JUDGMENT
MRS. JOYCE BAMFORD-ADDO J.S.C.:
This is an appeal against the
unanimous decision of the Court
of Appeal dated 18th January
1996 affirming the judgment of
the High Court dated 15th
September 1993 granting an order
of mandamus against the Lands
Commission.
The Respondents in this appeal
acquired a leasehold interest in
a large tract of land from the
James Town Stool on the Winneba
Road known as Korkor Dzor, by an
indenture dated 28th September
1973 and registered as L.R. No.
374/78. This document is marked
Exhibit 'A' in the Record of
Proceedings. The grant was made
by Nii Adja Kwao II in his
capacity as James Town Mantse
with the consent and concurrence
of the accredited elders and
received the concurrence of the
Appellant Lands Commission, the
body statutorily empowered by
Act 123 of 1962 to give due
concurrence to all grants of
Stool Lands and record them in
their books. In 1974 the said
Chief was destooled by the
National Chieftaincy Tribunal
which declared that his
enstoolment was null and void.
In view of this the Respondents
were prevailed upon to
renegotiate another grant with
Nii Okpe III on 28th July 1976
for the same piece of land for
yet another valuable
consideration. The 2nd indenture
covering this second grant was
marked Exhibit 'E' which was
submitted to the Lands
Commission for a fresh
concurrence but was refused. The
Appellants by letter marked
Exhibit 'C' dated 7th February
1990 wrote to the Respondents as
regards Exhibit 'A' as follows:
"Dear Sir,
ADMINISTRATION OF LANDS ACT 1962
DOCUMENT NO .A.C. 8780/73
Reference is hereby made to the
above-mentioned document to
which concurrence has been
granted by the Lands Commission.
It is observed that the above
grant was made by Nii Adja Kwao
II who was adjudged never to
have been a chief. This being
the case all grants made by him
in his purported capacity as
James Town Mantse, are in law
null and void.
An application has therefore
been placed before the Lands
Commission to have the
transaction expunged from the
records of this Secretariat.
You are therefore being informed
of this intention.
Yours faithfully
For Executive Secretary
Vanderpuye Orgle Estates
Accra."
The Respondents protested by
letter from their Solicitor but
this protest was met with a
negative result and he
eventually applied to the High
Court for an order of mandamus
to compel the Appellant to
restore to its books and
property records the deed of
lease Exhibit 'A' which
Appellants were intended to
expunge from their records. The
application was granted by the
High Court and the Appellant
appealed to the Court of Appeal
but that court dismissed the
Appeal which resulted in this
present appeal to this court.
A number of grounds of appeal
were filed but in my view two of
them are relevant and would
dispose of this appeal. I will
therefore deal these two
grounds.
Ground one is
a. That the Court of Appeal
misdirected itself on the effect
of the judgment of the
Chieftaincy Tribunal of the
National House of Chiefs
declaring the enstoolment and
installation of Nii Adja Kwao II
as null and void.
b. The Court of Appeal erred in
holding that the acts of Nii
Adja Kwao II ought to bind the
James Town Stool.
c. The Court of Appeal erred in
holding that the grant by Nii
Adja Kwao II to the Respondent
was valid.
Ground 2 states that
"The provisions of Act 123,
having imposed a duty on the
Minister vis-a-vis the Lands
Commission to grant concurrence
to disposition of stool lands,
and having further set out
remedies or reliefs on a refusal
for aggrieved parties
thereunder, the court erred in
granting mandamus as the
existence of specific statutory
reliefs in respect of duty
obligations under statute
precludes the granting of
prerogative orders including
mandamus" Ground I a, b, and c
would be dealt with together.
Nii Adja Kwao II was installed a
chief in 1959 and Gazetted in
the Ghana Gazette Extraordinary
No. 69 published by authority
and dated 1st August 1959, as a
chief entitled to perform
customary and statutory
functions.
L.N. 201, James Town Mantse
Recognition Order 1959 stated as
follows:
"The enstoolment of Samuel Eric
Golightly Odartei Thompson,
otherwise Nii Adja Kwao II as
James Town Mantse is recognised
and any person failing to
recognise Mr. Samuel Eric
Golightly Odartei Thompson
otherwise Nii Adja Kwao II as
enstooled James Town Mantse
commits an offence against the
Chiefs recognition Act 1959, and
shall be liable accordingly.
Made in Accra this 1st day of
August 1959
A.E.A. OFORI ATTA
MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS".
The installation of the said
Mantse having received
Government recognition as
indicated above made his
installation at the time
properly valid and he was held
out as the lawful representative
of the James Town Stool with
capacity to act on behalf of the
stool.
The argument of Appellant is
that once the nomination and
installation and enstoolment of
Nii Adja Kwao II in 1959 was
later declared null and void by
the National House of Chiefs in
a destoolment proceedings in
1983 it follows that he was
never a James Town Mantse, his
acts cannot bind the James Town
Stool and therefore that Exhibit
'A' is null and void. Appellant
relied on the decisions in Mcfoy
vs. UAC Limited 1962 AC 152 and
Moshie vs. Bagyina (1963) 1 GLR
337 which decided that where an
act is void and is a nullity
every proceedings or thing which
is founded on it is also void.
This is a general principle
which does not affect land and
is inappropriate in this case
where Exhibit 'A' would be shown
not to be void but valid. But as
stated earlier Nii Adja Kwao
II's installation in 1959 was
not void when he was duly
recognised a chief of James Town
by the then Government. Further,
a reigning chief is the agent of
the stool he occupies while he
remains on that stool see Ababio
vs. Tutu (1962) 1 GLR 489 which
held that a stool is a
corporation sole, a legal entity
which is represented by the
reigning chief.
See also Quarm vs. Yankah II and
Another (1930) 1 WACA 80 at 83
which was cited in the Ababio
vs. Tutu case supra, wherein
Deane C.J. at p.83 had this to
say
".... Since the conception of
the stool that is and has always
been accepted in the courts of
this colony is that it is an
entity which never dies, a
corporation sole like the crown
and that while the occupants of
the stool may come and go stools
go on for ever. When therefore
the Respondent is sued as
representing the stool since he
is the present occupant he is
not sued as the successor of the
previous holder but only as the
person for the time being
representing something that has
never changed he is in fact the
agent through whom the stool
acts at present while the
former chief was the agent
through whom it formerly acted."
If Nii Adja Kwao II was the
agent of the stool in 1959 and
acted on behalf of the stool
then he had capacity to act for
the stool at the time Exhibit
'A' was made in 1973 and his
acts would bind the stool. In
such case the disposition of
land made to Respondent cannot
be said to be void and therefore
Moshie vs. Bagyina in the
circumstances of is no authority
in support the Appellant's
argument contained in his ground
of appeal. Exhibit 'A' was
validly made by Nii Adja Kwao II
in 1973 and as agent of the
stool. Exhibit 'A' binds the
James Town Stool and is
therefore valid.
Amankwah vs. Kyere (1963) GLR.
409 also shows that once a chief
has been duly and properly
installed chief and recognised
by Government as such he has
authority and capacity in law to
enter into an agreement binding
upon the stool. In that case it
was held in holding (3) that
"a stool is a corporation sole
and provided the occupant has
been elected and installed in
accordance with law and custom a
person contracting in good faith
with the stool is entitled to
his remedies should the contract
later be abrogated. Even where
the appointments of a stool
occupant is later invalidated
his contracts are not thereby
invalidated." (underscoring
mine)
On these I hold that while Nii
Adja Kwao II was occupying the
James Town Stool he had capacity
to dispose of stool land and his
later destoolment would not
invalidate the valid disposition
made by him in respect of
Exhibit 'A' which binds the
James Town Stool. Another reason
for my view is that even if
Exhibit were void which is
denied, the doctrine of a bona
fide purchaser for value would
apply. The doctrine is laid down
in Mercantile Investment and
General Trust Company vs. River
Plate Trust Loan Agency Co.
(1894) 1 Ch. 578 which states as
follows:
"A purchaser of land cannot be
estopped as being a privy in
estate by a judgment obtained in
an action against the vendor
commenced after the purchase."
See also Abbey vs. Ollenu (1954)
14 WACA 567 which relied on the
same Mercantile Investment and
General Trust Co. vs. River
Plate Trust Loan and Agency Co.
case (supra).
In the Abbey vs. Ollenu case
land was conveyed to Respondent
who later built on the land in
ignorance of the fact that after
his purchase, and before he
built, the Appellants sued his
vendor and obtained declaration
of title in their favour. After
the building was completed
appellants as plaintiffs sued
the Respondent and obtained
judgment for the recovery of
possession and mesne profits;
this was set aside on appeal and
Appellants appealed to the Court
of Appeal. Held:
"The Respondent was not estopped
as being a privy in estate by a
judgment in an action against
his vendor commenced after the
purchase."
See other similar cases such as
Nettey vs. Odjidja 1952-55 land
case p.244.
Attram vs. Aryee 1965 GLR. 341
S.C. all to the same effect.
The law then is that a purchaser
of land would not lose his land
by virtue of a judgment in
litigation commenced after the
sale. Similarly even if a valid
deed is legally invalidated for
the proper legal reasons i.e by
a subsequent legally proper
judgment which is not so in this
case, the doctrine of bona fide
purchaser for value would apply
to protect the title of such
purchaser. The Appellant in this
case seeks to invalidate an
agreement on land properly made
to Respondent, by the properly
recognised chief of James Town,
Nii Adja Kwao II with capacity
to dispose of James Town Stool
Land on behalf of the Stool. The
ground relied on by that
Appellant, for this
unprecedented action is the
judgment of the National House
of Chiefs to the effect that the
installation of Nii Adja Kwao II
was null and void resulting in
his destoolment. According to
Appellant this judgment would
nullify the agreement Exhibit
'A' and consequently they are
enabled to withdraw their
concurrence to that agreement to
made it void. The National House
of Chiefs jurisdiction concerns
and extends only to chieftaincy
matters not land disputes and
its jurisdiction cannot affect
title to land, which
jurisdiction is vested only in
the Judiciary under 1992
Constitution. Further as said
earlier the disposition in
Exhibit 'A' being valid at the
time it was made by the said
Chief remains valid even after
the said chiefs destoolment and
is binding on the James Town
stool. Considering the fact that
the same stool made a second
conveyance of the same land to
the same Respondent in Exhibit
'E' it does not appear to me
that the James Town Stool, would
be justified in either
challenging or seeking the
invalidation of Exhibit 'A'
itself, that appears to be the
desire of Appellant, basing its
reasons for such action on wrong
legal grounds. Clearly this
whole case was brought about by
the wrong legal interpretation
put on the effect of judgment of
the National House of Chiefs by
the Appellant, resulting in the
Lands Commission's illegal, and
unjustified action in rendering
Exhibit 'A' void after over 20
years. The Appellant's action is
clearly wrong and unjustified
considering the relevant law
already discussed above.
Exhibit 'A' complied with all
legal requirements concerning
the disposition of stool land
and the vendor Nii Adja Kwao II
had capacity to dispose of the
land, in the name of the James
Town Stool which disposition was
also concurred in by Appellants.
Consequently Exhibit 'A' is
valid not void and it follows
that the withdrawal of the
concurrence given to Exhibit 'A'
for the wrong reasons must be
remedied by this court as this
has no doubt occasioned an
injustice to Respondent which
ought to be attracted by the
Order of Mandamus, since
Respondent cannot resort to the
relief provided under S.8(2) of
Act 123 of 1962.
In such a case Respondent must
have a remedy and has rightly
applied for an order of mandamus
to correct a clear injustice.
For the above reasons ground one
has no merit and fails.
Ground 2 states as follows:
"That the provisions of Act 123,
having imposed a duty on the
Minister vis-a-vis the Lands
Commission to grant concurrence
to the disposition of stool
lands, and having further set
out the remedies or reliefs on a
refusal aggrieved parties
thereunder, the court erred in
granting mandamus as the
existence of specific statutory
reliefs in respect of duty
obligations under statute
excludes the granting of
prerogative orders - including
Mandamus."
S.8(1) of Act 123 of 1962. The
Administration of Lands Act 1962
provides that:
"8(1) Any disposal of any land
which includes the payment of
any valuable consideration or
which would by reason of its
being to a person not entitled
by customary law to the free use
of land, involve the payment of
any such consideration and which
is made
a) by a stool;
b) by any persons who, by reason
of his being so entitled under
customary has acquired
possessing such land either
without payment of any
consideration or in exchange for
a nominal consideration, shall
be subject to the concurrence of
the Minister and shall be of no
effect unless such concurrence
is granted.
(2) disposal in writing and such
approval shall have A person
aggrieved by the refusal of the
Minister to approve the disposal
of any land under (1) of this
section or by failure of the
Minister to notify his decision
regarding such disposal within
three months of the date on
which the application for
concurrence was made may appeal
to an appeals tribunal. Which
may if it thinks fit approve
such the same effect as the
concurrence of the Minister."
It is to be noted that now under
Act 483 of 1994, the Lands
Commission Act 1994 S.4(3)
appeal in the case of a refusal
to grant concurrence lies
straight to the High Court.
It does seem to me that this
ground of appeal is quite
untenable in the circumstances
of this case. This is because
the said S.8(2) of Act 123 only
provides relief in the case of
refusal of the Minister to grant
concurrence to the disposition
of land under S.8(1). In this
case concurrence was given to
Exhibit 'A' by the Lands
Commission in discharge of its
duty under the said S.8. However
this concurrence was later
withdrawn by that authority on
unjustified grounds as I have
discussed earlier above. This
action was brought by
Respondents seeking or order of
mandamus against the Lands
Commission not for the purpose
of granting a fresh concurrence
which duty had already been
exercised by the Commission, but
for an
"Order of Mandamus to issue
directed to the Lands Commission
and its Executive Secretary to
restore to the property records
the Deed of lease reference No.
AC. 8780/73 registered as L/R.
No. 2374/98" i.e. Exhibit 'A'
which the Commission had given
Respondent notice of expunging
from the records. The reason for
the expunging of details of
Exhibit 'A' from the Lands
Commission's records was clearly
stated by the Appellant in its
letter Exhibit 'C'. Whether the
Appellant have carried out this
action was not ever in the whole
proceedings directly admitted by
them neither was it also
directly denied which is
unfortunate as I would have
expected the Appellant to be
candid and helpful with the
Court. However it is only in the
Appellant's statement of case
filed on 14th November, 1997
page 6 states:
"Examining the facts in relation
to the application of Section 8
sub section (2) Exhibit 'A'
could not be said to fall within
the category of documents caught
by this section i.e. Exhibit 'A'
is not a document which the
Minister had refused to grant
concurrence to what had happened
to Exhibit 'A' was that the
concurrence has been revoked by
the Minister/Lands Commission as
per reasons given by their
letter of 7th February 1990 (see
p.13 of the proceedings" i.e.
Exhibit 'C')
Here I find an admission of the
fact that the Commission per
Minister of Lands had in fact
revoked concurrence as contained
in Exhibit 'C'. This explains
the stout defence put up by the
Appellant in their attempt to
justify their action complained
of by Respondent which
implication was not lost to me.
Refusal to grant concurrence
when first applied for under Act
123 is not the same as
withdrawing a prior given
concurrence and expunging
records of Exhibit 'A'. In the
case of a refusal section 8(2)
Act 123 provides procedure for
appeal to a tribunal, in the
latter situation the law
provides no remedy for such
actions, no doubt because such
act resulting in the
nullification of a prior valid
deed was never within the
contemplation of the powers
given the Appellant under Act
123 and Appellant does not point
of any specific grant of such
power under Act 123 or any other
law, for their action. Nor can
section 11 of the interpretation
Act 1960 C.A. 4 apply in this
case.
This is because the power
referred to in S.11 affect power
to grant a licence,
authorisation or permit and to
revoke same if necessary, and
does not include the duty to
give or refuse concurrence to
legalise deeds in respect of
land dispositions. If this were
so, a deed which is valid one
day would became invalid the
next at the pleasure of the
Lands Commission even if by an
Unjustified withdrawal of a
prior given concurrence and or
not whether done "judicially,
judiciously or capriciously" see
R. vs. Lands Commission Ex Parte
Akainyah (1975) 2 GLR 487. In
that case an application for
mandamus succeeded in the High
Court for an order to compel the
Lands Commission to give
statutory consent and
concurrence to a grant in
compliance with Article 164(3)
of the Constitution 1969 and it
was held granting the
application that
"(1) Since the management of
Stools Lands was given to the
Lands Commission for the benefit
of stool subjects, they in the
course of performing their
duties must exercise their power
or discretion judicially and
judiciously but not capriciously
...........
I am of the view that if the
Commission had not been invested
with power to withdraw
concurrence once given properly,
nor does it possess judicial
power to decide title in land
matters. Withdrawal of prior
properly given concurrence
resulting in the deprivation of
good title to Respondents as
contained in Exhibit 'A' was a
wrong, which should be corrected
by order for mandamus to restore
to the property records the deed
of lease i.e Exhibit 'A' which
had been wrongly expunged from
those records as indicated in
Exhibit "C" by the Appellants.
For my part I see no power
granted in Act 123 for the
withdrawal of a concurrence once
granted to validify deeds on
land so as to render that deed
void. And as I said, resort to
C.A 4 is unhelpful and
unnecessary for the
determination of the issue
before this Court. Further it is
only a court of justice not an
administrative body such as
Appellant which has the right
and power to made a decision on
land dispositions so as to
deprive a bona fide purchaser of
his title in the land. And as
provided in Article 125(3) of
the 1992 Constitution.
"Article 125(3) the judicial
power of Ghana shall vest in the
judiciary, accordingly, neither
the President nor Parliament nor
any organ or agency of the
President or Parliament shall or
be given final Judicial power."
The lands Commission should not
be permitted to usurp the
function of the judiciary as the
result of their action would so
imply, this would be in
contravention of Article 125(3).
For the history, use and effect
of mandamus see H.W.R. Wade
Administrative law 5th Edition
page 63 which states thus:
"Lord Mansfield said in sweeping
terms in R.V. Baker (1762) 3
Burr. 1265 at 1267...'it was
introduced to prevent disorder
from a failure of justice and
defect of Police. Therefore it
ought to be used upon all
occasions where the law has
established no specific remedy
and where injustice and good
Government there ought to be one
..... the value of the matter,
or the degree of its importance
to the public police is not
scrupulously weighed. If there
be a right and no other specific
remedy, this should not be
denied."
According to the same writer at
page 63
"within the field of public law
the scope of mandamus is still
wide and the Court may use it
freely to prevent breach of duty
and injustice."
See the King v. The Revising
Barrister for the Borough of
Henley (1912) 3 KB 518. In this
case a revising barrister for
parliamentary borough, employed
clerical assistance to mark upon
the list of voters the results
of his decisions as pronounced
orally in court. By some
inadvertence the clerk omitted
to strike off the lists, of some
of the persons whose names were
to be expunged from the list
when the mistake was discovered
on the register later it was
held by the court
"Held that the court had
jurisdiction to grant writs of
mandamus to the revising
barrister and to the town clerk
to have the mistake corrected;
that in the circumstances there
need not be a previous demand
and refusal to do the act sought
to be enforced and that the
proper course was for the
revising barrister to expunge
the names on a copy of the
register and to deliver the same
to the town clerk and for the
town clerk to make the necessary
corrections in the register"
In the same way if entries on
records or property books at
Lands Commission have been
wrongly expunged by the wrongful
withdrawal of concurrence by the
Appellant, this court in order
to correct an injustice, should
issue mandamus to compel the
re-entry of the necessary
particulars in the said records.
As Darling J. in the above
quoted case put it
"The court has power by
prerogative writ of mandamus to
amend all errors which tend to
the oppression of the subject or
other misgovernment, and ought
to be used when the law has
provided no specific remedy, and
justice and good government
require that there ought to be
one for the execution of common
law or the provisions of a
statute."
He continued as follows at p.529
"Instead of being astute to
discover reasons for not
applying this great
constitutional remedy for error
and misgovernment, we think it
is our duty to be vigilant to
apply it in every case to which
by any reasonable construction
it can be made applicable."
See also Halsbury's Laws of
England vol. II 3rd Edition p.84
Par 159"..... Its purpose (i.e.
Mandamus) is to supply defeats
of justice; and accordingly it
will issue to the end that
justice may be done in all cases
where there is no specific legal
right and no specific legal
remedy for enforcing that right:
and it may issue in cases where
although there is an alternative
legal remedy, yet that mode of
redress is less convenient,
beneficial and effectual."
On the facts and circumstances
of this case it is clear and
evident that the Appellant's
erroneous interpretation of the
effect of the judgment of the
National House of Chiefs, has
occasioned an injustice by the
mistaken expunging of the
particulars of Exhibit 'A' from
property records and books of
the Lands Commission as I have
already stated, see Exhibit 'C'
par. 3 thereof. Since no
specific legal remedy was
provided for correcting such
error under S.8(2) of Act 123,
Mandamus would lie to compel
Appellant to correct this error
and restore the records on
Exhibit 'A' in the interest of
justice.
It is for the above reasons that
I support the grant of mandamus
by the High Court as affirmed by
the Court of Appeal but I do so
only in respect of Exhibit 'A'.
This is because the application
by Respondent to the High Court
was only in respect of Exhibit
'A' and not also Exhibit 'E'
which was wrongly included in
the High Court's order. The
application for the writ of
mandamus prayed for states.
"Order of mandamus to issue
directed to the Lands Commission
and its Executive Secretary to
restore to the property records,
the deed of lease reference No.
AC 8780/73 registered as L/R No.
2374/78"
The High Court in issuing the
order of mandamus prayed for,
mistakenly included Exhibit 'E'
in that order which should
properly have covered only
Exhibit 'A'. Consequently the
order in respect of Exhibit 'E'
should be considered as wrongly
issued, both Exhibit 'A' and
Exhibit 'E' cannot co-exist any
way. In any case Exhibit 'A' and
Exhibit 'E' are really the same
document in effect and the
validating of Exhibit 'A' should
suffice to remedy any injustice
done to Respondents.
In granting rnandamus in this
case it is my hope that this
case would inform officials of
institutions such as the Lands
Commission of the importance of
working within the confines of
the statutory powers granted
them by legislation and that in
legal matters they would
approach the Attorney-General
first for legal advise. This
would minimize the occurrence of
cases such as this happening
again in the future and would
help to instill more confidence
in users of land in this
country.
In conclusion to the extent of
the modification stated above in
the order of mandamus issued by
the lower Courts, I would
dismiss the appeal.
C. HAYFRON-BENJAMIN, J.S.C.:
In this appeal the Lands
Commission shall hereafter be
known as APPELLANTS and
VANDERPUYE ORGLE ESTATES LIMITED
shall hereafter be kown as
RESPONDENTS. At first blush it
appears that this appeal was
wrongly dismissed by their
Lordships in the Court of
Appeal. However it becomes clear
on a close reading of the
materials put before the Court
below and the submissions of
Counsel that their Lordships
appreciated the import of the
application and thereby came to
the right conclusions.
It seemed as if the judgment of
the National House of Chiefs
dated the 25th March, 1983 -
which incidentally was not
exhibited to the Court of first
instance, though BROBBEY J.A.
refers to it as having been
exhibited or thereafter -
declaring the James Town
Manche's nomination, election
and installation null and void
became pivotal in their
Lordships declaration on the
principal issue whether the
Applicant was entitled to an
order of mandamus. In my
respectful opinion the matter of
the effect of the declaration
made against the then James Town
Manche did not in anyway denude
the validity of any transactions
made by him while he was
undoubtedly on the stool. All
the evidence tendered by the
Respondent in the High Court -
clearly showed that in
accordance with the applicable
laws Nii Adja Kwao II was the
duly recognised James Town
Manche. Consequently I cannot
agree that the Appellants view
of the legal position of Nii
Adja Kwao II that:
"Any alienation of James Town
Stool land made by him in his
capacity as James Town Manche is
similarly null and void"
is right. The matter is not
without authority. The case of
AMANKWA VRS. KYERE (1963) 1 GLR
409 offers a perfect
illustration of the
circumstances under which the
deeds and actions of a Chief
subsequently destooled will be
valid. Holding (3) thereof
states:
"a stool is a corporation sole
and provided the occupant has
been elected and installed in
accordance with law and custom,
a person contracting in good
faith with the stool is entitled
to his remedies should the
contract later be abrogated.
Even where the appointment of
the stool occupant is later
invalidated, his contracts are
not thereby invalidated".
(emphasis mine).
It was common ground that the
James Town manche, Nii Adja Kwao
II Paramount Chief together some
elders of that stool had leased
a vast tract of land - to be
precise 214 Acres - as per an
indenture of lease dated 28th
September, 1973 to the
Respondent herein. The period of
the lease was to commence
"from the 6th day of August,
1976 for a TERM OF NINETY-.NINE
(99) YEARS as the rent reserved
in clause 4(e) hereof'.
The transaction being in respect
of stool land the validity of
the lease could only commence
from the date on which
concurrence was obtained from
the Lands Commission. This
concurrence was obtained on the
same date as the agreed date of
the commencement of the term
granted.
By the nature of the lease, the
said lease was in all respects a
Building scheme whereby the
Respondents were to develop the
area of land by first gridding
the area into plots and then
developing the plots in a
certain manner including such
principal covenants as:-
"(a) The lessee shall within
two (2) years from the date
hereof prepare a development
plan of the whole area dividing
the demised land into building
plots each to be an area note
exceeding 24,000 square feet and
showing thereon the order in
which the plots are to be
developed.
(b) The lessee shall within
Twenty (20) years erect Or cause
to be erected dwelling houses on
the Said plots but so that each
such dwelling house may at the
lessees' discretion be erected
on one or more plots or in any
other manner but provided always
that the order of erection of
the houses shall be in
accordance with the order of
erection of the houses set out
on the development plan
aforesaid.
(c) The lessee shall on the
completion of each such dwelling
house pay unto the lessor his
successors in office and assigns
the year rent of ¢11.00 for each
plot on which such dwelling
houses shall be erected.
(d) The lessee shall give to the
lessor notice in writing of the
construction of each such
dwelling house from the date of
which the rent or proportion of
such rent as aforesaid for each
plot on which the dwelling house
has been erected shall commence.
(e) If at the end of Twenty(20)
years any plot on the demised
premises shall still remain
undeveloped the said plot or
plots so remaining undeveloped
shall revert to the lessor".
(emphasis mine)
Notwithstanding certain
inconsistent covenants in the
lease, the general impression is
clear and the business name of
the Respondents - VANDERPUYE
ORGLE ESTATES a partnership
incorporated Private
Partnerships Act (Act ) -
confirms me in my view that it
was indeed a building scheme. A
building scheme
"Comes into existence where land
is laid out in plots and sold to
different purchasers or leased
to different lessees, each of
whom enters into a (restrictive)
covenant with the common vendor
or lessor that his particular
plot shall not be used for
certain purposes". see page 527
Cheshire on THE MODERN LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY (9th Edition).
A second lease prepared between
the Dzasetse of James Town Stool
and the Respondent and dated the
28th July, 1976, as a precaution
in the event that the Appellant
was correct in the view of the
law they had taken need not be
countenanced as in any case it
did not receive the concurrence
of the Lands Commission.
The present litigation arises as
a result of an application made
by the Respondents for a
concurrence to the creation of a
sublease of some plot or plots
of the land so leased to them in
favour of one ADAMU MAIGA. The
concurrence was refused on the
ground that the Respondent had
"no title to give". Whereupon
the Respondent gave the
Appellants the requisite notice
and instituted the present
application.
I have examined the said notice
and while I am not satisfied
that it was an unequivocal
notice as would be required by
law to satisfy the preconditions
for an application for mandamus,
the need to do justice whenever
such prerogative applications
are presented to the Courts
impels me to accept it.
By their motion on notice the
Respondents pray for:
"An Order of mandamus directing
either the Executive Secretary
or the Lands Commission or both
to restore to their property
Records the Deed of Lease
reference number ac. 8780/73
(32000/25041) and registered as
L/R. 2374/1978 made between the
James Town Stool acting by Nii
Adja Kwao II as James Town
Mantse of the one part and
Messrs Vanderpuye Orgle Estates
Ltd. of the other part."
And the grounds for the
application were stated thus:
"1. Refusal, Failure or Neglect
to carry out Statutory Duty
under Act 122 Sections 8, 22;
alternatively Act 123 Sections
8(1).
2. Unwarrantable usurpation of
the jurisdiction of the Courts
and of the Land Title
Adjudication Committee under
both Act 372 of 1971 and
P.N.D.C.L. 152, S. 135(2).
3 .Wilful Disregard of L.I. 450
OF 1965 and the Court of
Appeal's judgment in NTEM v.
ANKWANDAH (1977) 2 GLR. 452.
Also CHAHIN v. EPOPE PRESS
(1963) 1 GLR. 163 C.A.
4. Breach of the Applicant's
Right to freedom from
interference with his property,
contrary to Article 18 Clauses 1
and 2 of the 1992 Constitution
of Ghana."
The pith of the Respondents
presentation in the High Court
was as contained in paragraphs
15 and 16 of the affidavit in
support of their said motion
which run:
"15. Despite the clear lack of
legal authority, the Respondent
made bold to reject a sub-lease
made by my Company to one ADAMU
MIAGAH on the alleged ground
that my Company the Grantor of
the sub-lease had no title to
give.
16. I verily believe therefore
that the Respondent has carried
out the intention announced by
Exhibit "C" to expunge my
Company's leasehold from its
records, hence the rejection of
our sub-lease."
The Respondent took the threat
seriously and therefore
instituted the application for a
mandamus to have the Register
corrected. In his submissions in
the High Court Counsel for the
Appellant stated that "we never
carried out the intention". This
statement could not be correct
since in the view of Counsel for
the Respondent, the Appellants
had nevertheless rejected their
application for concurrence. I
think that in the light of the
evidence Counsel making such a
statement from his place at the
Bar was clearly in contempt of
Court. Counsel must know that
they are officers of the Court
and any statement which they
make from their place at the Bar
which is palpably false or the
bona fides of which they cannot
vouch amounts to a contempt of
Court. Consequently I hold that
the Respondents were right in
approaching the Court for a
Mandamus for wherever there is
a danger or threat that the
interest, whether proprietary or
otherwise, will be prejudiced or
unlawfully interefered with
mandamus will lie.
Before us the Appellants have
set out useless and irrelevant
grounds of appeal which, as I
have said, are centred on the
issue of the effect if the
destoolment of Nii Adja Kwao II
on the validity of the lease
executed by him in favour of the
Respondents, that issue has been
dealt with earlier in this
opinion. It seems that the
Appellant did not have any
quarrel with the Order of the
High Court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeal concerning the
grant of the Order of Mandamus.
Consequently but for the
insertion in their grounds of
Appeal that the judgment was
against the weight of evidence,
I would have been inclined to
dismiss the appeal in limine.
It is trite learning that the
general ground of appeal imputes
the presence of matters of mixed
law and fact and invites a court
of review to examine the record
and, where necessary, to resolve
the issues anew. In the present
appeal the issue is clearly
whether mandamus was properly
granted by the High Court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeal
in the light of the facts
presented before the Court of
first instance.
A mandamus is simply
"an order requiring an act to be
done."
It may issue to enforce a right
against public officers and
other Statutory authorities
derived by the citizen from a
statutory legal duty or the
common law. Its purpose was
succinctly set down in an old
English case by LORD MANSFIELD.
A Chief Justice of England as:
"a prerogative writ, to the end
of which the subject is entitle,
upon a proper case previously
shown, to the satisfaction of
the Court. The original nature
of the writ, and the occasions
it should be used. It was
introduced to prevent disorder
from a failure of justice and
defect of police. Therefore it
ought to be used upon all
occasions where the law has
established no specific remedy
and where in justice and good
government there ought to be
one. ... it has been liberally
interpreted for the benefit of
the subject and advancement of
justice,....If there be a right
and no other specific, this
should not be denied." (see
English & Empire Digest Vol. 16
(1961) at 315).
Thus an order for mandamus may
issue against a public officer,
a statutory authority or person
who has a public duty to perform
under the common law to do any
act so warranted but who refuses
or neglects to do that act or
perform that duty. It includes
the correction of such acts or
duty wrongly performed. The
order neither grants victory to
the person applying nor is it
the result of litigation.
In the present appeal the
Respondents - in the High Court
put their prayer simply in the
submissions. The Respondent was
seeking an order of the High
Court:
"to restore in their records the
deed of lease made and dated the
28th day of September, 1973
between the James Town Stool
acting by its gazetted Mantse
Adja Kwao II now deceased on the
one part and the Applicants on
the other part."
To this prayer the Appellants
only made a sham reply and
persisted in their mistaken view
of the law that they were
entitled unilaterally to declare
the lease null and void on the
grounds that the grantor chief
had been destooled. Consequently
they were also entitled to
expunge that lease from their
records.
In my respectful opinion
Brobbey, J.A. gave a fitting
answer to the Appellants'
submission when in his opinion
contributed for the judgment he
wrote:
"Since the appellant had no
legitimate reason for removing
the deeds from the records, it
was correctly ordered to restore
or to retain in their records
the documents in respect of
which concurrence had been
granted. When the facts leading
to this case are seriously
considered, one can not but
impugn, the decision of the
appellant's Officials as
unwarrantably officious action
which does fully take into
account due process of the law.
I make this point for a number
of reasons. The first reason is
that the lease was actually
executed between the stool
represented by the James Town
Mantse and the Stool Elders on
the one hand, and the respondent
on the other. The participation
of the stool elder was
indispensable in Validating the
lease transaction. The Chief
alone could not have validity
executed Exhibit 'C'. The
judgment of the NHC. Did not
rule that the appointments and
positions of the stool elders
who executed the lease with the
stool occupant were also null
and void. They presumably remain
the same stool elders today.
Needless to say, they must be
presumed to be working with
whoever is the current James
Town Mantse who is the properly
elected and enstooled chief. It
is the stool, the stool occupant
and stool elders who must take
legal action to recover the
lands from the respondent. This
is because several questions
will arise in such an action
which will have to be
adjudicated upon before it can
properly be decided whether the
lease were valid that the
appellant could properly expunge
them from its records. Until
then the appellant cannot
constitute itself into an
authority on its own and use its
own interpretation of the NHC
judgment, to expunge the
records."
I think there is an omission of
the one word in the quotation
stated above. That part of the
quotation should read:
... as unwarrantably officious
action which does not fully take
into account due process of the
law."
It may very well be that the
Appellants have power to revoke
or even expunge documents and
other written materials which
are by law required to be lodged
with them as part of the
legitimate records - and indeed
they have. But that power cannot
be exercised without due process
of law. It was therefore
presumptuous of the Appellants
by themselves to interpret the
effect of the judgment of the
National House of Chiefs and
give effect to their own view.
It is contrary to constitutional
norms and the very principles
upon which our common law is
based, that the legislature
should invest such awesome
powers and authority in the
hands of an executive officer of
whatever class to attempt to
expunge or rectify public
records without the due process
of law. My emphasis on that part
of Brobbey, J.A.'s opinion cited
and corrected above in support
of the necessity for compliance
with due process of law impels
me to the view that the Courts
will declare any such decisions
unilaterally made by such
officers null and void. Here
again I will declare the acts of
the Appellants in regard to the
lease under consideration null
and void.
Yet again the Appellants
complain that the Respondents
could have appealed in terms of
the relevant sections of the Act
123 instead of invoking the
prerogative writ of mandamus. It
is however clear from the record
that the Appellants did not
comply with the provisions of
the Act 123 and did not furnish
the Respondents with a written
refusal. Instead they sent to
the Respondents a written notice
of "intention". That notice of
intent - for what it was worth -
was not sufficient to invoke the
appeal process granted under the
Act. In my respectful opinion
even where there is an
alternative process it is not an
inflexible rule that the
statutory procedure so laid down
must necessarily be followed.
The present appeal arises out of
the exercise of the undoubted
discretion of the High Court
judge in granting the mandamus
thus sought. In my respectful
opinion the remedy of an appeal
now advocated by the appellants
would have failed as the
Appellants themselves had not
complied with the conditions
precedent which would have
opened the way for an appeal
property so-called to be lodged.
As I have stated there were
certain defects in the lease
dated the 28th September, 1973
which the Appellants sought to
expunge from their Register.
Appellant's conduct was a gross
officious interference in the
sanctity of private contracts
and ought to be roundly
condemned. In my respectful
opinion the parties should have
been left to their remedies, if
any, under the lease.
I will therefore dismiss the
appeal.
AMPIAH J.S.C.:
On the 18th of March, 1993, the
Respondent in this appeal
applied ex-parte for leave for
an order of Mandamus,
"............. directing either
the Executive Secretary or Lands
Commission or both to restore to
their Property Records the Deed
of Lease reference number AC.
8780/73[32000/2504] and
registered as L/R 2374/1978 made
between the James Town Stool
acting by Nii Adja Kwao as James
Town Mantse of the one part and
Messrs. Vanderpuye Orgle Estates
Limited of the other part..."
Leave was granted the Respondent
then Applicant in that
application on 22/3/93 and, on
23/3/93 pursuant notices were
filed. The Appellant, Respondent
in that application responded to
the Notice. The Court heard the
application and ruled on 15/9/93
granting the Applicant the
reliefs it sought.
Aggrieved by the High Court
Ruling, the Appellant filed an
appeal against it to the Court
of Appeal on 11/11/93. On
18/1/96, the Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the decision of the
High Court. The present appeal
is against the decision the
Court of Appeal.
In this appeal, the
Respondent/Appellant will be
referred to as the Appellant and
the Applicant/Respondent will be
referred to as the Respondent.
The Appellant originally filed
seven grounds of appeal
including the general ground
that the judgment was against
the weight of evidence. Leave
was however granted the
Appellant to argue further
grounds of appeal on which its
Statement of Case had already
commented; Notice of further
grounds of appeal was filed on
21/11/98 pursuant to the Court's
order.
The grounds for this appeal
are:-
(a) The Court of Appeal
misdirected itself on the effect
of the judgment of the
Chieftaincy Tribunal of the
National House of Chiefs
declaring the enstoolment and
installation of Nii Adja Kwao II
as null and void.
(b) The Court of Appeal erred in
holding that the persons who
concurred in the grant were
accredited elders of the James
Town Stool when the judgment of
the Chieftaincy Tribunal of the
National House of Chiefs had
declared Nii Adja Kwao II's
elders not to be the proper
persons by custom to enstool
him.
(c) The Court of Appeal erred in
holding that the acts of Nii
Adja Kwao II ought to bind the
James Town Stool.
(d) The Court of Appeal erred in
holding that Nii Adja Kwao II
was both in law and in fact the
Chief of James Town.
(e) The Court of Appeal erred in
holding that the grant of Nii
Adja Kwao II to the Respondent
was valid.
(f) The Court of Appeal erred in
holding that the Respondent is
protected and is lawfully vested
with the land despite the lack
of capacity by Nii Adja Kwao II.
(g) Th judgment is against the
weight of evidence.
And the Additional [further]
grounds are:-
(1) The Court erred in granting
the Order of Mandamus as there
was no proof that the Lands
Commission owes a duty to keep
records of registers of
Leases/Conveyances.
(2) The provisions of Act 123,
having imposed a duty on the
Minister vis-a-vis the Lands
Commission to grant concurrence
to the disposition of Stool
Lands, and having further set
out the remedies or reliefs on a
refusal aggrieved parties
thereunder, the Court erred in
granting Mandamus as the
existence of specific Statutory
reliefs in respect of duty
obligations under statute
excludes the granting of
Prerogative Orders - including
Mandamus.
(3) Having regard to the fact
that the Lease, the
subject-matter of the suit, was
executed between 2 parties
having mutual covenants creating
rights and duties between the
parties, any prerogative
application in relation to the
said lease should require that
all parties to the said lease
should have been heard in
relation to the application. The
Court below was in error
therefore, not to have made the
James Town Stool a party to the
Application - even though the
Applicant had not done so in the
first instance.
(4) The Court below and the
Court above erred in not
examining the lease, which is
the main evidence upon which the
Applicant claimed to have a
right either to sublet or to
assign any part of its interest
for if that had been done the
Courts would have found as a
fact that the sub-lease for
which concurrence had been
sought and refused, did not
qualify for any such
concurrence, as the sub-grant
was itself invalid as offending
the covenants in the head-lease.
(5) That there was nothing
before either Court to consider
as at the time the head-lease
had lapsed.
(6) And also whether there is
any duty cast on the Lands
Commission to maintain a
register or at all.
I intend to deal with the
grounds together in line with
the various submissions made.
For a clearer appreciation of
the issues involved in this
matter, a brief history of the
case would be required.
By an Indenture dated 28th
September, 1973 and registered
as LR No. 374/78, the Respondent
acquired a leasehold interest in
portion of the land belonging to
the James Town Stool. The grant
was made by Nii Adja Kwao the
then James Town Mantse with the
consent and concurrence of his
accredited elders. This grant
received the concurrence of the
Appellant - Commission, the body
statutorily empowered to give
such concurrence. The document
was tendered in evidence as
Exhibit "A". At the time the
grant was made, there was
pending in the Chieftaincy
Tribunals, a chieftaincy matter
challenging the status of Nii
Adja Kwao. In pursuance of a
decision delivered by the
National House of Chiefs in,
declaring that Nii Adja Kwao's
installation was null and void,
the Appellant duly served notice
on the Respondent of its
intention to withdraw the
concurrence given to the Deed of
Lease [Exhibit "A"]. In an
apparent attempt to validate
Exhibit "A". the Respondent
caused to be prepared for it, a
second document by one Nii Okpe
III the Dzasetse and the alleged
acting James Town Mantse at the
time that Exhibit "A" was
prepared - See Exhibit "D",
letter from the Respondent's
Solicitor. This new lease which
was never concurred in was
tendered in the proceedings as
Exhibit "E". In pursuance of the
lease granted the Respondent
[Exhibit "A"] the Respondent
purported to grant a sub-lease
of the head lease to one Adamu
Maigah. The Appellant refused to
give concurrence to this
sub-lease. After a long tussle
between the Respondent and the
Appellant, the Respondent
brought this application for
Mandamus, to compel the
Appellant to restore the
concurrence to the records of
the Commission.
Unfortunately, in coming to
their conclusion, both the High
Court and the Court of Appeal
had taken into consideration, in
my opinion, certain extraneous
matters which seem to blur the
main issues under consideration
in the application.
The application before the
Court, involved only one
document, namely the document
registered as No. L/R 2374/1978,
dated 28/9/73 and made between
Nii Adja Kwao as James Town
Mantse and the Respondent. This
was tendered as Exhibit "A" in
the application. The Mandamus
application was for the
restoration of the concurrence
given to that document and which
seems to have been withdrawn or
revoked by the Appellant. The
deed, Exhibit "E" made between
Nii Okpe III and the Respondent
and the Respondent and the
sub-lease made thereunder were
never the subject-matter of the
application. However, in
concluding his ruling the trial
judge said,
"........ In the result I issue
an order of Mandamus directed to
the Lands Commission, the
Respondent herein to carry out
its public duty in respect of
the two documents submitted by
the Applicant...." Which were
these two documents and what was
this public duty to be carried
out in respect of these
documents?
It has been assumed that once
Exhibit "A" had received
concurrence, all other documents
coming out of that document must
automatically receive
concurrence. This assumption is
wrong. The Lands Commission
reserves the right to give
concurrence or refuse to do so,
to any transaction or assurance
involving Stool lands. Exhibit
"A" and Exhibit "E" refer to the
same land granted to the
Appellant by two different
persons alleged to be grantors
holding office as Mantse or
acting Mantse, at the time of
the grant. I do not see how
concurrence could have been
given to the two documents
unless of course, it is conceded
that one of the documents is
incapable of transferring the
interest in the land. A critical
examination of the two documents
would reveal that even though
Exhibit "A" was said to have
been made on 28/9/73, it to take
effect on 6/8/76 it was not
until 10th May, 1978 when
execution of the document was
proved and at a time when
Exhibit "E" had been prepared to
replace Exhibit "A". Different
set of elders had consented and
concurred in the two documents!
If Exhibit "E" had been made at
the time of the grant to replace
Exhibit "A" what was the
necessity in submitting Exhibit
"A" for concurrence? How could
there be a Mantse and an Acting
Mantse at the time of the grant?
According to the Respondent's
Solicitor, the late E.D. Kom, of
blessed memory,
"My clients derive their title
not only from Nii Adja Kwao but
also from Nii Dzasetse who was
the then Acting James Town
Mantse at the time of the grant
...." - Exhibit "D". (emphasis
mine)
It is obvious that the two
documents cannot co-exist. There
are many questions to be
answered in respect of these
documents, which questions touch
on the Commission's discretion
whether to grant concurrence,
refuse it or revoke it. I will
return to this issue in the
course of my judgment. But since
Exhibit "E" was not the
subject-matter of the
application before the Court,
the High Court had no
jurisdiction in ordering that
Mandamus Order should apply to
both documents. The Court of
Appeal unfortunately committed
the same error by affirming the
decision of the High Court. I
would allow the appeal on this
issue and set aside the order
affecting Exhibit "E".
The application was brought
under Order 59; Rules 4[2] and
[4] of this Order state:-
"4[2] The notice or summons
shall be served on all persons
directly affected, and where it
relates to any proceedings in or
before a Court, and the object
is either to compel the Court or
an officer thereof to do any act
in relation to the proceedings
or to quash them or any order
made therein, the notice of
motion or summons shall, be
served to the clerk or Registrar
of the Court and the other
parties to the proceedings.
[4] If on the hearing of the
motion or summons the Court or
Judge is of opinion that any
person who ought to have been
served therewith has not been
served, whether or not he is a
person who ought to have been
served under the foregoing
provisions of this Rule, the
Court or Judge may adjourn the
hearing, in order that the
notice or summons may be served
on that person, upon such terms
[if any] as the Court or Judge
may direct."
The proceedings before the Court
show that since the installation
of Nii Adja Kwao in 1959 as
James Town Mantse, there have
been numerous Court actions
challenging his capacity to be
on the James Town Stool.
At the time that the grant in
Exhibit "A" was made, there was
pending before the Chieftaincy
Tribunal a case between one
Otukonor Sackey and Ors. Vrs.
Nii Adja Kwao. That was in 1974.
This was the matter which
eventually ended at the National
House of Chiefs in 1993, whose
judgment the Lands Commission,
the Appellant had relied on to
expunge or threaten to expunge
the concurrence given to Exhibit
"A'. At the time of the present
application therefore there were
persons other than the Lands
Commission who were interested
and directly affected by the
application. It cannot be said
that it was only the Lands
Commission which had sought to
expunge the concurrence which
was interested in the matter:
All those who had taken action
against Nii Adja Kwao, and who
had won in the National House of
Chiefs' decision by which the
Lands Commission was seeking to
rely on to expunge the
concurrence, had interest in the
matter and were directly
affected by whatever order the
Court would make, and were
entitled to contest the right of
the Lands Commission to give
concurrence. Of course, the
Lands Commission was a necessary
party having acted under the
provisions of the law and being
the statutory body charged with
the duty of concurring or
refusing to concur in assurances
affecting Stool Lands. But the
James Town Stool - as it was
obvious that Nii Adja Kwao had
left the scene - and the elders,
had interest in the matter.
After all, the land was vested
in the Stool. The Stool and its
elders should have been notified
of the pendency of the
application as required by law.
The issues of "bona fide
purchaser for value" and who the
legitimate elders were, were
issues properly determinable
between the Stool and any
purchaser. The exclusion of the
Stool from the mandamus
proceedings was bound to result
in a miscarriage of justice and
did so in these proceedings. I
would in the circumstances allow
the appeal and set aside the
proceedings.
It is not quite clear from the
papers filed in this application
whether or not there has been
actual removal from the records,
the concurrence given by the
Appellant to Exhibit "A", or
there has been only an intention
to withdraw. While the
Respondent had concluded thus in
its submission,
".....Therefore their act of
withdrawing amounts to
Interfering with our rights...."
[see page 32 lines 20 - 21 of
the record of proceedings]
the Appellant had responded,
".....we were informing them of
our intention. We haven't
carried out that intention...."
[see page 43 line 32 - page 44
line 1]
So far no letter of actual
withdrawal has been tendered in
these proceedings. That being
so, there could be no order for
the restoration of the
concurrence, even if an
application for mandamus lies.
The application would be
dismissed as misconceived.
However, in its affidavit filed
on its behalf by one Samuel
Mensah Addo, High Executive
Officer, it said at paragraph
9:-
"That I am advised and verily
believe same to be true that the
application is misconceived ....
and the Applicant cannot compel
the Defendants to restore in its
records that which in effect is
a nullity."
It is doubtful whether the above
paragraph could be taken as an
admission of the withdrawal of
the concurrence given to Exhibit
"A". Assuming, but not
accepting, that there has been
withdrawal of the concurrence,
would an Order of Mandamus lie
to compel the Appellant to
restore the concurrence to the
records? Unfortunately, too much
attention was given to
extraneous matters in resolving
the main issue before the Court;
both by the trial Court and the
Court of Appeal.
An order of mandamus is an order
of most extensive remedial
nature, and is in form, a
command issuing from the High
Court of Justice, directed to
any person, corporation or
inferior tribunals, requiring
him or them to do some
particular thing therein
specified which appertains to
his or their office and is in
the nature of a public duty.
[see Halsbury Laws of England,
3rd Ed. Vol. 11, page 84 para.
159].
In Ghana, the Supreme Court in
the exercise of it's supervisory
jurisdiction is given power to
order mandamus [Vide Article 132
of the Constitution] .
The Order of Mandamus will issue
where there is a specific legal
right and no specific legal
remedy enforcing that right or
where, although there is an
alternative legal remedy, yet
that mode of redress is less
convenient, beneficial and
effectual - see R Vrs. Thomas
[1892] 1 Q.B.426.
An Order of Mandamus will be
granted ordering that to be done
which a Statute requires to be
done - see Ex-Parte Nash [1850]
15 Q.B. 92 at p.96.
Article 267[3] of the
Constitution provides -
"[3] There shall be no
disposition or development of
any Stool land unless the
Regional Lands Commission of the
region in which the land is
situated has certified that the
disposition or development is
consistent with the development
plan drawn up or approved by the
Planning Authority for the area
concerned.
[4] Where the Regional Lands
Commission fails or refuses to
give the consent and concurrence
under Clause [3] of this
article, a person aggrieved by
the failure or refusal may
appeal to the High Court."
Also, Section 8[1] of the
Administration of Lands Act,
1962 [Act 123] provides:—
"8[1] Any disposal of any land
which involves the payment of
any valuable consideration or
which would, by reason of its
being to a person not entitled
by customary law to the free use
of land, involve the payment of
any such consideration and which
is made,
(a) by a Stool
(b) by any person who, by reason
of his being so entitled under
customary law, has acquired
possession of such land either
without payment of any
consideration or in exchange for
a nominal consideration,"
shall be subject to the
concurrence of the Minister and
shall be of no effect unless
such concurrence is granted."
The Lands Commission Act, 1980
[Act 401] provides in its
Section 3 the following:-
3[1] An assurance of Stool land
to any person shall not operate
to pass any interest in or right
over any Stool land unless the
same shall have been executed
with the consent and concurrence
of the Commission.
[2] Where the Commission grants
or refuses to grant its consent
and concurrence to any assurance
of Stool land under Sub-Section
(1) of this Section it shall,
within twenty-one days after
taking such decision, cause
notice of the decision to be
served on the person applying
for the consent and
concurrence."
In this Act, "assurance of Stool
Land" 'includes Conveyances or
transfer of Stool land or any
interest therein and the
instrument of transfer of such
land or interest' - Vide Section
24[1] of Act 401.
The activity or conduct which
provoked the present application
was in January 1993. Section 23
of Act 401 enjoins the Courts to
have recognition of the
provisions of Act 123 and the
Statutes which relate to land
which falls under the provisions
of Act 401.
It cannot be disputed that the
Statutes referred to above
impose a legal duty on the Lands
Commission or any person to whom
that duty is delegated. That
legal duty which Undoubtedly is
in the nature of a public duty
consists in giving concurrence
to assurances of Stool lands; it
includes a duty also to refuse
to give such concurrence.
Section 11 of the Interpretation
Act, 1960 [CA.] provides -
"Where an enactment confers
power to grant a licence,
authorisation or permit, the
power includes power to revoke,
suspend or amend the licence,
authorisation or permit."
According to the Notes on the
Interpretation Act, 1960, this
Section aims at eliminating the
repetition of a common formula
in enactments. It is based on
Section 25 of the Interpretation
Act, 1957 [No. 29] which
states:-
"Where by or under any Act a
power is conferred to make an
appointment, issue an Instrument
or grant a licence,
authorisation or permit, then,
unless otherwise provided in
that Act, the power conferred
shall include the power to
suspend or terminate the
appointment, to revoke the
Instrument, and to revoke or
suspend the licence,
authorisation or permit as the
case may require."
I have no doubt in my mind that
the power or the duty placed on
the Commission to concur in
assurances involving Stool lands
carries with it the power or
duty also to refuse,
revoke/withdraw, amend or
suspend any concurrence given.
It would be unreasonable to say
that once concurrence has been
given it cannot be withdrawn or
revoked. Say, if a concurrence
is given under fraud, are we
saying that the Commission
cannot revoke it? That would be
a travesty of justice.
Consequently, the legal duty
imposed under the Statutes
referred to earlier, would
include giving concurrence,
refusing concurrence, revoking
or withdrawing concurrence,
suspending concurrence and
amending concurrence.
There is no laid down conditions
for giving the concurrence. The
power to concur, as in the
exercise of all forms of legal
duties imposed, is left to the
discretion of the Commission.
The exercise of such power or
duty may include investigations
into -
[i] the land which is to be
granted whether or not is
already incumbered
[ii] the capacity of the person
granting the land
[iii] the duration of the grant
[iv] whether or not there are
any pending litigations over the
land etc. etc.
And, the Commission on the basis
of these enquiries may decide to
exercise its legal duty in any
manner it finds proper. Thus, in
cases where an application has
been made for the issue of an
Order of Mandamus, the order
will only be allowed to go
commanding the officer,
tribunal, corporation etc. to
decide a particular matter. No
writ will be issued dictating to
him or them in what manner it or
they have to decide - see R Vrs.
Marshland Smeeth and Fen
District Commissioners [1920] 1
K.B. 155 at p. 165. The award of
mandamus is fully compatible
with the principle that it will
not issue to order a body how to
exercise its jurisdiction or
discretion. In the R Vrs.
Marshland Smeeth etc. case
[supra] the Court observed,
If for example, a jurisdiction
be given to an inferior Court
all that that Court can be
called upon by the High Court to
do, save in special
circumstances, is to hear and
determine the matters brought
before it in a regular and
proper manner. Hence rnandamus
is granted if jurisdiction has
been declined by the inferior
Court, to hear and determine
only. If the inferior Court has
a discretion as to the decision
it may give, then if that
discretion be exercised bona
fide and not arbitrarily or
illegally and without reference
to extraneous considerations the
Court will not control the
exercise of that discretion."
[emphasis mine]
This observation may equally
apply to the instant case, where
jurisdiction is given to the
Lands Commission to concur in a
document with a right to refuse
such concurrence, or to
revoke/withdraw etc. etc., then
it is not an appropriate remedy
to compel the Commission
[Appellant] to act in a
particular manner. As stated
earlier in this judgment, no
conditions have been set down
for the exercise of the legal
duty imposed on the Commission;
the exercise of that duty or
power is vested in that
Commission itself.
In the exercise of its legal
duty, the Appellant relied on a
decision given by the National
House of Chiefs, a Court of
competent jurisdiction. There
had not been any appeal against
the decision of that house. The
decision was therefore binding
on the parties. By that decision
the status of Nii Adja Kwao, the
grantor in Exhibit "A" was
declared to be null and void. It
would mean therefore that short
of being a usurper to the James
Town Stool, he had no capacity
to make the grant in Exhibit
"A". Both the trial Court and
the Court of Appeal had doubted
the effect of that decision.
They had both employed the
principle of 'a purchaser for
value without notice' to attack
the decision made by the
Commission and, to support their
Order of Mandamus.
In my opinion, it was wrong to
use that principle to defeat the
exercise of the Commission's
discretionary powers. The
Appellant [Commission] may have
been wrong in saying that since
the grantor [Nii Adja Kwao]
should be taken as never to have
been enstooled a Chief of James
Town, it has revoked or intends
to revoke the concurrence given
to Exhibit "A" but neither the
Court of Appeal nor the High
Court had jurisdiction to sit on
that issue on appeal. That issue
was left to the Chieftaincy
Tribunals and the Supreme Court.
The principle laid down in Mcfoy
Vrs. U.A.C. Limited [1962] AC.
152 and Moshie Vrs. Bagyina
[1963] 1 GLR 337, is still good
law! Nobody is entitled to act
on an order or decision declared
to be null and void and say that
his act is valid because he did
not know of the existence of
that fact.
One of the arguments used in the
application of the principle of
a purchaser for value without
notice to support the grant of
the Order of Mandamus by the
Courts was that Nii Adja Kwao
having been recognised by the
Government and he having been on
the Stool albeit illegally, for
so many years, a person who
dealt with him in that capacity
could not be denied rights he
had acquired before the grantor
was 'destooled'. I would like to
dispel the impression that Nii
Adja Kwao was 'destooled'. Nii
Adja Kwao was never 'destooled';
he was said to have come to the
Stool illegally, he did not come
from the heritable lineage. His
position was that of a usurper;
one who has never been on the
Stool. Admittedly the Government
had recognised him, but there is
evidence to show that since his
installation there had been
attempts to get him off the
Stool - see the case of -
"In the Matter of the Chiefs
[Recognition] Act, 1959
- And -
In the Matter of the James Town
Manche [Recognition]
Order L.N. 201 OF 1ST August,
1959
- And -
In the matter of an Application
for leave to Issue an Order of
Certiorari for the said Order to
be brought to Court and quashed
etc. Misc. Suit No. 34/59." [See
Exhibit "F" attached to the
Respondent's Statement of Case].
This application which sought to
remove Nii Adja Kwao by the
quashing of the notice
recognising him a Chief was
refused.
But the case which was started
in 1974 and which eventually
ended at the National House of
Chiefs in 1993 had been pending
at the time that Nii Adja Kwao
made the grant in Exhibit "A";
at the time there was litigation
over his status:
In the first place, the fact
that Nii Adja Kwao was gazetted
or recognised by the Government
was not conclusive of his
status. As was similarly
considered in the case of Ntem
Vrs. Ankwandah [1977] 2 GLR 552,
registration of a Deed under Act
122 did not constitute a
state-guaranteed title. The fact
that Nii Adja Kwao had been
recognised did not estop any
person from challenging his
entitlement to the James Town
Stool. There is no evidence that
the Respondent made any search
before the grant; the existence
of the litigations, was notice
to him. The application of the
principle of "a bona fide
purchaser for value...."
depended upon certain facts
which the Court on the evidence
before it, could not apply;
besides, the proper persons
against whom the principle could
have been applied were not
before the Court. In the
circumstances, the application
of the principles was an
extraneous matter which was
wrongly considered. It was
unfair to other persons directly
affected by the order.
Be that as it may, the principle
of law is that a body or
tribunal which has jurisdiction
to determine a case does not
lose jurisdiction by incorrectly
determining the matter. The
question whether a tribunal has
jurisdiction depends not on the
truth or falsehood of the facts
into which it has to inquire or
upon the correctness of its
findings on these facts, but
upon their nature. Thus, a
tribunal empowered to determine
claims for compensation for loss
of office has jurisdiction to
determine all questions of laws
and fact relating to the measure
of compensation and the tenure
of the office and it does not
exceed its jurisdiction by
determining any of these
questions incorrectly - see S.A.
de Smith's 'Judicial Review of
Administrative Action', 3rd
Edition page 97. Whenever a
judicial tribunal - and this may
apply to any person or body
charged with the exercise of
power - is empowered or required
to enquire into a question of
law or fact for the purpose of
giving a decision on it, its
findings thereon cannot be
impeached collaterally or on an
application for certiorari but
are binding until reversed on
appeal - see [1929] 45 LGR. 459
also, Anisminic Ltd. Vrs.
Foreign Compensation Commission
[1969] 2 AC 147 at 171.
As the Commission had a
discretion in its determination
of the duty imposed on it by
law, it could decide either
wrongly or rightly. The Court
cannot command it by an order of
mandamus to determine in a
particular way; the aggrieved
person may appeal.
As stated before, the Appellant
had a discretion as to how it
would perform it legal duty. As
was produced in evidence, apart
from the National House of
Chiefs' decision, other factors
had come to the notice of the
Appellant upon which factors it
could exercise its discretion.
Firstly, it was brought to the
notice of the Court, that there
were numerous litigations in
respect of the land, pending
before various Courts. These
involved other Stools which have
laid claims to portions of the
land granted. The Respondent has
not denied these. Under Section
8 of Act 123 any transaction
which is entered into by the
Stool 'shall be of no effect'
unless concurrence is given.
And, any transaction entered
into in contravention of the
provisions of Section 8 shall be
void [vide Section 8(6) of Act
123]. Also, the Constitution
provides that "there shall be no
disposition or development of
any Stool land....."unless the
Lands Commission has given its
consent and concurrence to the
transaction [vide Article 267(3)
and (4)]. Since validity of a
transaction involving Stool
lands depends upon the
concurrence given, it would be
unjust to concur in a
transaction when there are other
claimants to the land. It is
part of the legal duties of the
Commission to examine all the
facts and claims before the
grant, and to refuse, revoke or
suspend the grant where
necessary.
Secondly, by an Executive
Instrument, 'the James Town
Stool Property [Seizure]
Instrument 1974 [E.I. 185]', all
James Town Stool Property
including its land, had been
vested in the District
Administrative Officer, Accra.
That was in 1974; the Instrument
was revoked on 15th May, 1978.
This means that at the time that
Nii Adja Kwao or for that matter
Nii Okpe purported to grant the
land to the Respondent, the
property was vested in the
District Administrative Officer,
Accra and the Grantors had no
capacity to grant the lease. One
may ask, if the Lands Commission
had inadvertently concurred in a
grant, would it not have power
to revoke the concurrence, when
it became aware of the
situation? If there was no power
of revocation or withdrawal
under the Statutes referred to,
there could be no power to
restore to the records under the
Statutes. There would therefore
not be any legal duty for which
an Order of Mandamus would lie.
Such an interpretation under the
Statutes would be absurd. It is
my contention that by the
interpretation of the relevant
provision of the Act, there
exists a legal duty. In the
particular circumstances of the
case however the enforcement of
any such duty should not be by
Mandamus proceedings unless that
duty has not been exercised. In
fact neither Nii Adja Kwao nor
Nii Okpe III could give the
Respondent a valid title of that
which was not vested in them. In
such a situation the proper way
to go about it, is by a
substantive action to determine
the various issues arising from
the circumstances.
Article 267[4], of the
Constitution, Section 8[2] of
Act 123 and Section 3 of Act 401
- all referred to supra,
prescribe an alternative remedy
where the Commission fails to
perform its legal duty. Although
the Constitution vests the legal
duty in the Lands Commission,
Act 123 vests that duty in the
Minister. But the Lands
Commission Act, 1980 [Act 401]
provides:-
"3 (1) An assurance of Stool
land to any person shall not
operate to pass any interest in
or right over any stool land
unless the same shall have been
executed with the consent and
concurrence of the Commission.
(2) Where the commission grants
or refuses to grant its consent
and concurrence to any assurance
of stool land under sub-section
[1] of this section it shall,
within twenty-one days after
taking such decision, cause
notice of the decision to be
served on the person applying
for the consent and concurrence.
(3) Where the Commission fails
or refuses to give its consent
and concurrence to an assurance
of stool land, any person
aggrieved by the failure or
refusal may appeal against it to
the High Court of Justice.
(4) Any person desirous of
appealing under this section
shall within three months after
service of notice of the
decision on him file a Notice of
Intention to appeal stating his
grounds of appeal at the High
Court, and copies thereof served
on the Commission and all
parties connected with the
proceedings before the
Commission.
(5) The high Court may on an
appeal under this section
confirm, reverse or amend the
decision of the Commission
appealed against or order the
decision to be sent back to the
Commission for amendment or
otherwise make such orders and
give such directions as the
justice of the case may be
required.
(6) Any Rules of Court
applicable to appeal proceedings
before the High Court in civil
matters shall, with such
modifications as may be
necessary, and subject to such
directions as the High Court may
give in the interests of
justice, apply to an appeal
under this section."
It follows that it is the
Commission and not the Minister
who must give the Concurrence or
refuse it. I have already stated
that, the power to grant
concurrence or refuse it
includes a power to revoke,
suspend or amend the grant.
Consequently when the Commission
has exercised any of its legal
duties in the manner aforesaid
the remedy available to an
aggrieved person is the one
prescribed under the statutes;
an order of mandamus would not
be a proper course. The Court
will, as a general rule, and in
the exercise of its discretion,
refuse an order of mandamus when
there is an alternative specific
remedy which is not less
convenient, beneficial or
effectual. See R. Vrs. Marshland
Smeeth Vrs. Fen District
Commissioners [supra]
In Ramia Vrs. African Wood
Limited [1956] 1 W.L.R. 193 p.
400 Coussey J. [as he then was]
said:-
"When you find in an ordinance
only one particular mode of
affecting the object one train
of formalities to be observed,
the regulations which the
section prescribed are essential
and imperative."
And in his Book "Judicial Review
of Administrative action",
referred to earlier, De Smith
sums up the position thus:-
"The existence of a right of
appeal against a refusal to
carry out a duty has generally
been regarded as fatal
impediment in application for
mandamus; nevertheless when the
need for speedy just and
efficient justice demands the
Court have shown themselves
ready to grant relief even
though the applicant has
declined to avail himself of the
right of appeal."
It has also been said that the
alternative remedy must be
remeduim juris, one that can be
dispensed by a Court. As stated
above, Act 401, Section 3 gives
a detailed procedure by which an
aggrieved person can have his
grievance resolved. It has been
contended that that procedure is
only permissive and that an
aggrieved person can have
recourse to any body and by
whatever means he could have his
grievance adjudicated upon. In
my opinion, the words "may
appeal ........." only gives
the aggrieved person the
opportunity to decide whether or
not he would appeal as, no one
can be forced to appeal against
a decision: but once he has
decided to appeal, he can only
go to the High Court on appeal
following the procedure laid
down in the Act. Section 3[5] of
the Act, tells us what the Court
can do in the circumstances. The
Court may confirm what had been
done; reverse what had been done
or amend the decision or order
the decision to be sent back to
the Commission for amendment or
otherwise make such orders and
give such directions as the
justices of the case may
require; in other words, it is a
rehearing of the application for
concurrence etc. I think this
would be a fairer and more
effective way of adjudicating on
the issue, than to command by an
Order of Mandamus to do
something without reference to
all persons directly affected by
the matter in issue.
A mandamus will not go when it
appears that it would be futile
in its result. Accordingly, the
Court should not, by mandamus,
order something if it is of the
opinion that no conceivable
benefit will accrue to the
applicant as, where at the time
the matter comes to Court, by
the terms in the document for
which the enforcement is
required, the document has
lapsed - See R. Vrs. Whiteway,
ex- parte Stephenson [1961] V.R.
168. Clause 4 of Exhibit "A"
states:-
"[b] The Lessee shall within
Twenty [20] years erect or cause
to be erected dwelling houses on
the said plots.....
"[e] If at the end of Twenty
[20] years any plot on the
demised premises shall still
remain undeveloped the said plot
or plots so remaining
undeveloped shall revert to the
Lessor." [emphasis supplied]
In the manner by which the
matter was brought to Court,
since the Lessor was not
involved in the application, it
was difficult to determine any
of these issues. No receipts of
payment of rent and no
development plans were shown.
Even though the Lessee was
entitled to sub-let or assign
the Lease, there was need for a
written notice to the Lessor to
that effect. Since Nii Adja Kwao
was no longer on the scene, the
only person interested who
should have been notified of the
pendency of the action was the
incumbent occupant of the James
Town Stool. Be that as it may,
Clause 4[e] provides that "if at
the end of twenty years any plot
on the demised premises shall
still remain undeveloped the
said plot or plots so remaining
undeveloped shall revert to the
Lessor". The lease was dated
28/9/73 and the application was
brought in March, 1973. The
Ruling of the Court was on 15th
September, 1993. The Judgment of
the Court of Appeal was on
18/1/96. It is quite clear that
at the time these proceedings
were in Court, the Applicant had
no further interest in the land
for a Mandamus Order to lie to
restore the concurrence if at
all. It would therefore have
been futile to make a Mandamus
Order.
In conclusion, for the various
reasons given, I hold that the
Application for an Order of
Mandamus was misconceived and
the order was wrong.
I would accordingly allow the
appeal and set aside both the
judgments of the High Court and
the Court of Appeal. I would
dismiss the application for
Mandamus.
ACQUAH, J.S.C.:
My Lords, what is the fate of a
grant of land made by a chief
whose nomination, election and
installation are later declared
by a Court to be null and void,
and in consequence thereof the
Chief is, destooled? Does the
grant made before such a
decision, become null and void
as contended by the Lands
Commission in this appeal,
citing in support thereof, Mcfoy
Vrs. UAC LTD (1961) 3 All ER
1169. and Mosi Vrs. Begyina
(1963) GLR 337 S.C.?
This issue is really part of a
wider one dealing with the
validity of acts of persons and
officers in positions or
authority whose authority,
office or appointment under
which they performed those acts
are later found to be defective
or invalid. Are those acts also
invalid? But first the facts of
this appeal.
The Vanderpuye Estates Limited
was granted a leasehold of a
tract of land by the James Town
Stool represented by Nii Adja
Kwao II and the principal elders
of that Stool. Nii Adja Kwao II
was at that time gazetted and
recognized as Chief of James
Town by LN 201 of 1959. The
grant was evidenced by an
indenture dated 28th September,
1973, stamped as No. 8780/73 and
registered as L/R 2374/78. The
grant also received the
concurrence of the Lands
Commission. In 1974, a
Chieftaincy petition was filed
at the Ga Traditional Council
challenging the nomination
election and enstoolment of Nii
Adja Kwao II. The suit went
through the various chieftaincy
tribunals and was finaly
determined at the National House
of Chiefs, where on the 25th
March, 1983, the nomination,
election and enstoolment of Nii
Adja Kwao II was declared null
and void. He was consequently
destooled.
Thereafter, the Lands Commission
in a letter dated 7th February,
1990, to Vanderpuye Estates Ltd.
stated that they intended
expunging from their property
records the Document No. 8780/73
and registered as L/R 2374/78.
The basis of the Lands
Commission decision, as advanced
by them was that by the
judgement of the National House
of Chiefs, Nii Adja Kwao II was
deemed never to have been a
chief, and therefore the said
grant made by him in his
capacity as James Town Mantse
was null and void. Since this
letter lead to the institution
of this action, it is important
to reproduce it in extenso. The
letter reads:-
"Dear Sir
Administration of Lands Act,
1962. Document No. AC 8780/73
Reference is hereby made to the
above-mentioned document to
which concurrence has been
granted by the Lands commission.
It is observed that the above
grant was made by Nii Adja Kwao
II who was adjudged never to
have been a chief. This being
the case all grants made by him
in his purported capacity as
James Town Mantse, are in law
null and void. An application
has therefore been placed before
the Lands Commission to have the
transaction expunged from the
records of this Secretariat.
You are therefore being informed
of this intention.
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd) ......................
For Executive Secretary
Vanderpuye Orgle
Estates
Accra."
The James Town Stool on whose
behalf Nii Adja Kwao II and the
stool elders executed the
document No. AC 8780/73 was not
given a copy of this letter.
Vanderpuye Estates Limited,
therefore on 18th March, 1993
applied to the High Court for
rnandamus to compel the Lands
Commission to restore unto their
property records the said deed
of AC 8780/73. On 15th
September, 1993, the High Court
granted the application. The
Court of Appeal also confirmed
the High Court's decision. Still
undaunted, the Lands Commission
lodged the instant appeal to
this court on a number of
grounds which really boil down
to two; first, that, challenging
the propriety of resorting to
the High Court for mandamus in
the face of an alleged remedy
provided in Section 8(2) of the
Administration of Lands Act 1962
(Act 123); and secondly, the
contention that because the
nomination, election and
installation of Nii Adja Kwao II
had been declared a nullity, the
grant contained in Document No.
AC 8780/73 is also a nullity.
Now the High Court in granting
mandumus to compel the Lands
Commission to restore the
respondents documents unto their
property records, said:
"I believe that purchasers or
innocent third parties ought to
find protection under the law in
such situations, and certainly a
court of equity would never
sanction or support the
respondent's contention because
the confusion and absurdity
arising therefrom can very well
be imagined".
At the Court of Appeal, all the
three judges unanimously
dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the conclusion of the
High Court. Mrs. Wood J.A.
sought to do so on the principle
of a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice of any
defect in the title of the
vendor. Brobbey J.A. on the
other hand argued that the lease
was granted in September, 1993
whereas the chieftaincy
litigation which resulted in the
destoolment of Nii Adja Kwao II
began in 1974. Accordingly he
sought to sustain the High
Court's judgement, principally
on the principle that a
purchaser of landed property
cannot be affected or estopped
by litigation involving the
vendor, initiated after the
purchase has been concluded. His
Lordship referred to cases like
Abbey Vrs. Ollennu (1954) 14
WACA 567;
Mercantile Investment & General
Trust Co. Vrs. River Plate Trust
Loan and Agency Co. (1894) 1 Ch.
578; Nettey Vrs. Odjidja
(1952-55) Land Cases 244; Attram
Vrs. Aryee (I 965) GLR 341 SC;
Golightly Vrs. Ashrifie (1961)
GLR 28 PC; and Yomo Dancherebebi
Vrs. Budu Kofi (1952-55) Land
cases 50. Baddoo J.A., while
agreeing with his two
colleagues, pointed out that
since Nii Adja Kwao II was
recognized by the then
Government in LN 201 of 1959, he
was clothed with authority to
make grants of the James Town
Stool land with the consent and
concurrence of the elders of
that stool. The grant to
Vanderpuye Estate Ltd. could not
in his view be impugned.
I do not intend, in this
opinion, to go over the above
principles ably expounded by my
lords at the courts below.
Instead I intend to dispose of
this appeal from other angles.
Now before examining the grounds
of appeal it is necessary to
make some preliminary
observations.
The records disclose that after
the destoolment of Nii Adja Kwao
II, the Vanderpuye Estates Ltd.
renegotiated the lease in
respect of the same land with
Nii Okpe III of James Town Stool
in a deed dated 28th July, 1976,
and that the Lands Commission
refused to grant its concurrence
to this deed. However, the
subject-matter of this appeal is
not this 28th July, 1976 deed
but the 28th September, 1973
deed numbered AC 8780/73 in
respect of which the Lands
Commission's concurrence had
long been granted. Thus the
relief sought at the High Court
reads:
"Order of mandumus to issue
directed to the Lands Commission
and its executive secretary to
restore To the Property records
the deed of lease reference
Number AC 8780/73 registered as
L/R No. 2374/78"
As to why the Lands commission
refused to grant its concurrence
to the deed of 28th July, 1976,
two varying explanations are
offered.
In the supplementary affidavit
of one S.M. Addo, Higher
Executive Officer of the
Commission, he swears in
paragraph 10 to 13 thus (Exh. A.
refers to Deed No. AC 8780/73
and Exh. E that of 28th July,
1976):
10 .... The applicants submitted
Exhibit E. to the respondent for
statutory concurrence in
replacement of Exh. A.....
11. That as at the date hereof
different stools and Family
heads such as the James Town,
Aplaku and Bortianor stools have
also been claiming ownership of
the subject land....
12. That information available
to the respondent also indicate
that a suit between the
Bortianor stool and the
Applicants over the ownership of
the subject land is still
Pending at the High Court....
13. That it is, inter alia,
because of the averments
contained In paragraphs 11 and
12 herein that concurrence has
not Yet been granted to Exh. E
since it is the position of the
Respondent that the grant of
concurrence to Exh. E. will Be
prejudicial to the Court case
and the interests of the Other
competing claimants".
The above explanation
notwithstanding, the Lands
Commission in its Statement of
Case filed in this Court on 14th
November, 1997 at page 4
paragraph 4 states:
"The said lease is dated the
28th day of July,, 1976. At that
date the James Town Stool
property had Been handed over to
the District Administrative
Officer, Accra by the James Town
Stool Property (Seizure)
Instrument 1974 (E.I. 85). This
instrument was not revoked until
the 15th May, 1978 by E.I. 57 of
1978. It therefore follows that
at the time Nii Okpe III
allegedly made the grant to the
respondents the Control of the
James Town Stool property
including Lands was vested in
the District Administrative
Officer, Accra and Nii Okpe III
has no authority or capacity to
Make the grant to the
respondents".
Which is which? Did the Lands
commission refuse its
concurrence to the 28th July,
1976 deed because of alleged
competing claims to the Land as
sworn to in the supplementary
affidavit or because of EI 85?
Whatever be the reason for
refusing concurrence to the 1976
deed, the important point is
that the claim for mandamus is
not in respect of this 1976 deed
but that of the 1973 numbered AC
8780/73.
Now as to whether the Lands
Commission did indeed expunge
the Deed No. AC 8780/73 from
their property records as
intended by them in their letter
of 7th February, 1990, there is
no letter from the Lands
Commission informing the
Vanderpuye Estates Ltd. that
this had been done. Except the
word of the Lands Commission
itself in its said Statement of
Case at page 6. Discussing the
relevance of section 8(2) of Act
123 to Exhibit A, that is, Deed
No. AC 8780/73 the Lands
Commission states:
"Exhibit A is not a document
which the Minister had refused
to grant concurrence to. What
has happened to Exhibit A was
that the concurrence has been
revoked by the Minister/Lands
Commission as per reasons given
by their letter of 7th February,
1990". (emphasis is supplied)
Now to the grounds of appeal.
And I begin with the ground
formulated in additional ground
2 which challenges the propriety
of this action. It reads:
"The provisions of Act 123,
however imposed a duty on the
Minister vis-a-vis the Lands
Commission to grant concurrence
to the disposition of stool
lands and having further set and
the remedies or reliefs on a
refusal aggrieved parties
thereunder, the Court erred in
granting mandamus as the
existence Of specific statutory
reliefs in respect of duty
Obligators under statute
excludes the granting Of
prerogative orders - including
mandamus.
In both their statement of case
and at pages 33 and 34 of the
record of proceedings, the Lands
Commission argues that once
section 8(2) of Act 123 clearly
spells out how an aggrieved
party should seek redress, it
was wrong for Vanderpuye Estates
Limited to resort to the High
court for mandamus.
Now section 8(1) of Act 123
reads:
"8(1) Any disposal of any land
which involves the payment of
any valuable consideration or
which would, by reason of its
being to a person not entitled
by customary law to the free use
of land, involve the payment of
any such consideration, and
which is made,
(a) by a Stool;
(b) by any person who, by reason
of his being so entitled under
customary law, has acquired
possession of such land either
without payment of any
consideration or in exchange for
a nominal consideration, shall
be subject to the concurrence of
the Minister and shall be of no
effect unless such concurrence
is granted.
2) Any person aggrieved by the
refusal of the Minister to
approve the disposal of any land
under subsection (1) of this
section or by the failure of the
Minister to notify his decision
regarding such disposal within
three months of the date on
which the application for
concurrence was made, may appeal
to an appeal tribunal which may,
if it thinks fit, approve such
disposal in writing, and such
approval shall have the same
effect as the concurrence of the
Minister".
From the language of the above
provisions it is clear that
section 8(1) of Act 123 makes it
mandatory to obtain the
concurrence of the Minister in
respect of a disposal of a stool
land. While section 8(2) thereof
provides the remedy for a person
aggrieved by the Minister's
failure or refusal to grant such
concurrence. The remedy is by
way of an appeal to an appeal
tribunal made up of three judges
or lawyers of not less than five
years standing, appointed by the
President in consultation with
the Chief Justice. (See section
9 of Act 123)
It is also clear that the remedy
in section 8(2) is in respect of
the minister's refusal or
failure to grant concurrence
under section 8(1) of Act 123.
In a situation like this where
the statute, in this case Act
123, provides a remedy under
section 8(2) of that Act for
particular disputes under
section 8(1) of the same Act,
the law is settled that
generally it is that remedy in
section 8(2) which should be
resorted to in the event of the
said dispute arising. Thus in
Halsbury Law of England (3rd
ed.) Vol.36 page 440 paragraph
664 it is stated:
"As a general rule, it may be
said that where a statute itself
provides a remedy there is a
prima facie presumption that
that remedy is intended to be
the only one, but this
presumption will by no means
always prevail: (emphasis mine).
See also Waghorn vrs. Collison
(1922) 91 LJKB 735 CA at 736 &
738 per Bonkes KJ.
Now the problem in the instant
case is not one of a request for
concurrence but that of a threat
to revoke concurrence already
granted, as contained in the
Lands Commission's letter of 7th
February 1990. In this
connection it is important first
to settle the issue whether the
Lands Commission has power to
revoke concurrence. Act 123 does
not specifically say so, but
section 11 of the Interpretation
Act 1960 (C.A. 4) undoubtedly
provides that a power to grant
something includes a power to
revoke that thing. The section
reads:
"11. Where an enactment confers
powers to grant a license,
authorisation or permit, the
power includes power to revoke,
suspend or amend the license,
authorisation or permit"
(emphasis mine).
Therefore where a person is
aggrieved by a revocation,
suspension or amendment of his
concurrence, he is to resort to
the remedy under section 8(2) of
Act 123.
But was section 8(2) of Act 123
in force at the time this action
was instituted?
In fact before 1962 when the
function of granting concurrence
became a ministerial
prerogative, it was either the
chairman or the clerks of the
defunct district and urban
councils which performed this
function. The substitution of
the Minister by section 8(1) of
Act 123 for these local
officials had its own drawbacks.
Accordingly when the 1969
Constitution was being prepared
the excesses of the previous
regime as to its land policy led
the framers and later the
Constituent Assembly to look far
and wide for an institution to
manage and administer stool and
other lands with a minimum of
political interference. The
English Lands Commission set up
by the Labour Government in
1966, captured the imagination
of the Constituent Assembly and
was incorporated into the 1969
Constitution with significant
adaptations. Thus the 1969
Constitution established for the
first time in Ghana, the Lands
Commission in Article 163(1)
thereof. And in article 164(3)
provided that there could be no
assurance of any stool land
unless executed with the consent
and concurrence of this
Commission. It also provided
that a person aggrieved by a
refusal of the Lands Commission
to grant its concurrence had a
right of appeal to the High
Court and not to the appeal
tribunal established under Act
123. The Lands Commission Act of
1971 (Act 362) was subsequently
enacted. The 1979 Constitution
also continued with the Lands
Commission under its article
189(1) and the Lands Commission
Act of 1980 (Act 401) was in
consequence made. It repealed
Act 362. When the PNDC overthrew
the 3rd Republic, PNDCL 42 was
made which repealed, among other
Laws, Act 401, and
re-established the Lands
Commission under its section 36.
Section 47(1) of PNDCL 42 made
it mandatory like previous
legislations, to obtain the
consent and concurrence of the
Lands Commission in respect of
any assurance of stool land. But
unlike previous legislation,
section 47(1) did not provide
any remedy for a person
aggrieved by a refusal or delay
in granting concurrence.
Indeed in 1990 when the Lands
Commission wrote their letter of
7th February, 1990, the Law
regulating the Commission was
the relevant provisions of PNDCL
42 and the unrepealed provisions
of Act 123. The 1992
Constitution of Ghana in chapter
21, re-established the Lands
Commission, authorized it inter
alia, to grant consent and
concurrence to any disposition
and development of stool land,
and gave a right of appeal to
the High Court, to any person
aggrieved by the Commission's
refusal to grant consent and
concurrence. Following the
provisions of the 1992
Constitution, the Lands
Commission Act of 1994 (Act 483)
was enacted and Gazetted on 9th
September 1994.
Now Vanderpuye Estates Ltd.
instituted this action on 18th
March 1993, at a time when the
1992 Constitution of Ghana was
in force. Article 267 (3) of
which, empowered the Lands
Commission to certify that the
disposition or development of
any stool land is consistent
with the development plan drawn
up or approved by the planning
authority for the Area
concerned. Any person aggrieved
by the failure or refusal of the
Lands Commission to grant such
consent and concurrence is
provided with a remedy under
Article 267 (4) thereof, in the
following words:
"267(4) Where the Regional Lands
Commission fails or refuses to
give the consent and concurrence
under clause (3) of this
Article, a person aggrieved by
the failure or refusal may
appeal to the High Court".
The above constitutional
provision obviously overrides
section 8 (2) of Act 123. For
the remedy for a refusal or
failure to grant concurrence now
lies at the High Court. Thus the
Lands Commission's submission
that Vanderpuye Estates Ltd.
ought to have resorted to the
remedy under section 8 (2) of
Act 123 is patently erroneous
since at the time the action was
instituted, that is, 18th March
1993, the 1992 Constitution of
Ghana was in force. Of course by
article 267 (4) the remedy is by
way of an appeal to the High
Court. But Vanderpuye Estates
Ltd. came by way of mandamus.
Are they then to be thrown out
of Court?
I concede that the existence of
a right of appeal against a
refusal to carry out a duty has
generally been regarded as an
impediment to an application for
mandamus: R. v. Smith (1873) LR
8 QB 146; R.v. Bristol Licensing
JJ (1893) 9 TLR 273-, R. v.
London (City of ) Assessment
Committee (1907) 2 KB 764;
Stepney B.C. vrs. Walker (John)
& Sons Ltd. (1934) AC 365,
395-397; Ex. P. Jarret (1946) 62
TLR 230; and Mc Beatty v. Gorman
(1975) 2 NSWLR 262.
Nevertheless, where the
interests of speedy and
effective justice so demand the
courts have shown themselves
ready to grant relief even
though the applicant has
declined to avail himself of his
right of appeal. Thus in R. vrs.
Newcasttle-on-Tyne Corporation
(1899) 60 LT 963 mandamus was
issued to compel the authority
to grant an application which it
had no discretion to refuse. In
R. vrs. Thomas (1892) 1 QB 426
at 431 the court held that
notwithstanding the fact that
the statute provided a right of
appeal,
"the remedy by appeal would not
be as satisfactory and effectual
as the remedy by mandamus".
Again in R vrs: Paddinton
Valuation Officer ex parte
peachey Property Corp. Ltd.
(1966) 1 QB 380 where the
statute provided a right of
appeal by way of a remedy to an
aggrieved person, but the
applicant's resorted to
certiorari and mandamus, the
Court of Appeal held that on the
law, the applicants were
entitled to do so. For the
existence of the statutory
remedy for the correction of
particular assessments in a
valid valuation list did not bar
the rate payer who sought to
attack the whole list from
applying for the remedies by way
of prerogative orders, for in
such a case those remedies were
more convenient, beneficial and
effective than the statutory
procedure. In R. vrs Perth
Shire, ex p. Dewar and Burridge
(1968) W.A.R. 149 it was held
that a right of appeal was an
inadequate remedy for the
refusal of planning application
on irrelevant grounds. In a
large number of cases mandamus
were issued to order tribunals
of first instance to exercise a
jurisdiction which they had
wrongly declined to exercise in
spite of the fact that the
applicant could have appealed
against the decision to refuse
jurisdiction. On our local
scene, Edusei J, as he then was,
in Republic vs. Lands Commission
ex parte Akainyah (1975) 2 GLR
487 granted mandamus to compel
the Lands Commission to grant
its concurrence, in the face of
a statutory right of appeal. The
courts therefore do exercise a
wide discretion in the
determining whether a statutory
right of appeal is to be
construed as operating as a bar
to an application for mandamus.
The major consideration being
whether on the facts and in
particular the issues raised for
determination, mandamus would be
more convenient, beneficial and
effectual than the statutory
right of appeal.
In the instant case the problem
created by the Lands Commission
was not a refusal to grant
concurrence as same had been
granted years ago. The problem
as stated earlier, was that the
Land Commission had threatened
in their letter of 7th February
1990 that they intended to
revoke the concurrence already
granted. For in their view the
grant was null and void because
the nomination, election and
installation of Nii Adja Kwao II
whom the Commission regarded as
the grantor, had been declared
null and void by the National
House of Chiefs.
lndeed from 7th February 1990 to
the institution of this action
on 18th March 1993, there is no
evidence on record as to the
positive steps the Lands
Commission took either to carry
their intention expressed in
their letter, into effect or to
retract it. Complete inactivity.
And when the solicitors of
Vanderpuye Estates Ltd. wrote
protesting, the reply of the
Commission dated 4th February
1993, was to say the least,
evasive. The reply reads:
"Sir,..............
Please refer to your letter
dated 29th January, 1993 and
referenced amc - 20/0/DAN-A/PAA.
You have grossly erred in your
appreciation of the functions of
this Commission. You do not
appear to have distinguished,
the difference between
registration of documents
relating to land transactions on
the one hand and the granting of
concurrence to validate
transactions affecting stool
lands on the other hand. Until
you are clear on these fine
differences in the statutory
Functions of the various bodies
dealing in land, you would often
write with such emotions which
do no good to anyone.
Yours faithfully,
Sgd. Executive Secretary".
The above letter does not give
any information as to whether
the Commission had revoked,
suspended or amended their
concurrence. Since their letter
of 7th February 1990, there was
no further communication on
this. And it was in their
Statement of Case quoted above
filed in this Supreme Court,
that that Lands Commission for
the first time disclosed that
the concurrence had been
revoked. As to when the
revocation was done, is not
disclosed. And why could the
Lands Commission not notify
Vanderpuye Estates Ltd. about
this revocation, but wait for
this action before making such
disclosure?
It is also important to
appreciate that the reason
advanced by the Lands Commission
in their letter of 7th February
1990, raises purely a legal
issue as the basic facts are not
in dispute. That is, there is no
dispute that the National House
of Chiefs had declared the
nomination, election and
installation of Nii Adja Kwao II
null and void. And there is
further no dispute that the
Document No. AC 8780/73 was
executed by Nii Adja Kwao II in
his capacity as James Town
Mantse. Thus the issue for
determination is whether by the
nullification of Nii Adja Kwao
II's enstoolment, that document
also stands nullified.
Indeed the unreasonable delay by
the Lands Commission in the way
they dealt with the problem
created by themselves, makes it
imperative to take legal action
to compel them to sit up to
their public duty. For a
statutory duty must be performed
without unreasonable delay, and
that if any such delay occurs,
mandamus may be employed to
enforce the performance of such
duty. Accordingly in R. Vrs.
Home Secretary ex-parte
Phansopkar (1976) QB 606
mandamus was granted on this
ground against the Home
Secretary when the Home office
insisted that a would-be
immigrant who was legally
entitled to enter England
without let or hindrance should
wait for over a year in the
queue of applicants for entry
certificates. See also R. vrs.
Governor of Durham Prison
ex-parte Singh (1984) I ALL ER
983.
It is therefore clear that form
the special circumstances of
this case, the remedy of appeal,
provided in article 267 (4) was
not the appropriate and
effective remedy to contain the
problem created by the Lands
Commission. The problem created
was not one of a refusal or
failure to grant concurrence,
neither was it that of
revocation, suspension or
amendment of the concurrence
already granted. A resort to
mandamus was therefore the most
effective and beneficial remedy
to determine both the validity
of the Lands Commissions
contention and to achieve the
restoration of the concurrence
in question. It is for the above
reasons that I agree with the
lower courts that mandamus was
the proper remedy in the
circumstances.
Now to the crucial issue in this
appeal. The Lands Commission's
position is that since the
enstoolment of Nii Adja Kwao II
had been declared a nullity by
the National House of Chiefs,
the Document No. AC 8780/73
executed by him and other is
also a nullity because by that
decision Nii Adja Kwao II was
deemed never to have been a
chief. The Court of Appeal
rightly pointed out that no
where in the judgment of the
National House of Chiefs was it
stated that Nii Adja Kwao II was
deemed never to have been a
chief.
To begin with an examination of
the Document No. AC 8780/73
clearly shows that the leased
transaction was between the
James Town Stool and Vanderpuye
Estates Ltd., and that Nii Adja
Kwao II, the principal elders
and Councillors of the James
Town Stool executed the document
for and on behalf of the James
Town Stool. Thus the rent
accruing from the lease was not
paid or payable to Nii Adja Kwao
II but through the Chief Lands
Officer or his authorized agent
into the relevant Stool Lands
Account, At page 11 of the
record of proceedings where the
concurrence of the Lands
Commission to the Document No.
AC 8780/73 is shown, it is
stated under the said
concurrence:
"The rent payable under the
lease shall be paid to the Chief
Lands Officer or to his duly
authorized agent".
And under sections 19 and 20 of
Act 123 which were in force
before the promulgated of PNDCL
42, the beneficiaries of the
proceeds of this stool land
account were:
i. Local authorities in whose
areas the lands were situated.
ii The relevant stool or
traditional authority
iii Projects and scholarship for
the people of the area.
It is therefore quite clear that
the lease document of AC 8780/73
is that of the James Town Stool
and not Nii Adja Kwao II. It was
on behalf and to the benefit of
the James Town Stool that Nii
Adja Kwao II and others executed
that document. It is thus
fallacious for the Lands
Commission to equate Nii Adja
Kwao II with the James Town
Stool simply because he executed
the document.
For a stool is a corporation
sole, separate and distinct from
its occupant. And that while the
occupants come and go, the stool
never dies. Accordingly in Quarm
vrs. Yankah II (1930) 1 WACA 80
at 83, Deane CJ said:
".....the conception of the
stool that is and has always
been accepted in the courts of
this colony is that it is an
entity which never dies, a
corporation sole like the crown,
and that while the occupants of
the stool may come and go, the
stool goes on for ever."
But assuming without admitting
that Document NO. AC 8780/33 is
the deed of Nii Adja Kwao II and
not the James Town Stool, would
the nullification of his
enstoolment imply the
nullification of that deed?
As a general rule where
something is declared a nullity,
the declaration has the rippling
effect of contaminating that
thing ab initio. But this is not
always the case, as each
situation has to be determined
in its own peculiar
circumstances. For example,
article 1(2) of the 1992
Constitution of Ghana renders
null and void any law
inconsistent with any provision
of the Constitution. An existing
law which cannot co-exist with a
provision of the Constitution
may thus be declared void. But
such a declaration does not
render void, acts done under
that law before the coming into
force of the Constitution.
Indeed the law under certain
circumstances by the doctrine of
de facto sed non de jure upholds
the validity of acts of persons
and officers in positions or
authority, whose office
authority or appointment under
which they performed those acts,
is later found to be invalid. In
the USA case of Norton vrs.
Shelby Country (1886) 118 US 425
at 444, the doctrine was stated
thus:
"where an office exist under the
law, it matters not how the
appointment of the incumbent is
made, so far as the validity of
his acts are concerned. It is
enough that he is clothed with
the insignia of the office, and
exercises its powers and
functions .... the official acts
of such persons are recognised
as valid on grounds of public
policy and for the protection of
those having official business
to transact."
A review of the earlier
authorities of this doctrine can
be found in two masterly
judgments of State vrs. Carroll
(1871) 38 Conn. 449 or 9 AM 409
(Supreme Court of Connecticut,
USA), and In re Aldridge (1875)
15 NZLR 361 Court of Appeal of
New Zealand). The doctrine is
also discussed in an article
entitled De Facto Officers by
Dixon J (later Chief Justice of
Australia) in the publication
Res Judicata (Melbourne 1940)
Vol. 1. pp.285 - 292. The
rationale for this doctrine was
stated by Butler CJ at page 432
in State vrs. Carroll (supra) as
follows:
"the de facto doctrine was
introduced into the law as a
matter of policy and necessity
to protect the interests of the
public and individuals, where
those interests were involved in
the official acts of persons
exercising the duties of that
office without being lawful
officers."
In the English case of Scadding
vrs. Lorant (1851) 3 HLC 418,
the House of Lords applied this
doctrine to an administrative
authority so as to uphold a rate
levied by a vestry although a
member of the vestry men had not
been duly elected. On the
competence of those who had not
been duly elected, Lord Truro LC
said at page 448:
"With regard to the competence
of the vestrymen, who were
vestrymen de facto, but not
vestrymen de jure, to make the
rate, your Lordships will see at
once the importance of that
objection, when you consider how
many public officers and persons
these are who are charged with
very important duties, and whose
title to the office on the part
of the public cannot be
ascertained at the time. You
will at once see to what it
would lead if the validity of
their acts, when in such office,
depended upon the propriety of
their election. It might tend,
if doubts were cast upon them,
to consequences of the most
destructive kind. It would
create uncertainty with respect
to the obedience to public
officers, and it might also lead
to persons, instead of resorting
to the ordinary legal remedies
to set right anything done by
the officers, taking the law
into their own hands".
In Waterloo Bridge vrs. Cull
(1859) 1 E & E 245, the English
court relying on this doctrine
upheld a distress levied by a
collector of land tax who did
not have the residential
qualification required for his
appointment. The same doctrine
was applied in Margate Pier Co.
vrs. Hannam (1819) 3 B & Aid 266
to uphold a distress warrant
granted by a magistrate who had
not taken the necessary judicial
oath. Again in Buckley vrs.
Edwards (1892) AC 387, and In re
Aldridge (supra) the doctrine
was applied when the appointment
of a New Zealand Supreme Court
Judge was found to be invalid.
The cases indicate that the
doctrine applies where the
person or officer, the validity
of whose acts are in issue, has
"colourable authority". That is,
he has some colour of title to
the office or appointment under
which he acted. Thus in Rex vrs.
Bedford Level Corporation (1805)
6 East 356 where the registrar
of the Bedford Level Company
employed a deputy to register
land titles within the level, it
was held that registrations
effected by the deputy after the
death of the registrar was
known, were invalid: the
deputy's authority expired on
the death of his principal, and
once the death was generally
known the deputy could not be
taken to have any colour of
authority to act. Lord
Eenborough CJ said at page 368:
"An officer de facto is one who
has the reputation of being the
officer he assumes to be, and
yet is not a good officer in
point of law."
It follows that where the
circumstances giving rise to the
defect on the appointment or
office are notorious, the
doctrine does not apply. So in
Adams vrs. Adams (1970) 3 All ER
572 a divorce granted in 1970 by
a Rhodesian judge, appointed
under the unconstitutional
Rhodesian regime (UDI)
established in 1965, was held to
be invalid in England, since it
was notorious in both Rhodesia
and England that the Rhodesian
regime had been declared
unlawful by Act of Parliament
and order in council. Therefore
the Rhodesian judge who granted
the divorce had no colour of
title to his office in the eyes
of the law.
The rejection of the doctrine in
Adams vrs. Adams (supra) was
heavily criticized by Lord
Denning in Re James (an
insolvent) (1977) 1 All ER 364
wherein he concluded that Adams
vrs. Adams was wrongly decided.
The de facto doctrine has a long
history and had been applied to
a wide variety of officers. It
was even said to have been
applied to the English monarch,
so that it might validate acts
done in the names of kings whose
title to the throne was
considered illegitimate and who
were kings "in fact and not in
law", (the quoted words are from
the Act of 1461 which on the
accession of Edward IV removed
doubts as to the judgments given
in the reigns of Henry IV, Henry
V and Henry VI, then considered
usurpers).
In Ghana, the doctrine was
applied, without specifically
mentioning it, in Nartey vrs.
Attorney General & Anor.
(1996-97) SCGLR 63 wherein the
Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the judgment and
acts of the judge whose
continuous stay in office after
a certain date was found to be
invalid. The Court held that in
the interest of public policy
and in order not to create
hardship and confusion the
judgments and functions
performed after that period were
of full force and effect.
Now the import of the de facto
doctrine is that the public must
be able to rely on the acts of
officers or persons in authority
so long as there is no reason to
suppose that such persons are
not validly appointed. It is
thus a very useful and sane
doctrine. However the conditions
for its invocation will depend
not entirely on general
principles but on the peculiar
circumstances of each case,
taking into consideration the
interests of the public, the
rights of third parties and
above all, the justice of each
situation.
In the instant case, the office
of a chief is the foundation of
our traditional rule and
culture. The colonial
governments recognised and
guaranteed the institution. And
each of the post-independence
Constitution of Ghana guaranteed
it. In the case of Nii Adja Kwao
II his status as James Town
Mantse was even recognised and
fortified by the then Government
with the enactment of LN 201 of
1959 of 1st August 1959. It
reads:
"The enstoolment of Mr. Samuel
Eric Golightly Odartei Thompson
otherwise Nii Adja Kwao II as
James Town Mantse is recognized
and any person failing to
recognise Mr. Samuel Eric
Golightly Odartei Thompson
otherwise Nii Adja Kwao II as
the enstooled James Town Mantse
Commits an offence against the
chiefs (Recognition) Act 1959
and shall be liable
accordingly."
LN 201 of 1959 did not therefore
merely recognize Nii Adja Kwao
II as James Town Mantse, but
also made it an offence for
anyone to deny him such
recognition. He was thus
portrayed to the whole world as
having legal authority to act as
the James Town Mantse.
Consequently since in 1973 when
he executed Document No. AC
8780/73 on behalf of the James
Town Stool, the said LN 201 of
1959 had not been set aside, he
had colourable authority to act
and execute the document as
James Town Mantse. And the
invalidation of his enstoolment
in 1983 by the National House of
Chiefs, can in no way invalidate
what he did at a time he had
legal authority to do under LN
201 of 1959.
Thus if event the deed of AC
8780/73 is that of Nii Adja Kwao
II and not the James Town Stool,
the doctrine of de facto is
applicable to save the validity,
not only of the deed but the
acts he performed during the
period.
Thus which ever way one looks at
it, the contention of the Lands
Commission is unfounded and
indeed, subversive of the quest
for security in title to land.
In their statement of case, the
Vanderpuye Estates Ltd., real
estate developers, disclose that
as at the 7th February 1990 when
the Lands Commission wrote
threatening to withdraw their
concurrence to Document No. AC
8780/73, they had invested over
¢150 million in the development
of that land into housing units
for the public. What has now
happened to such huge investment
by such threats from the Lands
Commission, is anybody's guess.
It cannot be doubted that no
investor in real estate
development would be willing to
sink his investment into such
venture if he gets to know that
the Lands Commission of all
national institutions, can
behave in the way they did in
this case. Let's hope we have no
more of this.
As pointed out earlier, the
claim of Vanderpuye Estates Ltd.
was in respect of Document No.
AC 8780/73 and not the 28th July
1976 deed. But the High Court in
its ruling, affirmed by the
Court of Appeal, granted
mandamus in respect of the two
deeds. This ought to be and is
hereby corrected by confining
the order of mandamus to only
the Document No. AC 8780/73.
Subject to this correction, I
dismiss the appeal and affirm
the judgment of the Court of
Appeal.
MS. AKUFFO, J.S.C.
I agree
COUNSEL
Nii Amponsah for the Respondent
Mrs. F.C. Quansah, Chief State
Attorney for the Appellants
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