Application for an order
consequential to a previous
judgment of the Court to the
effect that a judgment of the
Divisional Court should be
varied by the order for costs in
favour of Plaintiff-Respondent
being set aside and judgment
being entered for a less sum
than that previously
awarded-Plaintiff-Respondent
refused to refund the difference
and questions the power of the
Court to make an order that he
should do so.
Held: The
Court has the power to make the
order. Evans v. Main
Colliel'Y Co., Ltd., (1915)
W.N. 10; 50 L.J.N.C.26
; 138 L.T Jo., 163;
31 T.L.R. 127 followed.
There is no
need to set out the facts.
A.
Ridehalgh (Crown Counsel)
for Appellants. E. C.
Quist for Respondent.
The following
joint judgment was delivered :-
KINGDON,
c.]., NIGERIA, PETRIDES, C.].,
GOLD COAST AND GRAHAM PAUL,
c.]., SIERRA LEONE.
In this
action judgment was given in the
Divisional Court for the
Plaintiff-Respondent for £1,644
10s. and costs to be taxed. The
costs were taxed at £73 18s. 6d.
On appeal to this Court,
inter alia, the judgment was
varied by judgment being entered
for the Plaintiff-Respondent
against the
Defendants-Appellants jointly
and severally for £250 only and
the order as to costs was set
aside. The usual formal
certificate was issued directing
the Court below to carry out the
judgment of this Court.
In pursuance
of that certificate application
was made to the Court below for
an order that the
Plaintiff-Respondent should
repay to the
Defendants-Appellants the sum of
£1,394 10s. together, with
interest thereon from the 27th
July 1939 to the date of payment
at the rate of 4 per cent per
annum and the sum of £73 18s.
6d" That application was refused
on the ground that the
certificate did not authorise
the Court below to enforce the
payment.
The
Defendants-Appellants have not
appealed against that refusal,
but have come to this Court with
the present application for an
order consequential upon and
For supplemental to the
judgment of this Court that the
Plaintiff-Respondent do repa to
the Defendants-Appellants the
difference between £1,644 10s.,
and £250, namely, £1,:>'94 10s.
together with interest thereon
from the 27th July 1939 to the
date of payment at the rate of
-1 per cent per annum and also
the costs of £73 18s. 6d.
The
Plaintiff-Respondent has
questioned the power of the
Court to make the order prayed.
But it appears to us that w
undoubtedly have the power.
The matter
seems, on this point, to be on
all fours with the: case of
Evans v. J\iI(Jin Colliery Co.
Ltd. 31 T.L.R. 127.
In that case, as in this, the
successful Defendants-Appellants
omitted t ask the Appeal Court
at the time of judgment for an
order that al sum of
money which had been paid by
them to the PlaintiffJ
Respondent under the judgment of
the Court below should b repaid
to them, and a subsequent
application by the Defendants.!
Appellants that the order might
be added to by providing that
the sum paid should be returned
was granted. We think that:
there is nothing in the argument
of Counsel for the Plaintiff·1
Respondent that, because this
Court has already issued a
certificate directing the Court
below "to carry out",
this Court cannot make any
additional order. The ratio
decedendi in the Court below
for the refusal to make the
order prayed was that such an
order was not included in that
which it was directed to carry
out. The inherent power of this
Court to make an order adding to
its previous order cannot be
affected by the fact that it has
already issued ~o the Court
below another order which does
not include the order, now
prayed. Put in another way, the
very argument upon which the
Plaintiff-Respondent succeeded
in getting the Court below to
refuse the
Defendants-Appellants' prayer is
an argument in favour of this
Court's power to make the order
now prayed. On the merits the
Defendants-Appellants are
plainly entitled to the order
they seek, save that we see no
reason to award interest except
from now onwards.
It is
accordingly ordered that the
Plaintiff-Respondent do repay to
the Defendants-Appellants such
sum (including any sum paid by
way of costs), less £250, as the
Defendants-Appellants may: have
paid to the Plaintiff-Respondent
in pursuance of the judgment of
the Court below dated the 7th
July, 1939, together with
interest thereon from this date
until the date of payment at the
rate of 4 per cent per annum,
and that the previous order of
this Court dated the 24th
February, 1940, shall be added
to accordingly.