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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE HELD IN ACCRA ON MONDAY

 31ST JANUARY, 2011 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP MR. JUSTICE S. H. OCRAN

  

SUIT NO. IRL /41/08

_______________________________________________________

VERONICA POKU

 

                                                     VRS.

                                                MARY LARTEY

________________________________________________________

 

 

JUDGMENT

BY COURT:

On 14th November, 2008, the Plaintiff issued this writ, accompanied by a Statement of claim and claimed the following reliefs.

      I.        An Order for recovery of possession of the aforesaid land together with the house numbered C48/22 Abofu, Accra, the subject matter of this suit from Defendant.

    II.        Perpetual Injunction restraining Defendants, their heirs, privies assigns and all other persons claiming through Defendants and whatsoever described from interfering in any way disturbing Plaintiff’s Peaceful and or quiet enjoyment of her land, together with her house number C 48/22, Abofu, Accra, the subject matter of this suit.

   III.        General Damages for trespass.

The gist of the case of the Plaintiff put up in her Statement of Claim is that by an agreement between the Plaintiff and one Doris Lolonyo Hotse as the vendor she purchased the land in dispute together with the house thereon, and put in occupation her son Richard Peprah.  That her son Richard Peprah died, and thereafter, the Defendant occupied the said house without her consent.  Sometime in 2008, she caused her solicitors to write to the Defendant to vacate from the house.  The Defendant also caused her solicitors to reply to the said letter, and denied Plaintiff’s title.

The Defence of the Defendant is that it was Richard Peprah, her Sister’s husband who came down to Ghana from United States and acquired the disputed premises from Madam Efe Amponsah Mensah in 1994.  That in 1997, Richard Peprah married her sister Mrs. Iris C. Peprah and they lived in this house till they left for the United States in  1999.

The Defendant pleaded further that Madam Efe Amposah Mensah prepared the document in respect of the house in the name of Plaintiff before Mrs. Iris C. Peprah was married.  After the marriage, Richard Peprah requested Madam Efe Amponsah Mensah to change the documents into his name, but this could not be done before Richard died.  That Richard Peprah devised the house in dispute to Iris C. Peprah the Defendant’s Sister.

With regard to the letters pleaded by the Plaintiff, the Defendant admitted that they were written, but the house belonged to her sister, by the Will of Richard Peprah, and therefore cannot be ejected. 

The Defendant counter claimed as follows:

a.    Declaration that the disputed house numbered C 48/22, Abofu, Achimota Accra has now devolved upon Mrs. Iris C. Peprah by virtue of a devise made by Richard Peprah (deceased) as contained in his last Will and Testament dated 24th July, 2003 and admitted to probate.

b.    Perpetual Injunction to restrain the Plaintiff her agents, assigns, servants, workmen, privies, grantees and by all claiming through under and in trust of the Plaintiff, from interfering in anyway whatsoever with the House No. C 48/22 Abofu, Achimota, Accra in the Greater-Accra Region of Ghana.

The issues that were set down for resolution are as follows:

      i.        Whether or not Plaintiff is the rightful owner of the disputed land.

    ii.        Whether or not Richard Peprah was the rightful owner of the disputed land.

   iii.        Whether or not Defendant has any valid interest in the disputed land.

   iv.        Whether Plaintiff is entitled to all or any of the reliefs claimed in this case.

    v.        Whether or not Defendant is entitled to any of the reliefs claimed in her counter claim.

   vi.        Any other issue arising from the pleadings filed in this case.

 

The Plaintiff gave evidence that she is a Ghanaian who lives in the United States of America.  That she is a Nurses Aid in America and earned US$1,800.00 a week, but her take home pay was US$600.00.

The Plaintiff tendered Exhibit A as the document given to her when she purchased the house.  Exhibit ‘A’ is a lease between Doris Lolonyo Hotse and the Plaintiff, and is dated 2000.  The Plaintiff gave further evidence that she bought the house from Antie Efe but she also named other persons that she bought the land from.  Exhibit ‘A’ however has the Plaintiff’s signature.  Whilst under cross examination, the Plaintiff explained that she bought the house from Antie Efe, but if she also bought it from some people she will not know but it was Antie Efe who gave Exhibit ’A’ to her.

The Defendant pleaded in her paragraph 4 that it was Richard Peprah who came down from U.S. and acquired the disputed premises from Madam Efe Ampoma Mensah.  Again, the Defendant pleaded in her paragraph 8 of the Defence that Madam Efe Ampoma Mensah prepared the document in respect of the house in the name of the Plaintiff and that an official search that she conducted at Lands Commission revealed that there is a Conveyance between one Madam Doris Lolonyo Hotse and the  Plaintiff.

Instead of the Defendant leading evidence on how Richard Peprah came down from U.S.A to acquire the house, and how he got the documents to be prepared in the name of the Plaintiff as pleaded, she failed to do that.

It is trite that a party is not permitted to plead one thing and testify to another as Acquah J.S.C (as he then was) remarked in In Re: Blay-Miezah (Deceased); Ako Adjei & Another Vrs. Kells & Another (2001-02) SC GLR 339 at 347-348 “…… for pleadings are not just mere puppets in the process of adjudication but essential means of unfolding what is in dispute between the parties.  It is through the pleadings that the parties set out the nature of their complaint and the basis of their disagreement with the opposing parties.  And from the nature of their complaints and the areas of disagreement, the issues between them are identified.  Once the parties have complied with the requirements of pleadings and the issues between them have been identified and agreed upon, it is not permissible for the Court to ignore the issues and dangle in fanciful legalities…….”

Again in the case of Ogbarmey-Tetteh Vrs. Orgabarmey Tetteh (1993-94) 1 GLR 353, Wiredu J.S.C. (as he then was) put it this way “The law as I understand it is that a party is bound by his pleadings and the acceptance in favour of a party of a case which is inconsistent with what he has put in by his evidence is wrong and unjustified in law……”

The Defendant’s evidence on the acquisition of the house is that the house was bought before her sister Iris C. Peprah was married.  She also said she has no documents on the house except Exhibits 5, 5A and 5B which are property rate payments.

Since the house was bought before Irish C. Peprah was married, the Defendant should have disclosed the source of her information as she has no personal knowledge.  The Only person who should have assisted the Defendant is Madam Efe Amponsah Mensah, but she was not called.  The failure to call Madam Efe Amponsah Mensah is fatal to the case of the Defendant because the Onus of proof was on her.  Under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1975 (NRCD 323), the owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title.

In this case, the Defendant admits that when she conducted a search at the Lands Commission, it was revealed that the land stands in the name of the Plaintiff.  Section 37 of N.R.C.D 323 also states that “It is presumed that an official duty has been regularly performed.

As Exhibit ‘A’ is in the name of the Plaintiff and the search also shows that the land stands in the name of the Plaintiff, I accept the case of the Plaintiff that she acquired the land and the house and put her son in occupation.

 I have reached this conclusion because the Defendant has not been able to rebut the presumption that the Plaintiff acquired the land with the house thereon. The Only documentary evidence led by the Defendant as evidence of Richard Peprah’s ownership is Exhibit 5, 5A and 5B, which are property rate payments.

 Exhibits 5, is property rate in respect of House Number C 43/22 in the name of Richard Peprah.  Exhibit 5A is in respect of House Number B C 42/22 in the name of Richard Peprah and is dated 23rd November, 2006, at a time that Richard Peprah was dead.  Exhibit 5B is in respect of House No. C 42/22 in the name of Mr.  & Mrs. Richard Peprah and is dated 22nd April, 2008, also after the death of Richard Peprah.

It must be noted that the house in dispute is numbered as C 48/22 Abofu Accra and not either C 43/22 or B C 42/22 or C 42/22.  It has been held that payment of property rate or ground rent does not make the person paying the owner of the house.  Ref: to Tonado enterprises & others Vrs. Chou Sen Lin (2007-08) SC GLR 135.

If the house was acquired by Richard Peprah from Madam Efe Amponsah Mensah, then the burden of proof was on the Defendant to prove that.  The Plaintiff relied on Exhibit ‘A’ which the Defendant admits is the document on the house.  If the House actually belonged to Richard Peprah, then it was the Defendant who should have adduced evidence in proof of that.  In the case of Barkers Woode Vrs. Nana Fitz(2007-08) SC GLR 879, the Supreme Court considered section 10 of the Evidence Act 1975 (NRCD 323) which says.

10. (1)     “For the purpose of this Act the burden of persuasion means the                                           obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief                                  concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court” and                         held  in its 2nd holding that

“since the Defendant claimed that the admitted oral contract between himself and the Plaintiff had been rescinded by mutual agreement, the persuasive burden clearly was on him to prove that assertion, “ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.  This burden of persuasion defined under section 10 (1) of the Evidence Act 1975 (NRCD 323) as meaning “the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court remains on the Defendant even if the evidential burden shifts as a result of any assertion made by the Plaintiff in response to his claim.  The common sense approach that the burden of persuasion on proving all facts essential to any claim lies on who ever is making the claim …..”

 

In this case before me, the Defendant admits that the document on the house is in the name of the Plaintiff.  She has however failed to lead evidence on how Richard Peprah, her sister’s husband came down from America and acquired the disputed premises from Madam Efe Ampomah Amponsah.  Since the Defendant claims she even went to the house of Madam Efe Ampoma Amponsah in connection with the change of name, she the Defendant should have called this Madam Efe Ampomah Amponsah to testify on her behalf that she sold the house to the late Richard Peprah, but this she failed to do.

 It has also been argued that because Richard Peprah was paid a huge sum of money whereas the Plaintiff was earning very little, it stand to reason that the house was bought with Richard Peprah’s money.

The Defendant has however not told us how much the house was bought.  The Plaintiff tendered Exhibit ‘A’ as her root of title.  On Exhibit ‘A’, the property was stated to be five Million Cedis.  The Plaintiff was however not cross examined on the price of the house.

In the case of Takoradi Flour Mills vrs. Samir Faris (2005-06) SC GLR 882, The Supreme Court held in its 1st holding that “the law is well settled that where the evidence led by a party is not challenged by his opponent in cross-examination and the opponent does not tender evidence to the contrary, the facts deposed to in that evidence are deemed to have been admitted by the opponent and must be accepted by the trial court”.

That being the state of the law, I may pose a question “could the Plaintiff who is a Nurses Aid in America, and earns a take home pay of $600.00 a week not be able to pay ¢5,000,000.00 at the time that the house was bought?  It is my view that the Plaintiff could pay for it, without the assistance of her son, Richard Peprah.

Granted that Richard Peprah even gave money to his mother to pay for the house that will not make the house the property of Richard Peprah unless it is proved that it was agreed that the house was to be for Richard Peprah. This is so because as Ghanaians, it is not strange for a son to pay for property for his mother, especially at a time that the son is not married and the mother is caring for him.

The Defendant had led evidence that Richard Peprah bought a house each for his two sisters in Accra.  If it is true that he bought houses for his two sisters, and it is also true that he even paid for the Plaintiff's house in their hometown, then it cannot be said that the Plaintiff was holding the house in trust for Richard Peprah since this will be relationship between mother and son. 

Since the Defendant has not been able to prove that Richard Peprah negotiated, and bought the house in the name of his mother the issue of the Plaintiff holding the house in trust for Richard Peprah does not arise.

The Defendant also tendered the Will of Richard Pepah as Exhibit 3. In the said Will, it is stated that “I leave my house in Accra Ghana to my beloved wife Iris C. Peprah”.  This Exhibit 3 has not been sealed in Ghana, under section 84 of Act 63 as amended by Administration of Estates (Amendment) Law 1985 (PNDCL 113).

Even if Exhibit 3 were to be sealed in Ghana, the Defendant cannot rely on it to claim the house in dispute.  This is so because the particular house in Accra was not described in the Will.  Exhibits 5 series indicates that Richard Peprah paid property rate in respect of two houses other than the house in dispute.  Again, even if the house numbers were the same as the house in dispute, the Defendant will be expected to lead evidence to prove that the house was acquired by Richard Peprah otherwise, whenever a person states in a Will that a particular property has been devised then the beneficiary can take it without any proof.  Once a person other than the devisee asserts title to that property, the devisee must prove that it belonged to the testator. Not having been able to prove that the house belongs to Richard Peprah, I resolve issues i, ii, and iii in favour of the Plaintiff and hold that the Plaintiff is the rightful owner of the disputed land with the house thereon, but not Richard Peprah, and that the Defendant and her sister Mrs. Iris C. Peprah have no interest in the disputed house.  With this holding it follows that the Plaintiff is entitled to all her reliefs claimed.

The Defendant is ordered to give immediate possession of House Number C48/22 Abofu, Accra to the Plaintiff.

An Order of Perpetual Injunction is decreed against the Defendant, her heirs, privies, assigns and all other persons through whom the Defendant claims and whatsoever described from interfering and in any way disturbing Plaintiff’s peaceful and quiet enjoyment of her land, together with her house number C 48/22 Abofu, Accra.

With regard to the extent of damages, the Plaintiff did not lead any evidence on how much she has been loosing as a result of the Defendants refusal to vacate from the house.  The Defendant however admitted in the pleading that she received the Plaintiff’s letter dated 24th June, 2008 asking her to vacate from the house, but she declined. 

The Continual occupation of the premises by the Defendant from 24th June, 2008, without the consent of the Plaintiff, amounts to trespass to the said house. Considering the values of houses in Accra, I am of the view that an amount of GH ¢7,000.00 will be adequate damages for the period that the Defendant has occupied the house in dispute till today, 31st, January, 2011.  I therefore make an award of GH¢7,000.00 as damages to the Plaintiff.

The Defendant counter-Claim is dismissed.

The Plaintiff is awarded cost of GH¢5,000.00.

                 

        (SGD.)  MR. JUSTICE S.H. OCRAN 

                                                                                                                 Justice of the High Court

 

Counsel:                  Mr.  Shahadu Mohammed for Plaintiff.

                                        Mr.  Ebow Paintsil holds Mr. Ayikoi Otoo brief for Defendants.

                                   

 

 

 

 
 

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