsel for
parties who have consented to
orders or judgments of the court
on the ostensible authority of
the parties they represented. In
the instant case however, the
facts are different. On the
application for certiorari
coming up for hearing, counsel
for both sides had made
submissions to the court for
ruling upon and the matter had
been adjourned for ruling. On
the date for the ruling however,
having detected a ‘defect’ in
the affidavit in support of the
application, His Lordships had
repaired to their common room
and invited counsel on both
sides. The defect in the
affidavit was pointed out to
counsel and it was agreed that
the defaulters (the applicants)
be given leave to file a fresh
affidavit in support of their
application. In fact at that
stage there was no affidavit in
support of the application and
the motion should have been
struck out as incompetent.
Naturally when the judges and
counsel returned to the court
room, the applicant herein was
surprised at the turn of events;
he had a right to find out from
his counsel what had transpired
in chambers. Since his counsel
was, until he was invited to the
chambers, not aware of the
defect, it could not be said
that his client had given him
any authority to agree to
whatever was going on in
chambers. The position would
have been different if the
proceedings had taken place in
the open court where the parties
could have been told of what was
happening before the agreement.
In the circumstances, the
applicant (respondent in the
certiorari proceedings) was
entitled to question the conduct
of his counsel and to challenge
whatever decision had been taken
in chambers without his
involvement. Of course the court
has a discretion to refuse or
grant whatever application that
may be brought.
I have agreed to the refusal of
this application on the ground
only that since the substantive
application for certiorari
raises issues of public interest
and concern, this review
application not demonstrating
any exceptional circumstances
which had or is likely to
occasion a miscarriage of
justice, it is only proper that
it be dismissed to enable the
substantive application i.e. the
application for certiorari, to
be dealt with.
ADJABENG, J.S.C:
I agree with the opinion about
to be read by my learned
brother, Acquah, J.S.C., and I
have nothing useful to add.
ACQUAH, J.S.C.:
This is an application praying
this court to review its order
of 23rd July, 1997 which
directed the respondent herein
to file a sworn affidavit to
replace a unsworn one supporting
his motion for Certiorari. What
happened was that the
respondents herein, Atumfuwa
Kwadwo Bi and Asibour Boateng
Ababio, filed an application for
certiorari at this court to
quash a portion of a Kumasi High
Court’s ruling, striking out
three out of four reliefs, they
sought in Suit No. 15/96. The
application for certiorari
consisted of a motion paper, an
affidavit verifying the facts, a
statement and a number of
exhibits.
On service of the certiorari
application on the respondents
therein, the latter filed their
affidavit in opposition. On 22nd
April, 1997 this court ordered
the parties to file their
respective statements of case.
Thereafter the Court adjourned
to deliver its ruling. Several
adjournments followed. Later at
one of its sittings for ruling
on 23rd July, 1997 the court
discovered that the affidavit
supporting the application for
certiorari was not sworn. They
adjourned to 29th July, 1997. On
28th July 1997 the 2nd and 3rd
respondents in the certiorari
application, filed the instant
motion for a review of the order
granting leave on grounds that
once the affidavit was unsworn
it was a nullity and the court
could not therefore order a
sworn one to be filed. They
contended that their counsel
ought to have obtained their
consent before agreeing to the
filing of a sworn affidavit.
They set out the grounds of
their application for review in
paragraph 15 of their affidavit,
as follows:
“a. An unsworn affidavit is
useless in any proceedings and
cannot be countenanced in a
Court or Tribunal.
b. Since the Rules say that an
affidavit must accompany a
motion paper, it will be country
to law for a court to condone
such a clear breach of Rules by
allowing a subsequent sworn
affidavit to replace an unsworn
affidavit.
c. It will be contrary to public
policy for this Honourable Court
to permit unsworn affidavit to
be replaced by subsequently
sworn affidavits as the ripple
effect of such an order will be
that courts lower than this
Honourable Court may now
entertain unsworn affidavits.
d. If an affidavit is an
essential prerequisite to the
presentation of a party’s case,
the fact that the accompanying
affidavit is unsworn renders the
proceedings void and such
proceedings cannot be
countenanced by the Court.”
In their statement of case they
referred to rule 61(1) of C.I.
16 and contended that the
absence of a sworn affidavit in
support of the application for
certiorari rendered the
application “bad, incompetent
and incurably defective”. And
such a situation gives right to
the opposing party to ask that
the application be dismissed or
struck out. When the opposing
party’s counsel makes such an
application, he makes it on
behalf of his clients. And once
the client opts to have the
incompetent process dismissed
his counsel has to carry out his
wishes. Thus it was a serious
error for their counsel to have
consented to allow a late
affidavit to be filed in place
of the unsworn one. For if the
counsel had consulted them, they
would have definitely instructed
him to ask that the application
be dismissed as this court did
in the review application of
Opanyin Kwabena Boakye
substituted by John Osei vrs.
Francis Manu, 29th July 1997.
They contended that the consent
of their counsel had caused them
substantial injustice, hence
their application for review to
rescind the order of 23rd July,
1997 and dismiss the application
for certiorari as incompetent,
“for the application has been
argued so far on the basis of an
inadmissible affidavit, an
unsworn affidavit being wholly
void and of no legal effect.
Opposing the review application,
the respondents contended that
the unsworn affidavit was
neither useless nor void.
Neither was it incapable of
being replaced by a subsequent
sworn affidavit. Referring to
Order 38 rule 14 of the High
Court Civil Procedure Rules 1954
(L.N. 140A) they pointed out
that courts have wide
discretionary powers in
correcting any lapses in Civil
proceedings. They also pointed
out that the affidavit
supporting the review
application was thumbprinted,
yet there was no jurat
indicating that the contents of
the said affidavit were read
over, interpreted to the
deponent, and same understood by
him before thumbprinting it.
That affidavit was therefore
incompetent to support the
application for review.
Counsel for the applicants, Mr.
Ahenkorah conceded to the need
to have jurat in his affidavit,
and accordingly prayed for leave
to rectify the defect.
The present position therefore
is that the applicants for
review who are asking the court
to rescind its order in respect
of the unsworn affidavit, also
suffer from a defect in their
affidavit due to the absence of
a jurat. Indeed just as the
applicants herein seek to rely
on the review ruling in Kwabena
Boakye vrs. Francis Manu to have
the certiorari application
dismissed because of the unsworn
affidavit, the appeal judgment
in the same case delivered on
16th April, 1997 also forbids
their affidavit without a jurat
from being rectified. For since
on the face of their affidavit
it is clear that the deponent
was illiterate by thumbprinting
same, and since there is no
jurat on the said affidavit to
show that same was read over
interpreted to the illiterate
deponent, it is clear that the
said affidavit did not comply
with section 4 of the
illiterates Protection
Ordinance, Cap. 262.
Consequently same cannot be
used. Speaking on section 4 of
Cap. 262, C. Hayfron-Benjamin,
J.S.C. in Kwabena Boakye vrs.
Francis Manu. (16/4/97) said:
“In my respectful opinion the
provisions of section 4 of the
Illiterates Protection Ordinance
(Cap. 262) are mandatory and the
matters required to be complied
with must appear on the face of
the letter or documents.”
(emphasis mine)
He then went on:
“It is only when the statutory
requirements of form have been
satisfied that a court or
tribunal may examine the
contents thereof.”
On the strength of the above
authoritative statements from C.
Hayfron-Benjamin, J.S.C., the
applicants affidavit lacking
jurat is certainly as defective
as the respondents unsworn
affidavit.
And the applicants description
of the unsworn affidavit as void
would not put their defective
affidavit in any better position
than the respondents unsworn
one.
Now rule 61(1) and (2) of C.I.
16 requires that an application
to invoke the supervisory
jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court must consist of:
i. Motion on notice as in
form 29
ii. A copy of the decision
complained of
iii. An affidavit, and
iv. Statement of the
applicant’s case.
Of course by an affidavit is
meant a duly sworn affidavit.
Since the affidavit supporting
the certiorari was unsworn, it
meant that same was incapable of
satisfying that requirement,
resulting in non-compliance with
rule 61(1) of C.I. 16. And to
determine the effect of this
non-compliance, one has to
examine the provisions of this
same C.I. 16 and not to indulge
in any theorisation on void and
nullity. For even Lord Denning
who in the 1960’s in Macfoy vrs.
U.A.C. Ltd. (1961) 3 All E.R.
1169 and R. vrs. Paddington
Valuation Officer ex parte:
Peachey Property Corporation
Ltd. (1966) 1 QB. 380, took the
view that the so-called void
acts or decisions were incurably
bad and could not be rectified,
later on in life conceded that
such view was not free from
logical difficulties. He
appreciated that there were
certain situations where a court
has even a discretion whether to
quash a void order.
For, as he explained at page 77
of this book: Discipline of Law:
“Much work may have been done in
pursuance of the void order.
Many persons may have acted on
it in the belief that it is
good.”
Thus in Lovelock vrs. Minister
of Transport (1980) 40P & CR
Lord Denning said:
“I have got tired of all this
discussion about “void” and
“voidable”. It seems to me to be
a matter of words—of
semantics—and that is all. The
plain fact is that, even if such
a decision as this is ‘void’ or
a ‘nullity’ it remains in being
unless and until some steps are
taken before the courts to have
it declared void”
This is clearly a retraction
from his 1960s pronouncements.
Indeed courts may in some
situations refuse to declare
such decisions and acts void, as
explained by Prof. Wade at page
352 of his book, Administrative
Law, thus:
“The order may be hypothetically
a nullity, but the court may
refuse to quash it because of
the plaintiff’s lack of
standing, because he does not
deserve a discretionary remedy,
because he has waived his
rights, or for some other legal
reason. In any such case the
“void” order remains effective
and is in reality, valid.”
Now in respect of the unsworn
affidavit, how does C.I. 16
treat such non-compliance? Does
it give the court a discretion,
or does the non compliance
automatically nullify the
application? Rule 79 of C.I. 16
provides:
“Where a party to any
proceedings before the court
fails to comply with any
provision of these Rules or with
the terms of any order or
direction given or with any rule
of practice or procedure
directed to determined by the
court, the failure to comply
shall be a bar to further
prosecution of proceedings
unless the court considers that
the non-compliance should be
waived.”
This rule 79 is the same as rule
66 of C.I. 13 except that the
words “was not willful and that
in the interest of justice the
non-compliance” which appeared
in rule 66 no longer appear in
rule 79 of C.I. 16. The scope of
this rule in respect of the
Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction had been expounded
in Darke IX vrs. Darke IV
(1984-86) 1 GLR 481 at 489 per
Adade, J.S.C. Patu-Styles vrs.
Amoo-Lamptey (1984-86) 2 GLR 148
and Sandema Naa vrs. Asangalisa
(1996-97) SC. GLR 302. These
cases establish that for this
court to deal with a
non-compliance in any appeal
proceedings, an appeal must have
been lodged in this court. That
is, a notice of appeal to this
court must have at least been
filed—rule 8 (3) of C. I. 16.
It is clear from the language of
rule 79 of C.I. 16 that
non-compliance with any rule in
C. I. 16, like the instant one
of failing to file a sworn
affidavit, is a bar to further
prosecution of the proceedings
except where this court decides
to waive the said
non-compliance. Rule 79 does not
employ the words “void”
“voidable”, “nullity”,
“irregularity” or “defect”. Thus
in each case of non-compliance
of whatever degree and nature,
the decision to waive or not to
waive lies with the Court. And
since this is more an exercise
of the court discretion, the
court would naturally take into
consideration the circumstances
surrounding the inability to
comply with the particular rule
in question, the nature of the
non-compliance and other
relevant factors necessary to
enable a fair and judicious
exercise of that discretion. And
of course once this is an
exercise of discretion, each
non-compliance would be decided
in accordance with its own
peculiar circumstances. Thus the
fact that in X situation, the
court refused to waived the
non-compliance does not mean
that in another situation based
on different circumstances, the
court should refuse to waive the
non-compliance. Otherwise it
ceases to be an exercise of
discretion. I am aware that in
an identical provision in Order
70 rule 1 of L.N. 140A, a number
of decided cases had established
that where the non-compliance
goes to the root of the action,
as opposed to a mere
irregularity, such
non-compliance renders the
proceedings void and cannot be
validated. Thus Taylor, J.S.C.
in Amoakoh vrs: Hansen (1987-88)
2 GLR 26 at 37: referring to
Order 70 rule 1 of L.N. 140A
said:
“If however it is an
irregularity that goes to the
root of the trial and fouls the
springs of the judicial process
and thus disabling the machinery
of the law from advancing the
course of justice then … the
whole proceedings is void and a
nullity…”
But the point here is that the
decision that a particular
non-compliance goes to the root
of the action and thereby
renders the proceedings a
nullity, is that of the court,
and not the party to the action.
And the court arrives at such a
decision after considering all
the relevant facts, statutory
rules and the surrounding
circumstances. And when so
satisfied, declares same void.
In my view rule 79 of C.I. 16
avoids the use of the words
“void, irregularity, defective,
and nullity” and rather uses the
word “non-compliance” in order
to enable the court do more
substantial justice to each case
having regard to its peculiar
circumstances. Thus in the
instant case, the applicant’s
submission that they are seeking
this review because this court
erred in granting leave for a
leave for a fresh sworn
affidavit to be files in place
of the unsworn affidavit since
the unsworn affidavit was void
and of no legal effect, is not
justified by any rule in C.I.
16. As already stated what C.I.
16 does is to give power to the
Court in rule 79 in respect of
any defect or non-compliance of
a matter within its
jurisdiction, to decide whether
to terminate the proceedings
because of that defect or to
waive it. C.I. 16 does not under
rule 79, forbid particular types
of non-compliance from being
waived.
In the instant case, the court
by granting leave for a fresh
affidavit to be filed, waived
the non-compliance arising from
the unsworn affidavit. And the
proper issue to consider
therefore is whether the court
had power under C.I. 16 to waive
that non-compliance by granting
leave.
The undisputed facts about this
application are that when the
applicants herein were served
with the motion and other papers
including the unsworn affidavit
for certiorari, they files their
affidavit and other papers
opposing the certiorari
application. Thereafter, they
filed their statement of case in
obedience to the court’s order,
and relied on their papers at
the hearing of the motion. None
of the parties discovered that
the affidavit supporting the
certiorari application was
unsworn. The parties and the
court all proceeded in the
genuine belief that the
affidavit was sworn. On these
facts and circumstances, it is
obvious that the most sensible
and judicious exercise of
discretion under rule 79 of C.I.
16 was to waive the
non-compliance, and allow the
situation to be regularised.
The applicants contend that the
injustice they suffered was the
right to insist, on the
discovery of the fact that the
affidavit was unsworn, that the
application be dismissed. But it
is one thing to insist that the
application be dismissed and
another thing for the court to
decide whether they would accede
to that request. On the fact,
the exercise of that right would
not have resulted in the
dismissal of the application, as
the non-swearing of the
affidavit was evidently more the
result of an oversight than a
deliberate act non-compliance.
Having regard to the
circumstances of this case, it
is evident that this Court
exercised its discretion under
rule 79 of C.I. 16 judiciously
in granting leave for a sworn
affidavit to be filed. And since
rule 79 does not draw a
distinction between void and
voidable non-compliance, but
rather gives power to waive or
not to waive any non-compliance
within its jurisdiction, it
would be erroneous for the
applicants herein to contend in
effect, that the unsworn
affidavit was a defect which
this Court has no power to grant
leave to rectify. Our procedural
rules have gone a long way in
freeing this court from the
clutches of pointless
technicalities. The tendency now
is to look at the substance of
the case and to ensure that
substantial justice is done on
the merits within the four
corners of the procedural rules.
Of course where parties and
their counsel exhibit deliberate
and reckless non-compliance of
the rules, sometimes with a view
to over reach their opponents,
the court's discretion would not
be exercised in their favour.
In conclusion, I am of the
opinion that the application for
review should be refused as it
is evident from the language of
rule 79 of C.I. 16 that the
unsworn affidavit resulting in
the non-compliance of rule 61(1)
thereof did not automatically
render the application for
certiorari “bad, incompetent and
incurably defective” as
contended by the applicants for
review. For the court has a
discretion under the said rule
79 to waive such non-compliance.
And this is what the court did
by granting the leave on 23rd
July, 1997.
ATUGUBA, J.S.C.:
As to the question whether
counsel for the interested
parties/applicants had authority
to consent to leave being
granted by this Court to the
applicants/ respondents, to
remedy the unsworn affidavit,
the answer ought upon settled
authority, to be in the
affirmative. It is contended
that he needed the authority of
his clients so to do. To which I
say, counsel had jurisdiction
qua counsel at common Law so to
do without recourse to his
client.
In BAIDEN v. SOLOMON (1963) 1
GLR 488 S.C, to a contention
that counsel for the defendant
had no authority to concede the
issue of negligence without the
defendant's instructions to that
effect, Crabbe J.S.C. as he was,
Ollennu J.S.C. and Akufo-Addo
J.S.C. as he then was,
concurring held at page 493 as
follows:
“A counsel instructed to appear
ought to have full control over
the case and conduct it
throughout to the best of his
ability.”
“The duty of counsel”, said Lord
Esher M.R. in Matthews v.
Munster,
“is to advise his client out of
court and to act for him in
court, and until his authority
is withdrawn, he has, with
regard to all matters that
properly relate to the conduct
of the case, unlimited power to
do that which is best for his
client” (emphasis supplied)
Continuing further down he said:
“It seems to me that one of the
limits on this general authority
of counsel is that he had no
power to bind the client on
matters collateral to the issues
in the suit, unless the client
expressly assents. See Swinten
v. Lord Chelmsford, per Pollock
C. B.”
This statement of the law has
enjoyed sustained application up
to date. See IN RE ARTHUR
[DECEASED], ABAKAH v.
ATTAH-HAGAN (1972) 1 GLR 435
C.A. at 441 per Azu Crabbe
J.S.C. (as he was), GWIRA v.
STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION
[1984-86] 1 GLR 132 C.A. and
POMAA v. FOSUHENE [1987-88] 1
GLR 244 S.C.
The question of remedying the
unsworn affidavit in this case
was one that properly related to
the proper conduct of the case
and was not collateral, it
stemming from the heart of the
application before the court. It
was strenuously argued by both
counsel before us as to whether
an unsworn affidavit renders an
application for certiorari
before this court null and void.
Rule 79 of the Rules of this
court, 1996, C.I. 16 provides:
“Where a party to any
proceedings before the court
fails to comply with any
provision of these Rules or with
the terms of any order or
direction given or with any rule
of practice or procedure
directed or determined by the
Court, the failure to comply
shall be a bar to further
prosecution of proceedings
unless the Court considers that
the non-compliance should be
waived.”
At first blush this rule would
seem to make all forms of
non-compliance with the rules a
matter of discretionary waiver
for this court. But it is a well
settled rule of law that where a
proceeding is fundamentally
defective, the same is a
nullity. The celebrated case of
MOSI v. BAGYINA (1963) 1 GLR 337
S.C. and several subsequent
others such as FAH v. BEDIATUO
II (1964) GLR 468, SEYIRE v.
ANEMANA (1971) 2 GLR 35 C.A.,
ARMAR v. ARMAR (1969) C.C. 73
C.A., OMANE v. POKU (1973) 2 GLR
66 C.A. CLERK v. CLERK (1976) 1
GLR 123 C.A. accept this
principle. It is true that some
judges here and in England have
sometimes shifted positions on
the validity of the distinction
between what is a nullity and
what is only voidable, but the
principle is too well
established to suffer
abrogation.
It is common knowledge that the
cases 1 have just alluded to
supra relate to the proper
construction of O. 70 r.1 of the
High Court Civil Procedure
Rules, 1954, L.N. 140A which
provides as follows:
“1. Non-compliance with any of
these Rules, or with any rule of
practice for the time being in
force, shall not render any
proceedings void unless the
Court or a Judge shall so
direct, but such proceedings may
be set aside either wholly or in
part as irregular, or amended,
or otherwise dealt with in such
manner and upon such terms as
the Court or Judge shall think
fit."
Despite this wide discretion it
has been well settled as stated
by Azu Crabbe J. A. (as he then
was) in SEYIRE v. ANEMANA,
(supra) at p.47 that:
“The application of Order 70, r.
1 to any particular case depends
upon whether or not the
proceeding is a nullity or a
mere irregularity. If the
procedural blunder is a nullity
then Order 70, r.1 does not
apply.”(e.s.)
The distinction between what is
a nullity and what is voidable
is copiously indulged in by our
courts, and in relation to rule
66(1) of the old Supreme Court
Rules, 1970 C.I. 13 which is
almost identical with the
current r. 79 of C.I. 16 this
court has held in DARKE IX v.
DARKE IV (1984-86) 1 GLR 481
S.C. that an appeal filed out of
time is a nullity to which rule
66, aforesaid does not apply.
See also PATU-STYLES v.
AMOO-LAMPTEY [1984-86] 1 GLR 481
S.C., KHOURY v. MITCHUAL
(1989-90) 2 GLR 256 S.C. In
SANDEMNAB vr. ASANGALISA
[1996-97] S.C. GLR 302 my
brother Acquah J.S.C. (Edward
Wiredu, Amua-Sekyi, Amuah and
Sophia Akuffo JJ.S.C.
concurring) stated at page 311
that
“…… in Darke IX v. Darke IV
....... The scope of this rule
66(1) was explained (as stated
in the headnote, holding (3) as
follows:
“Case Law on the interpretation
and application of rule 66 of
C.I 13 had crystallised along
the lines that the court’s
discretion under rule 66 was to
be exercised when the appeal
itself could be said to be
properly pending before the
court and the court had
jurisdiction to deal with it.
That meant that the appeal must
have been filed timeously and
where applicable, the requisite
leave had been obtained. But
where the appeal was filed out
of time or otherwise suffered
from a fundamental and radical
defect which went to the very
roots of the appeal, then
notionally there was nothing
before the court with respect to
which the court might exercise
any discretion at all.” (e.s.)
It is therefore clear that in
certain circumstances
non-compliance with a rule of
C.I. 16 may be so fundamental as
to render rule 79 thereof
inapplicable. In this regard the
test for nullity vel non adopted
by Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then
was) in SHARDEY v. ADAMTEY AND
SHARDEY v. MARTEY,
[CONSOLIDATED] (1972) 2 GLR 380
at 390 C.A. based on the
substantially similar provisions
of 0.70 of the High Court Civil
Procedure Rules, 1954, L.N.
140A, would be useful. His
Lordship said:
“The problem in this case really
turns on the answers to two
questions. First, is the notice
of motion a nullity which is
incurable, or is it a defective
notice whose defect can be cured
by amendment?.......”
Continuing at page 391 he said:
“In Re Pritchard; Pritchard v.
Deacon (1963) Ch. 502 Upjohn
L.J. said at pp. 523-524:
“I do not think that the earlier
cases or the later dicta upon
them prevent me from saying
that, in my judgment, the law
when properly understood is that
Order 70 applies to all defects
in procedure unless it can be
said that the defect is
fundamental to the proceedings.
A fundamental defect will make
it a nullity. The court should
not readily treat a defect as
fundamental and so a nullity,
and should be anxious to bring
the matter within the umbrella
of Order 70 when justice can be
done as a matter of discretion,
still bearing in mind that many
cases must be decided in favour
of the party entitled to
complain of the defect ex debito
justitiae. Lord Denning in
Macfoy ([1962] A.C. 152, 160
P.C.) pointed out that a useful
test was whether the defect
could be waived. I agree with
that as a good common sense
test, but I also agree with Mr.
Rubin that it cannot be a
completely legal test, for until
you have decided whether the
proceeding is a nullity, you
cannot decide whether it is
capable of waiver. The
authorities do establish one or
two classes of nullity such as
the following. There may be
others, though for my part I
would be reluctant to see much
extension of the classes. (1)
Proceedings which ought to have
been served but have never come
to the notice of the defendant
at all. This, of course, does
not include cases of substituted
service, or service by filing in
default, or cases where service
has properly been dispensed
with: see for example, Whitehead
v. Whitehead (orse Vasbore)
[1962] 3 WLR 884, C.A. (ii)
Proceedings which have never
started at all owing to some
fundamental defect in issuing
the proceedings, (iii)
Proceedings which appear to be
duly issued but fail to comply
with a statutory requirement;
see, for example Finnegan vr.
Cementation Co. Ltd. [1953] 1
Q.B688. Now for the argument on
this particular point. The whole
question is whether the
originating summons has been
issued or not”.
I think that the present
application fails within
category (ii) of Upjohn L.J.’s
classification, and that the
proceedings in this case had not
been commenced at all owing to a
fundamental defect. This court
cannot entertain an application
under rule 28, until it is shown
by the applicant (1) that he had
made a similar application to
the court below and (ii) that
his application was refused.
These are two conditions
precedent to the exercise of
this court’s jurisdiction in any
proceedings under rule 28, and
unless these are satisfied the
commencement of proceedings
pursuant to that rule would be a
nullity.
... the commencement of any
proceedings which is not
warranted by any law or rule of
procedure is void and is a
nullity.” (e.s)
For completeness I will add that
Azu Crabbe J.S.C. (as he then
was) in his dissenting judgment,
was construing rule 28 of the
old Court of Appeal Rules, 1962
(L.I. 218), as amended by the
Court of Appeal (amendment)
rules, 1969 (L.I. 618) which
provided that:
“28. Subject to the provisions
of these rules and to any other
enactment, where under any
enactment an application may be
made either to the Court below
or to the Court it shall be made
in the first instance to the
court below, but if the Court
below refuses to grant the
application, the applicant shall
be entitled to have the
application determined by the
court.”
His Lordship’s judgment
demonstrates also that the
distinction between proceedings
which are a nullity and those
that can be waived or cured was
applicable to the old Court of
Appeal Rules also and points to
the universality of that rule of
law, in the common law tradition
(subject of course to extremely
explicit provisions to the
contrary). As Ollennu J.S.C.,
delivering the judgment of the
Supreme Court said in MENSAH vs.
NSOWAH (1964) GLR 288 S.C. at
297, silence in the wording of a
rule of court “is no
justification for violating a
well established rule of
practice which is now a rule of
law”. His Lordship was
commenting on the necessity of
notice to the other side of an
application for extension of
time even though the Native
Courts (Ashanti) Procedure
Rules, made no provision for
such notice.
I will summarise the principles
relating to r. 79 of C.I. 16 as
I see them thus:
(1) where the proceedings suffer
from a fundamental defect they
are not within the purview of
rule 79, and cannot be waived,
though such instances must be
very rare.
(2) Where the proceedings suffer
from a curable defect then
non-compliance with any of the
rules can be waived at the
discretion of the court.
Waiver is not automatic. See
NYANTAKYIWA vs. KISSI (1982-83)
GLR 480 S.C. where Charles
Crabbe J.S.C. in dealing with
the power of the court to waive
non-compliance with the old
Rules of this court in C.I. 13
under rule 66 thereof stated at
page 488 as follows:
“The rule in my view, demands an
objective test. The competing
and conflicting rights of both
parties need to be considered.
But in the light of an higher
ideal. That consideration does
not depend upon the personal
equation of either of the
parties. It depends upon
standards devoid of personal
conveniences.............”
(3) Where the defect in
procedure can be waived the
waiver may take the form of
ignoring the defect simpliciter
and continuing with the
proceedings. In DARKE IX vrs.
DARKE IV [1984-86] 1 GLR 481
S.C. the court simply overlooked
the defect of absence of a
motion, properly formulated.
(4) The waiver may also take the
form of allowing the defaulting
party to remedy the defect, by
filing the requisite proceeding,
see HARLLEY vs. EJURA FARMS
(GHANA) LTD (1977) 2 GRL 1974
C.A (full bench), A.S. NORWAY
CEMENT EXPORT LTD. V. ADDISON
(1974) 2 G.L.R. 177 C.A (full
bench).
(5) It may also take the form of
amendment.
Applying the above principles,
which are by no means
exhaustive, to the present case
it cannot be said that the
absence of a properly sworn
supporting affidavit is so
fundamental that the application
can be said not to have been
commenced at all. IN THE
REPUBLIC vs. GA TRADITIONAL
COUNCIL, EX PARTE DAMANLEY
(1980) GLR 609 Mensa Boison J
was faced with an objection in
limine against the grant of
leave to apply for certiorari
because there was “as put by the
respondent counsel, no affidavit
in the true sense”, as required
by Order 59 r. 2(3;) of L.N.
140A. At page 260 his Lordship
distinguished the case of State
vs. Asentehene’s Divisional
Court B1; Ex Parte, Kusada
[1963] 2 GRL 238 S.C, where a
similar objection succeeded. His
Lordship said:
“Beyond that point as to what is
intended by an “affidavit” in
Order 59, r. 2(2), the case of
Ex Parte Kusada (supra) is
distinguishable from the facts
of the case in hand. In Kusada’s
case there was neither a
statement nor affidavit because
there was no motion filed as the
application was oral So that
there was no attempt at
compliance with the rule. In the
instant case, there is a motion
filed with a statement,... so
that here one is faced with what
is really a defect in practice,
rather than outright failure to
comply with the Rule”. (e.s.)
His Lordship overruled the
objection holding that the
absence of 'the requisite
affidavit was not on the facts
of the case, “concealment or
misstatement of the facts”.
Again in REPUBLIC vs. BEKWAI
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, GRADE 1; EX
PARTE GYAMFI (1981) GLR 388
Quashie-Sam J, (as he then was)
faced with a similar objection
held at p.391 as follows:
“I would not rank a statutory
statement as required under the
rules with an affidavit and
exhibits, which, as counsel for
the respondent has rightly
pointed out, are ancillary and
merely verifying the facts
relied on in such applications.
The two must be distinguished.”
His Lordship however, held that
under the rules the statutory
statement was an indispensable
requirement the absence of which
vitiated the leave granted to
apply for certiorari. That
aspect has been disputed
elsewhere, but we are here
dealing with the requirement of
an affidavit not a statement. It
is important to point out that
the Rules under 0.59, r.2(2) of
L.N. 140A governing an
application for leave to apply
for certiorari are substantially
the same as those of rule
61(1)(2), of the Rules of this
court (C.I.16) which are as
follows:
“61 (1) An application seeking
to invoke the supervisory
jurisdiction of the court under
article 132 of the Constitution
shall be by motion on notice as
specified in the Form 29 set out
in Part IV of the Schedule to
these Rules and shall be filed
with a copy of the decision
against which the application is
sought and accompanied by an
affidavit.
(2) The notice of motion shall
be accompanied by a statement of
the applicant’s case based upon
the reliefs sought and the
grounds of the application.”
By comparison, as stated by
Mensa Boison J, in the Damanley
case, at p.619 “ORDER 59, R.
2(2) of LN. 140A, ... requires
that the application for leave
ex parte “shall be accompanied
by a statement setting out the
name and description of the
applicant, the relief sought,
and the grounds on which it is
sought, and by an affidavit
verifying the facts relied on.”
It is pertinent to remark that
even though rule 61(1) of C.I.
16 requires an application to be
accompanied by an affidavit the
opposite party is enjoined by
rule 64(1) only to react to the
applicant's statement of his
case. Rule 63 provides:
“63. The Registrar shall, as
soon as practicable after the
filing of the applicant's
statement of case cause copies
of the statement of case
together with a copy of the
notice of motion to be served on
the respondent and any other
interested party.
“64. A party upon whom an
applicant's statement of case is
served shall if he intends to
oppose the application, within
fourteen days of the service, or
within such time as the court
upon terms may direct, file a
statement of his case in answer
to the applicant’s statement.”
I will therefore like Mensa
Boison J, (as he then was) in
the Ex Parte Damanley case
(supra) and Quashie-Sam J, (as
he then was) in the Ex Parte
Gyamfi case supra, deny any
superintendent charismatic
status to an accompanying
affidavit the absence of which
vitiates an application under r.
61 of C.I. 16.
Having regard to the similarity
between 0.70 of L.N. 140 A, r.
66(1) of the old rules of this
Court under C.I. 13 and r. 79 of
C.I. 16 and the construction the
first two have received, the
case of CLERK vs. CLERK (1976) 1
GLR 123 C.A. should help counsel
to fix his tackle when minded to
take procedural objections in
limine. In that case, as appears
in the headnote, W. appealed
against a decree of divorce
granted H. under the English
Divorce Reform Act, 1969, s.
2(1) (e) on grounds that the
petition was signed not by H.
but by his solicitor, and that
even though the petition was
amended by substitution of H.’s
signature for that of the
solicitor, the amendment was
filed out of time, thus the
whole proceedings should be
declared null and void. Between
pages 124-125 Francois J.A.
delivering the judgment of the
court said; “The argument under
first limb is not novel. A
similar view as that pressed by
counsel was raised and
thoroughly discredited by this
court in Armar vs. Armar, Court
of Appeal 21 April 1969,
unreported; digested, in (1969)
C.C. 73. Upon almost identical
facts this court held that a
petitioners failure to sign a
petition was not a defect which
could not be remedied by
invoking Order 70 of the High
Court (Civil Procedure) Rules,
1954 (L.N. 140A). In that case
Amissah J.A. delivering the
judgment of the court said, “In
my view whether a defect is
fundamental or not depends on
all the circumstances of the
case; prejudice to the other
party being an important
consideration”.
Amissah J.A. saw no objection to
the petition being amended “by
the substitution of the
signature of the petitioner for
that of his solicitor which has
erroneously been subscribed”. We
respectfully endorse this view;
and add that in the present case
we see no evidence of
disadvantage occasioned by the
irregularity, nor the erosion of
natural justice; see also Omane
vs. Poku [1973] 2 GLR 66 at P.
71 C.A.
As to the second limb of her
complaint relating to the
tardiness in filing the
amendment, the record shows that
the appellant participated fully
in the hearing below. She made
no pretence of invoking Order
28, r. 7 or 4 to disallow the
amendment when the period had
lapsed. We think it is too late
in the day to complain.
If the amended petition is
thrown overboard the appellant
would still have to contend with
the original petition which
would be legally resuscitated”.
It will be seen that these
holdings could be described as a
radical attitude of the courts
against arguments claiming
nullity in respect of procedural
lapses. But an escape from the
sanction of nullity is no
comprehensive insurance for a
defaulting party.
In one respect, r.79 of C.I. 16
differs form 0.70 of L.N. 140A.
For r.79 holds that prima facie
a breach of the rules of this
court “shall be a bar to further
prosecution of proceedings” but
has a saving grace, namely,
“unless the Court considers that
the non-compliance should be
waived”. Rule 79 therefore comes
to the rescue of a defaulting
party where very good reasons
are given for a breach of rules
of this court. It is therefore
in line with the tenor of r. 79
of C.I. 16 to attend a pardon
for breach of the rules with
sanctions, costs being one of
the obvious sanctions one can
readily think of.
In conclusion however, having
regard to all that I have said
supra, the unsworn affidavit in
the proceedings under review was
not a defect in limine but a
curable defect which this court
waived in an atmosphere of
mutual consensus of counsel on
both sides in which they, with
legal authority qua counsel,
rightly basked.
It follows that there being no
error in the course pursued by
this court in its order dated
the 23rd day of July 1997
against which this application
for review has been brought, the
applicant has not satisfied the
customary requirements of the
review jurisdiction of this
court and I will also dismiss
the same.
MS. S. AKUFFO, J.S.C.:
For the reasons given by my
brother Acquah, J.S.C. I also
agree that the application be
refused.
COUNSEL
Mr. Ahenkorah with Danso
Acheampong for the Applicant.
Mr. Prince Neequaye holding
Adumua-Bossman’s brief for the
Respondent. |