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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION) HELD IN ACCRA ON MONDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF MAY, 2011, BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, JUSTICE UUTER PAUL DERY, HIGH COURT JUDGE.

SUIT NO. HRC 29/10

VIDA AGYEKUM ACHEAMPONG                                               - PLAINTIFF

VRS   

THE GENERAL LEGAL COUNCIL                                             - DEFENDANT        

 

 

I

JUDGMENT

By her writ of summons, issued on 12-03-2010, the plaintiff, Vida Agyekum Acheampong, claims against the General Legal Council and George Sarpong, Director of Legal Education, jointly and severally, the following reliefs:

i.             A declaration that the decision of the Board of Examiners that the plaintiff should pay the sum of GH¢12,900.00 as a condition precedent to being called to the Ghana Bar is null and void and of no legal effect, as the same was made without jurisdiction and also in contravention of the plaintiff’s unfettered right of review and/or appeal against the findings and recommendations of the Ali-Nakyea Abdallah Committee;

ii.            A declaration that the Director of Legal Education has no capacity, in the absence of compliance with the procedure in Rules 22 and 23 of the Code of Conduct of the Ghana School of Law, to make any report to the General Legal Council which has the effect of influencing the latter not to call the plaintiff to the Ghana Bar.

iii.           A declaration that the Director of Legal Education’s refusal or failure to ensure that the plaintiff’s petition against the Ali-Nakyea Abdallah Committee’s findings and/or recommendations are properly heard and determined, amounts to a breach of the rules of natural justice;

iv.           A declaration that there is no legal impediment standing in the plaintiff’s way from being called to the Ghana Bar at the next call ceremony and accordingly the plaintiff is entitled to be called to the Ghana Bar at the next call ceremony;

v.            An order directed to the General Legal Council and the Director of Legal Education to ensure that the plaintiff is duly enrolled on the Roll of Lawyers in Ghana at the next call to the Bar scheduled for April, 2010, there being no legitimate impediment or legal obstacle standing in the plaintiff’s way.

The case of the plaintiff is that, at all material times between 2007 and 2009, she was a student of the Ghana School of Law and became President of its Students’ Representative Council (SRC) from 2008 to 2009. In February, 2009, the Director of Legal Education set up a committee (the Ali-Nakyea Abdallah Committee) to conduct an administrative enquiry into allegations of financial impropriety leveled against the plaintiff by some members of the SRC. Purporting to have conducted the said administrative enquiry, the committee submitted its report, signed and dated 27-03-2009 by its chairman, to the Director of Legal Education, which report contained adverse findings against the plaintiff, with recommendations, inter alia, that the plaintiff should be made to refund the total sum of GH¢12,900.00, being alleged funds unaccounted for by the plaintiff.

Upon receipt of the committee’s report, and without any reference whatsoever to the plaintiff, the Director of Legal Education referred same to Justice Amonoo-Monney, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeal (not Supreme Court as alleged by plaintiff) to review it, in consequence of which the latter, without any reference whatsoever to the plaintiff, purported to review it and, having done so, submitted his report, dated 27-04-2009, to the Director of Legal Education.

Following from the review report, by a letter of 27-05-2009, the registrar of the Ghana School of Law notified the plaintiff that she was under the Director of Legal Education’s instructions to implement the committee’s recommendations and that the Director of Legal Education was conscious of the plaintiff’s right to petition against the findings and/or recommendations of the committee’s report and/or request a review of same or submit receipts to justify any expenditure which the plaintiff incurred but could not submit to the committee’s sittings. The plaintiff was, further, advised that the Director of Legal Education would only take a final decision on the report after receipt of petitions or application for review from the plaintiff and other affected students, which instructions were confirmed in the main by the Director of Legal Education’s letter of 02-06-2009.

In consequence of the above, the plaintiff, by letter of 29-06-2009, with supporting documentary evidence, petitioned for a review of the findings and/or recommendations of the committee. The plaintiff, further, and without prejudice to her rights at law as well as her right to have the committee’s findings and recommendations reviewed, by letters of 17-08-2009 and 22-09-2009, offered to refund an amount of GH¢6,000.00 as full and final satisfaction of her liability under the committee’s report, which offer the Director of Legal Education firmly rejected by a letter of 06-10-2009.

The plaintiff, also, as a result of the Director of Legal Education’s failure to react to her petition for review, by letters dated 22-09-2009 and 05-02-2010, reminded the Director of Legal Education to take action on her said petition. However, without attempting to address the issues raised by the plaintiff in any way, and in contravention of the plaintiff’s unfettered right of review and/or appeal, the Director of Legal Education, by letter of 17-02-2010, notified the plaintiff that the Board of Examiners of the Ghana School of Law had taken a decision that the plaintiff should pay the sum of GH¢12,900.00 as a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s call to the Ghana Bar and that unless the plaintiff does that he would be unable to recommend to the General Legal Council that the plaintiff should be called to the Ghana Bar.

The plaintiff contends, therefore, that the Director of Legal Education’s letter of 17-02-2010 was premeditated and intended to stampede and blackmail the plaintiff into accepting the Director of Legal Education’s illegal demand and relieve him of the necessity of due process. Or in the alternative, contrary to Rules 22 and 23 of the Code of Conduct, the Director of Legal Education has constituted himself into a one-man committee and evinced a clear intention in the nature of an imposition of a disciplinary sanction to dis-recommend the plaintiff to the defendant and thereby prevent the plaintiff from being called to the Ghana Bar. The plaintiff has suffered distress and continues to suffer distress as a result of the Director of Legal Education’s conduct. Thus, the plaintiff’s instant action for she was duly qualified and entitled to be enrolled on the Roll of Lawyers in Ghana.

The defendant denies that the plaintiff was duly qualified and thus entitled to be called to the Ghana Bar for, apart from passing of exams, the person must satisfy the defendant that he/she is of good character. The defendant scheduled 29-03-2010 to decide on the eligibility or otherwise of the plaintiff to be called to the Ghana Bar but before that the plaintiff instituted this action which is thus premature, unwarranted and is only calculated to pre-empt the defendant from carrying out its statutory functions on the subject.

It is, further, the case of the defendant that the Director of Legal Education at all material times acted purely in his official capacity as such the reliefs sought and the matters raised can be dealt with without making him a party to the suit. The joinder of the Director of Legal Education is thus unnecessary, embarrassing and will unduly delay the fair trial of the suit. It is misconceived and an abuse of the process of the court.

The defendant contends, again, that the Director of Legal Education acted properly in accordance with the Code of Conduct of the Ghana School of Law. In the process, he set up the Ali Nakyea-Abdallah Committee of Enquiry to investigate the allegation of financial impropriety leveled against the plaintiff by some members of the student body. The committee report of 27-03-2009 revealed several acts of misconduct and/or impropriety on the part of the plaintiff and recommended, inter alia, that the plaintiff should refund the sum of GH¢12,900.00, not properly accounted for. The report was also subsequently reviewed by Justice Amonoo-Monney who confirmed the findings of the committee and its recommendations. The Director of Legal Education, by memorandum dated 27-05-2009 and addressed to the registrar, formally directed the registrar that in fairness to the affected students, copies of the report should be made available to them for their reaction and the registrar complied.

The defendant admits that the plaintiff petitioned for a review of the findings and/or recommendations of the Ali Nakyea Committee and her offer to refund the amount of GH¢6,000.00 as full and final satisfaction of her liability under the committee’s report which the Director of Legal Education rejected. However, the petition for review was overtaken by her offer for reparation. The Director of Legal Education subsequently informed the plaintiff that the decision that the plaintiff refunded the GH¢12,900.00 was taken collectively by the Board of Examiners of the Ghana School of Law and not he alone. He, therefore, notified the Board of Examiners on the matter. The Board of Legal Education agreed that the Board of Examiners could recommend plaintiff’s disqualification for entry to the Bar but the matter ought to be separated from the publication of the plaintiff’s results. The plaintiff’s results were, thus accordingly, published leaving the matter of payment of the GH¢12,900.00 as a pre-condition for being called to the Bar to be met by the plaintiff.

The Director of Legal Education communicated the plaintiff’s offer to pay GH¢6,000.00 as satisfaction of the amount outstanding to the Board of Examiners. At the meeting, held on 14-09-2009, the Board of Examiners decided that the GH¢6000.00 could be accepted subject to confirmation from the Ali Nakyea Committee that the outstanding amount had been revised from GH¢12,900.00 to GH¢6,000.00. However, by letter dated 22-09-2009, the chairman of the committee indicated that the committee had not revised its findings. The plaintiff was duly notified by letter dated 27-02-2010 of the Ali Nakyea-Abdallah Committee’s decision.

Before the Ali Nakyea Committee’s decision not to revise the amount was communicated to the plaintiff, the latter had, by letter dated 10-02-2010 to the Director of Legal Education, reminded him of the matter. The plaintiff, by another letter of 25-02-2010, notified the secretary of the defendant of the matter. The defendant, at its meeting held on 26-02-2010, decided that the Director of Legal Education should furnish the defendant with all the relevant documents on the matter to enable the defendant consider same. The Director of Legal Education complied and the matter was slated for discussion by the defendant at its meeting on 29-03-2010. Before that date, the plaintiff, on 12-03-2010, instituted this action.

The defendant thus contends that the plaintiff’s instant action is misconceived and a vain attempt to overreach the decision of the defendant which is the sole competent statutory body that has the power to determine the eligibility of persons being called to the Bar. The action is premature as no decision has been taken by the defendant on the eligibility of plaintiff or otherwise to be called to the Bar.

The defendant, finally, contends that the plaintiff failed and/or refused to avail herself of procedures contained in the Code of Conduct for the review of disciplinary action by aggrieved persons, that is to say that the plaintiff did not exhaust internal/domestic remedies. The defendants, thus, counterclaim for the following reliefs:

1.    A declaration that the plaintiff is not entitled to be called to the Bar until a formal decision on the matter has been taken by the defendant.

2.    A declaration that the instant suit is premature, unnecessary and embarrassing in as much as that the defendant has neither considered the plaintiff’s case nor made a decision as to her eligibility or otherwise to be called to the Bar.

3.    Such further or other reliefs as in the circumstances may appear just.

At the application for directions, the following issues were set down for trial.

i.              Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of good character and be called to the Ghana Bar pending the final determination of any enquiry against her;

ii.            Whether or not the plaintiff’s offer of reparation after petitioning for review of the Ali Nakyea Committee’s findings and recommendations compromised the petition;

iii.           Whether or not the averments in paragraph 23 of the defendant’s statement of defence is prejudicial to the fair hearing and determination of any administrative enquiry founded on the allegations against the plaintiff ; and

iv.           Any other issues arising on the pleadings.

Paragraph 23 of the statement of defence states as follows:

“… Assuming without admitting that the plaintiff has suffered as alleged or at all, same has been occasioned by her misconduct by assuming the role of the treasurer to the SRC Accounts and withdrawing funds thereon ostensibly for projects which were neither executed nor carried out with the knowledge, or concurrence of the other SRC executives.”

The plaintiff sought directions by way of an order that the points of law raised by the issues be set down for hearing and disposed of forthwith and that the determination of the said issues dispose of the whole trial. The plaintiff, again, sought for an order that the evidence of any fact which any party relies upon or intend to rely upon for the due presentation of its case may be received at the trial by the production of any documents or entries in books or as the party requires as appropriate.

On 19-07-2010, this court, pursuant to Order 33, rule 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47), set down the issues stated above and ordered that the whole matter be disposed of by legal arguments and requested counsel to file their submissions. On 01-10-2010, counsel for plaintiff filed his submissions and same was served on the counsel for defendants, the Attorney-General, on 04-10-2010. Counsel for defendants, on 15-10-2010, filed her submissions by which she raised preliminary legal objection to the jurisdiction of this court to hear the entire case and asked that the preliminary legal objection should be taken first.

On 21-10-2010, this court ordered that the preliminary legal objection should be taken together with the issues that have been set down for hearing. Aggrieved by this order, the defendant, on 01-11-2010, applied to the Supreme Court for judicial review for an order of prohibition to restrain this court from hearing and determining this case on the following grounds:

“a) That the learned trial judge has no jurisdiction to pronounce on a matter that is wholly within the discretion of the applicant herein and of which the applicant is seized.

b)    That the learned trial judge has no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs being sought by the plaintiff.”

On 07-12-2010, the Supreme Court struck out the defendant’s application for judicial review as same was withdrawn. This, thus, paved the way for the consideration of this case, by way of the legal arguments submitted.

Before going into the merits of the case, it has to be noted now that this court, in its ruling on an interlocutory application by the plaintiff on 12-04-2010, took the view that, by the provisions of the Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32), the Director of Legal Education is just an employee or servant of the defendant. He cannot sue or be sued in the performance of his functions as he is an officer of the defendant. That all the acts and omissions of the Director of Legal Education complained of by the plaintiff in this action occurred in his official capacity. As such, it is, therefore, wholly untenable for the plaintiff to join him to this action. His name was, accordingly struck out from the suit leaving the General Legal Council, as the only defendant.

It also has to be noted that the plaintiff’s reliefs (iv) and (v) were dismissed in the said ruling. For the purposes of clarity of thought, I would hereunder restate the said reliefs.

“(iv) A declaration that there is no legal impediment standing in the plaintiff’s way from being called to the Ghana Bar at the next call ceremony and accordingly the plaintiff is entitled to be called to the Ghana Bar at the next call ceremony;

(v) An order directed at the defendants to ensure that the plaintiff is duly enrolled on the Roll of Lawyers in Ghana at the next call to the Ghana Bar scheduled for April, 2010, there being no legitimate impediment or legal obstacle standing in the plaintiff’s way.

With the dismissal of the above two reliefs, the only other reliefs the plaintiff seeks and for which this judgment would be concerned with are the following:

“(i) A declaration that the decision of the Board of Examiners of the Ghana School of Law that the plaintiff should pay the sum of GH¢12,900.00 as a condition precedent to being called to the Ghana Bar is null and void and of no legal effect, as the same was made without jurisdiction and also in contravention of the plaintiff’s unfettered right of review and/or appeal against the findings and recommendations of the Ali-Nakyea Committee;

(ii) A declaration that the Director of Legal Education has no capacity, in the absence of compliance with the procedure in rules 22 and 23 of the Code of Conduct of the Ghana School of Law, to make any report to the defendant which has the effect of influencing the defendant not to call the plaintiff to the Ghana Bar.

(iii) A declaration that the Director of Legal Education refusal or failure to ensure that the plaintiff’s petition against the Ali-Nakyea Committee’s findings and/or recommendations are properly heard and determined, amounts to a breach of the rules of natural justice.”

This matter would thus be dealt with in respect of the three outstanding reliefs of the plaintiff and the defendant’s counter-claims. The legal submissions of both counsel would only be considered if they relate to the above outstanding reliefs of the plaintiff and the defendant’s counter-claim.

The whole dispute arose as a result of allegations of financial malfeasance against the plaintiff which culminated in the setting up of the Ali-Nakyea Abdallah Committee of Enquiry which made adverse findings against the plaintiff. The findings and recommendations, among others, were that the plaintiff embezzled an amount of GH¢12,900.00 which amount she should refund. The Board of Examiners of the Ghana School of Law decided that the plaintiff refunds the said sum of money before she would be recommended for the call to the Ghana Bar.

The plaintiff petitioned for a review of the findings and recommendations and also offered to pay a reparation of GH¢6,000.00. The offer of reparation was refused. However, her request for review has not been considered. In fact, it was decided that the full amount of GH¢12,900.00 be paid as a precondition for the plaintiff’s call to the Ghana Bar.

Be that as it may, the defendant, by letter dated 04-03-2010, informed the Director of Legal Education that the defendant at its meeting, held on 26-02-2010 (mistakenly written as 26-03-2010), had discussed the issue of the plaintiff’s call to Ghana Bar and had decided that the director furnishes it “with all the relevant documents on the matter to enable it consider same and take a decision at the next meeting of the Council (the defendant) to be held in March, 2010”. The Director of Legal Education, by his letter of 09-03-2010, duly furnished the defendant with the said documents.

The defendant, after receiving the relevant documents stated above, was yet to hold its meeting on 29-03-2010 to discuss the plaintiff’s call to the Ghana Bar when the plaintiff issued this writ on 12-03-2010, claiming the reliefs stated hereinbefore.

In resolving the issues involved in this dispute, I find the introduction to the “Code of Conduct of the Ghana School of Law” quite inspiring and which is worth quoting. It states thus:

“The standard of conduct expected of a student of the law school is the same as that expected of a member of the Ghana Bar. Any standard short of that is an indication of the student’s unsuitability for an eventual call to the Bar …” (my emphasis)

The undisputed facts in this case are that the Director of Legal Education set up the Ali-Nakyea Abdallah Committee to, among other matters, investigate allegations of financial impropriety against the plaintiff who was then the SRC President of the Ghana School of Law and other members of the SRC. One of the complaints of the plaintiff for which she seeks a declaration to that effect is that the Director of Legal Education failed to comply with rules 22 and 23 of the Code of Conduct of the school. These rules state as follows:

“22. The Director of the School, on behalf of the Board of Legal Education shall be immediately responsible for initiating the appropriate disciplinary process.

So however that apart from a reprimand only, the Director shall constitute a panel comprising himself as Chairman, two senior members of the academic staff and two student representatives, nominated by the S.R.C. executive to discuss and decide on the appropriate disciplinary measure.

Final responsibility for any measure, however, shall rest with the Director.

23. For the purposes of discipline, the Director shall have power:

(i) to reprimand only;

(ii) in the alternative, to reprimand and, in addition, suspend any student for a maximum of one school term;

(iii) to recommend to the Board of Legal Education that any student

(a)  be suspended for more than one school term.

(b)  be disrecommended for immediate or eventual call to the Bar;

(c)  be dismissed altogether.”

It is obvious from the facts of this case that the Director of Legal Education was not a member/chairman of the Ali-Nakyea Abdallah Committee as mandatorily required by rule 22 of the Code of Conduct.

Furthermore, the decision to recommend or disrecommend a person for call to the Ghana Bar, arising out of any disciplinary proceedings, by rule 23 of the Code of Conduct, is mandatorily done by the Director of Legal Education and no other person or body. The facts of this case, however, shows that the Board of Examiners were instrumental in disrecommending the plaintiff for the call to the Ghana Bar. The status of the Board of Examiners is not known to the Legal Profession Act, 1960 (Act 32). Neither is it known to the Code of Conduct. So, it is not clear where the Board of Examiners derives its powers from. Whatever the case, the Director of Legal Education stood by the stand taken by the Board of Examiners not to recommend the plaintiff to the defendant for the call to the Ghana Bar if the latter did not refund the sum of GH¢12,900.00. This is confirmed by the Director of Legal Education’s letter of 17-02-2010, referred to earlier on.

The plaintiff, again, complains that she was prevented from exercising her right of review and/or appeal against the findings and recommendations of the Ali-Nakyea Abdallah Committee. The provisions for review and appeal are provided in rules 24 and 25 of the Code of Conduct and they state as follows:

“24. Except in a case of a reprimand, an application for a review of any disciplinary action taken against a student shall lie as of right WITHIN TWO WEEKS of such action, to the Board of Legal Education.

The application shall state reasons for dissatisfaction with the disciplinary action.

25. An appeal shall lie as of right from a decision of the Board of Legal Education to the General Legal Council. Such an appeal shall be brought within ONE MONTH of the Board’s decision and state reasons for dissatisfaction with the Board’s decision.”

From the undisputed facts of this case, the Director of Legal Education did not make any recommendation to the Board of Legal Education and the latter did not hear any application for review for any aggrieved party to appeal to the defendant.

What happened was that the Director of Legal Education, by letter dated 17-02-2010, informed the plaintiff that, if she failed to refund the sum of GH¢12,900.00, he would be unable to recommend her to the defendant for her to be called to the Ghana Bar. It was after the Director of Legal Education’s letter and after the defendant’s letter of 04-03-2010 requesting the Director of Legal Education to “furnish it with all the relevant documents on the matter to enable it consider same and take a decision at the next meeting of the Council to be held in March, 2010” that the plaintiff hurriedly instituted this action. So, no decision has been taken by any person or body recommending that the plaintiff should not be called to the Ghana Bar.

Following from the above findings of facts, it is my view that, firstly, the Ali-Nakyea Abdallah Committee was not properly constituted as it did not include the Director of Legal Education as a member/chairman as mandatorily required by rule 22 of the Code of Conduct.

Secondly, the Director of Legal Education did not at any time make any recommendation to the effect that the plaintiff should not be called to the Ghana Bar. At best, he evinced an intention to do so but did not carry out his intention before the plaintiff instituted this action.

Thirdly, without any recommendation by the Director of Legal Education to the Board of Legal Education, the plaintiff could not have applied for a review pursuant to rule 24 of the Code of Conduct. Indeed, the purported invitation to the plaintiff by the Director of Legal Education to apply for a review or appeal was misdirected as he did not make any recommendation to the Board of Legal Education disrecommending the call of the plaintiff to the Ghana Bar. Of course, there was no appeal to the defendant of any matter from the Board of Legal Education.

Fourthly, the Board of Examiners have no power to determine whether the plaintiff should be called to the Ghana Bar or not. That decision is for the defendant to take based on two considerations, namely:

(a)  that the plaintiff is of good character.

(b)  that the plaintiff is a holder of a qualifying certificate granted by law (See Section 3 (1) of Act 32).

The defendant did not take any decision pursuant to section 3 (1) of Act 32 for which the plaintiff was aggrieved to challenge the defendant’s decision. The plaintiff’s action was, therefore, premature.

Fifthly, the actions or omissions of the Board of Examiners and the Director of Legal Education are of no consequence as regards the decision of the defendant to call the plaintiff to the Ghana Bar.

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s other claims are incompetent and the same are also dismissed.

The defendant on the other hand has made a case to entitle it to its counterclaim. The defendant is, therefore, entitled to judgement as follows:

1.    It is hereby declared that the plaintiff is not entitled to be called to the Ghana Bar until a formal decision on the matter has been taken by the defendant.

2.    It is further declared that the instant suit is premature, unnecessary and embarrassing in as much as the defendant has not made a decision as to the plaintiff’s eligibility or otherwise to be called to the Ghana Bar.

 

COUNSEL:  

1. Mr. Kweku Y. Paintsil for Plaintiff.

2. Mrs. Sylvia Adusu, Principal State Attorney, (Vivian A. Ofori, State Attorney, with her) for Defendant.

 

 

(SGD.) UUTER PAUL DERY

JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT.

 

 
 

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