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COMMERCIAL  COURT CASES

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) HELD IN ACCRA ON  26TH MAY 2011 BEFORE HER LADYSHIP BARBARA ACKAH-YENSU (J)

 

                                                        SUIT NO.BFS/266/09 

 

                                                     UT FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED                      ===   PLAINTIFF 

                                                         

                VRS. 

1.   DR. SAMPSON OTOPAH AMOAFO

2.   KOKUI TAMAKLOE                                         ===  DEFENDANTS

 

 

=======================================================

 

 

JUDGMENT:

 

The Plaintiff has sued Defendants jointly and severally for the following reliefs:

 

“i.   Recovery of the sum of GH¢444,033.31 being the

outstanding balance of the loan advanced to 1st Defendant and accrued interest as at 3rd May, 2009, payment of which was guaranteed by 2nd Defendant.

 

  ii.    Interest on GH¢444,033.31 from 3rd May, 2009, to date of

   final payment.

 

iii.   Further Order or Relief including costs.

 

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE

 

Judicial sale of 1st Defendant’s property that is House no. 7 Adom Street Oyarifa, which said property is the subject-matter of a Mortgage dated 3rd April 2008, to enable proceeds of sale to be applied in the liquidation of Defendants indebtedness to Plaintiff and; Judicial sale of 2nd Defendant’s property situate at Achimota which said property is the subject-matter of a Surety Mortgage dated 3rd April 2008 to enable the proceeds of sale to be applied in the liquidation of Defendants indebtedness to Plaintiff.”

 

Plaintiff’s case is that on 3rd April, 2008, upon a request by the 1st Defendant, the Plaintiff then known as Unique Trust Financial Services Limited advanced to the 1st Defendant a loan of GH¢159,000.00  The loan was to attract interest compounded at the rate of 8% per month and was to be paid back on or before October 2008.  As security for the facility, the 1st Defendant mortgaged his property situate at Oyarifa.  Another security was provided by 2nd Defendant who mortgaged her property situate at Achimota as security for the due repayment of the loan.  The 2nd Defendant also guaranteed repayment to Plaintiff of the loan.

 

The 1st Defendant refuted the claims of the Plaintiff on the grounds that he is a director of a company by name of Netco Rockville Limited which needed Letters of Credit (L/C) established for it and approached Plaintiff for funds for the payment of the deposit for the establishment of the L/C by UT Logistics Limited but Plaintiff deceived, influenced or misled him to sign the documents in his name as the applicant for the loan.  Furthermore, he never received the loan and the Letters of Credit was not established for Netco Rockville Limited.  The 2nd Defendant also refuted the Plaintiff’s claims on the ground that she did not understand the documents she was made to thumbprint and that the document had no jurat.

 

The Plaintiff’s Credit Manager, Christiana Atuhene Acheampong (P.W.1) testified on behalf of Plaintiff.  She tendered in evidence the following documents amongst others.

 

1.    Loan Agreement                                               -        Exhibit “A”

2.   Deed of Guarantee                                  -        Exhibit “B”

3.   Surety Mortgage between Plaintiff

and 2nd Defendant                                    -        Exhibit “C”

4.   Mortgage between Plaintiff and

1st Defendant                                            -        Exhibit “D”

5.   Notice of Default dated 13/08/08            -        Exhibit  “E”

 

P.W.1’s evidence was that 2nd Defendant accepted the terms and conditions of the Surety Mortgage (Exhibit “C”) and also the Deed of Guarantee after the 1st Defendant had explained the contents of the documents in the Ga Language to the 2nd Defendant.  The further evidence of P.W.1 was that after the grant of the facility, the 1st Defendant made two (2) payments and then defaulted.  A Notice of Default dated 13th August, 2008 was tendered in evidence as Exhibit “E”.  She also tendered in evidence a statement of account as Exhibit “F”, which shows that as at 3rd May 2009 1st Defendant was indebted to Plaintiff in the sum of GH¢444,033.31.

 

Under cross-examination, P.W.1 contended that 1st Defendant instructed that the money was to be used as a deposit for the establishment of letters of credit to be issued by UT Logistics Limited and so instructed that the money be paid directly to UT Logistics Limited, and this was accordingly done.  Daniel Amuzu, an Accountant with Plaintiff (P.W.2) tendered in evidence the receipt that 1st Defendant signed in acknowledgment of receipt of the loan.

 

Henrietta Opoku Amissah, Development Manager of UT Logistics (P.W.3), also testified on behalf of Plaintiff.  Her evidence was that UT Logistics Limited received funds from Plaintiff for the cost of establishing an L/C, and that the L/C was actually established by UT Logistics Limited through Standard Chartered Bank Limited (Stanchart Bank).  She also confirmed that UT Logistics received Barclays Bank cheque No. 136530 with a face value of GH¢155,820.00 from Plaintiff and explained that the sum received was less the commission and administrative charge of the Plaintiff.  Her evidence remained the same under cross-examination as she insisted that UT Logistics Limited had received money from the Plaintiff.  She supported her evidence on the payment with Exhibit “H” and “H1” which are statements of account from Stanchart Bank.

 

1st Defendant’s evidence, on the other hand, was that he did not receive any money from the Plaintiff and no L/C was established.  His further evidence was that it was Netco Rockville Ltd., a limited liability company that approached the General Manager of UT Logistics in Tema, Richard Abban, to import cement at a time when there was shortage of cement in the country. 1st Defendant’s further evidence was that US$300,000.00 was too much money for a “small company like ours to lose” and upon advice from the said Richard Abban, they went to UT Financial Services Limited for a facility. The evidence was that he was supposed to be the originator or the one who took the loan “with my mother as a co-guarantor.”  He said he never received a cheque, neither did he receive a loan; he never instructed anybody to give a cheque to anybody; he was subsequently informed that he had defaulted on a facility granted to him.  He stated further that he never made the two instalment payments towards retiring the facility.  He however conceded that he explained the contents of the loan documents to the 2nd Defendant in Ga.

 

Looking at Exhibit “A”, the Loan Agreement, it is clear that Plaintiff did give a loan facility of GH¢159,000 to 1st Defendant under the terms and conditions already stated above.  The properties to be used as security were listed in schedule II, and 2nd Defendant was stated as the Guarantor/Surety in schedule III.  There was also a jurat with the thumbprint of the 2nd Defendant.  Again both Defendants signed/thumb printed Deeds of Mortgage.  I will therefore find that 1st Defendant took the facility of GH¢159,000.00 from the Plaintiff.

 

The further evidence adduced on behalf of Plaintiff by P.W.1, was that 1st Defendant instructed the Plaintiff to issue the cheque for the loan amount to UT Logistics and he signed an official receipt to that effect.  According to P.W.1, 1st Defendant stated that UT Logistics was establishing an L/C for him and therefore he wanted the Plaintiff to make that payment to UT Logistics.  In Exhibit “G”, the Official Receipt signed by the 1st Defendant, it stated categorically that the 1st Defendant had received an amount of GH¢159,000.00 “being a loan from Unique Trust Financial Services”.  It also stated that the payment was made by way of CHEQUE NO. 136530.  So the question is; who was the cheque issued to?  1st Defendant under cross-examination denied ever receiving the cheque.  This is what he said:

 

“Q     Isn’t it a fact that at the time you applied for the facility, you know that the facility was for the benefit of Netco Rockville?

 

A:      No it was not a fact.  I applied for the facility, and during those times there were problems within Netco Rockville as a company. And therefore until those issues within the company were resolved, i didn’t want to step in and take that responsibility because of the inner struggle, so that applying the loan and receiving it would have given me that leverage to now make sure that the internal inconsistency or the problems that the company was having have been resolved before I hand over the personal loan I have taking to UT Logistics.

 

Q:      At the time you applied for the loan from UT financial, isn’t that a fact that you informed them that it was meant for an establishment of an L/C Netco Rockville?

 

A:      I don’t remember My Lord.

 

Q:      What is your educational background?

 

A:      I have an MBA, I have a BSC, I have MSA finance and i have Doctorate in International Economics and Finance.

 

Q:      With this background, don’t you think it was prudent that you ensure that you actually received or the beneficiary received the facility before you signed the receipt?

 

A:      My Lord when you deal with a situation where everything is so in a rush, in 48 hours you have to receive a loan, there are so many documents that you have to sign from the time you applied for the loan until you receive it.  So that part of the package or the paper work that you have to fill is that receipt.  I filled it in anticipation that as soon as the cheque was signed, which I was told that the cheque has gone up for signature, I know that it was coming down and I was going to get my cheque.

 

I must state here that I cannot accept1st Defendant’s evidence that he did not remember that he informed Plaintiff that the loan he was taking was for the establishment of an L/C for Netco Rockville, when his earlier evidence was that he went to UT Logistics with another director of Netco Rockville, Jakins Baker, purposely for the establishment of an L/C. I find this piece of evidence it incredulous. His further evidence was that the company could not raise the money required to be deposited and were thus advised to go to Plaintiff.1st Defendant stated further under cross-examination as follows:

 

Q:      What I am saying is that Mr. Abban who was the officer you dealt with, you went to UT Logistics as a representative of Netco Rockville together with another Director, is that not correct?

 

A:      That is correct

 

Q:      When you went to that meeting, Mr. Abban, the officer you dealt with, called someone on the phone from UT Finance and discussed your issue with the fellow?

 

A:      That is correct.

 

Q:      UT Financial was informed that the loan that you were going to apply for was for the fulfilment of those conditions?

 

A:      Yes my lord.  When the call was made, it was Netco Rockville that was going to take the loan not Dr. Amoafo or Madam Kokui Tamakloe, we were not parties to the transaction, it was the company.  So when Mr. Abban placed a call it was on behalf of Netco Rockville.

 

Q:      But you went to UT Financial to apply for the facility?

 

A:      That is not correct.  When we got there, because for one reason or the other I have a property, my mother has a bigger property; Netco Rockville didn’t have any property or collateral.  So I was asked to apply for the loan and that is how we switched from the company to me been the securer or procurer of the loan.

 

Q:      You were asked to and you agreed to do that?

 

A:      That is correct.

 

Q:      After that meeting at UT Financial, and after you have signed that receipt, there was some communication between Netco Rockville of which you are a director and UT Financial on this transaction, is that not correct?

 

A:      I believe so, there were several.

              

Exhibit “J” is one of the correspondences referred to above, and it was signed by the 1st Defendant.  For purpose of emphasis, I am going to reproduce the entire letter.  This is what it stated:

 

“August 18th 2008,

 

UT FINANCIAL SERVICES

Accra.

 

Attention:  Mr. Ebenezer Asante Sefa

                             Asst. Branch Manager

Dear Sir,

 

STATUS OF THE LOAN

 

I write to inform you that the total amount of GH¢159,000 less commissions we borrowed was paid directly to UT Logistics to pay the Letter of Credit (LC) and Performance Bond (PB) fees for the establishment of an LC to import Ordinary Portland Grey Cement into Ghana.  This was the condition under which we secured this loan from UT financial Services (UT).

 

UT Logistics issued an LC with a validity period of thirty days in May 2008 to the supplier.  However, our supplier failed to supply and that has resulted in the delay in paying off this indebtedness.  The transaction is still a viable one with adequate cash flows to service all related obligations.  It was our intention to pay back quickly the principal and interest with proceeds from the sale of the cement which should have landed in Ghana over two months ago.

 

As a result of the failed performance by the previous supplier, Mr. Richard Abban, our relationship manager, at UT Logistics has requested that the new supplier must first provide a PB and/or POP bank-to-bank as an evidence of their capability to supply before reissuing the payment instrument.  Since then, we have identified new supplier who is willing to comply to the request of Mr. Abban by issuing the POP and PB before receiving the payment instrument.

 

However, the new supplier’s request is to provide them with a Bank Comfort Letter (BCL) before honouring Mr. Abban’s request.  Several weeks ago, we had a conversation with Mr. Abban on the BCL, he did indicate that to secure the BCL, the director of finance of UT has to identify source of funds which would be put to support this particular transaction and that such funds was not available.  Again on August 18, we reminded Mr. Abban of the urgency to receive the BCL to allow the supplier to provide the POP and PBB.

 

We have every intention in paying off our loan but unless we receive the BCL from UT Logistics to support the cement import, it would be very difficult to outright liquidate the outstanding obligations.  In the meantime, we will endeavour to pay part of the interest charges until the BCL and other financial instruments have been issued to our new supplier to enable the cement to start arriving in Ghana by mid October, 2008,

 

Yours faithfully,

 

         (Signed)

Dr. Sampson Amoafo   

 

cc:  Legal Depart (UT Financial Services)

                   Mr. Richard Abban (UT Logistics)

                   Madam Korkui Tamakloe

 

I think this letter speaks for itself; it says it all.

 

The position of the law and this is common knowledge, is that for every case there is a burden of proof to be discharged and the party who bears this burden will be determined by the nature and circumstances of the case. Our Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D 323) as interpreted in Ababio v. Akwasi III [1994-95] Ghana Bar Report, Part II, 74 where it was held that a party whose pleadings raise an issue essential to the success of the case assumes the burden of proving such issue.  However as stated by Justice Mensa Boison JA in the case of Acquaye v. Awotwi [1982-83] 2GLR 110, the testimony of a plaintiff is presumptive evidence which is rebuttable.  The well-known rule of evidence is that although proof in a civil case rested on the plaintiff, that burden was discharged once the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence of the probability of his case.  It would then rest on the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s evidence.  Thus in Re Ashalley Botwe Lands:  Adjetey Agbosu & Ors v. Kotey & Ors [2003-04] SCGLR 420, it was held as follows:

 

“....the burden of producing evidence in any given case was not fixed, but shifted from party to party at various stages of the trial depending on the issue (s) asserted and/or denied.”

 

It is trite learning that in civil proceedings, the standard of proof required to be met by either party seeking to discharge the legal burden of proof is on a balance of probabilities. In Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2All ER 372, Denning J described as well settled the degree of cogency required in discharge of the legal burden in a civil case. He said:

 

“It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say; ‘we think it more probable than not’, the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal it is not.”

 

Most of the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff was documentary; namely Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G H, H1, 1, 1A and 1B. Exhibit “H1”, a statement of account from Stanchart Bank clearly indicates that on 04/07/08, a Barclays Bank cheque (BBG 136530) for an amount of GH155, 820.00 was paid as “Deposit for Cement L/C CHA”. And the unchallenged evidence of P.W.3 was that the Plaintiff’s bankers was Stanchart Bank. She also said that at any time that Plaintiff required an L/C to be established UT Logistics would request Stanchart Bank to do that on its behalf. Exhibits “1”, “1A” and “1B” are further proof of the establishment of the L/C. The confirming bank was Stanchart UK. And from the documents, the beneficiary was DC Weber LLC in the US. Indeed, Exhibit “1B” states that the said L/C issued expired unutilised. The L/C was therefore cancelled from the records of Stanchart Bank and the files were closed. In my opinion, it is obvious from Exhibit “J” that it was not the fault of the Plaintiff that the L/C expired.

 

Per section 25(1) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 328), there is a presumption that the facts recited in the written documents are true. The section provides as follows:

 

“25(1) Except as otherwise provided by law including a rule of equity, the facts recited in a written document are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties to the instrument, or their successors in interest.”  

 

Section 21 of the Evidence Decree again provides the procedure for determining the establishment and discharge of proof applicable to rebuttable presumptions. Where the burden of proof is by the preponderance of probabilities, the rule is that, the Court will assume the existence of the presumption once the basic facts which establish the presumption have been proved. This presumption will exist until the party against whom it has been established proves that the non-existence of the presumption is more probable than its existence. In my opinion, the Plaintiff has produced credible evidence in support of its claim before the Court. 1st Defendant’s evidence that he did not receive the loan, in my view, is incomprehensible. 1st Defendant led no evidence to challenge the facts contained in the said documents.

 

In the case of the 2nd Defendant, the Plaintiff by its evidence and the evidence of the 1st Defendant under cross-examination established that the 2nd Defendant actually mortgaged her property to secure the facility. The 2nd Defendant at all material time knew the purpose of visiting the Plaintiff’s office and handed over to Plaintiff the title deed of her property. In Youhana v Abboud [1963] 1GLR 258, it was held that where an illiterate executed a document, any other party to the document who relied on it had to prove that it was read over and if necessary interpreted to the illiterate. See also Zabrama v Segbedzi [1991] 2GLR 221 CA. In the case of Kano v Kalla & Another [1977] 2 GLR 367, the Court of Appeal held that in determining the issue of protection for an illiterate who executed documents, depending on the circumstances of each case the evidence needed to rebut the presumption of an illiterate’s ignorance of contents of documents executed could be circumstantial or direct or a mixture of both. In the instant case, there is ample evidence that the documents 2nd Defendant signed were read over and explained to her in the Ga language by the 1st Defendant.

 

In conclusion, I will find that Plaintiff has proved its case on the balance of probabilities, and will therefore hold that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants, jointly and severally, the sum of GH¢444, 033.31, together with interest at the prevailing bank rate, from 3rd May, 2009 to date of final payment. I will award costs of GH¢2,000.00 against the Defendants.

          

 

 

BARBARA ACKAH-YENSU (J)

JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT

 

 

COUNSEL

CHRIS ARCHER                  -        PLAINTIFF

CHARLES BENTUM  -        DEFENDANTS

 

                        

 

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