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J U D G M E N T
DR. DATE-BAH, J.S.C:
This is an appeal from a
judgment of the Judicial
Commitee of
the National House of Chiefs
delivered on 21st January 2002.
That judgment upheld the
judgment of the trial Judicial
Committee of the Upper West
Region House of Chiefs in favour
of the
PetitionerlRespondent/Respondent
who is hereafter referred to as
the Petitioner and is a Prince
of the Wala Traditional Area and
was held by the trial Judicial
Committee to be the Guli-Na, one
of the Divisional Chiefs of the
Wala Traditional Area. These two
judgments make the same findings
of fact. Where there are such
concurrent findings of fact by
two lower courts, it is always
an uphill battle for an
appellant before this Court to
reverse those findings of fact.
As Date-Bah, J.S.C. indicated
recently in the unreported case
of Wood and Ors v
Oxyair and Anor (Unreported
judgment of the Supreme Court,
dated 27th April 2005, Case No.
J4/35/2005):
"Where there are concurrent
findings of fact by two lower
courts, an appellate court is
usually reluctant to reverse
that finding of fact, unless
there are compelling reasons so
to do. (See, for instance, Lord
Russell's judgment in the Privy
Council decision of Bassayin
and Achah v Bendentu II
(1937) 5 W.A.C.A. 1,
especially at pp. 2-3. In the
more recent case of Achoro
& Anor v Akanfela
& Anor [1996-97]
SCGLR 209, Acquah JSC, as he
then was, had this to say, at p.
214, delivering the judgment of
the Supreme Court:
"Now in an appeal against
findings of facts to a second
appellate court like this court,
where the lower appellate court
had concurred in the findings of
the trial court, especially in a
dispute, the subject-matter of
which is peculiarly within the
bosom of the two lower courts or
tribunals, this court will not
interfere with the concurrent
findings of the lower courts
unless it is established with
absolute clearness that some
blunder or error resulting in a
miscarriage of justice, is
apparent in the way in which the
lower tribunals dealt with the
facts."
The decision of the Review Panel
of the Supreme Court in
Koglex Ltd (No.2) v Field
[2000] SCGLR 175 is to a similar
effect.)"
It is thus
within this context of case law,
that this Court is to re-hear
this case by way of appeal.
The facts of the case are as
follows: an election took place
on 20th April 1998 at the
Princes' Grounds at the Wa Na's
Palace in Wa, in the Upper West
Region. The election was by the
seven Kingmakers of the Wala
traditional State, consisting
of: one representative each of
the 4 gates or Divisional
chiefdoms of the Wala State; and
representatives of the Froko;
the Tendaana and the Yeri Na.
The four Divisions or gates
are: Yijihi;
Najeri; Jonyoubi
and Nakpaha. The
Second
Respondent/Appellant/Appellant,
the late Mr. B. K. Adama, who
will be subsequently referred to
as the Second Respondent,
conducted the affairs of the
election meeting, in his
capacity as the most senior
Prince. The Second Respondent
died before the appeal before
this Court could be heard and
Alhaji Issah Bukari has been
substituted for him, by an order
of this Court dated 11th
February 2004.
At the
election meeting, the Second
Respondent invited all
contestants to the vacant Wa
skin to identify themselves,
whereupon the Petitioner and the
First Respondent/Appellant/
Appellant, subsequently referred
to in this judgment as the First
Respondent, identified
themselves. The Petitioner and
the First Respondent both made a
presentation to the meeting of
their "manifesto", setting out
the reasons why they should be
elected to the vacant skin of
Wa. In his presentation, the
Petitioner averred that he had
reminded the meeting that in
1951 during the reign of Wa Na
Mumuni Koray of Jonyuobi, the
Wala Traditional Council had
decided and resolved that there
were four gates to the Wa
Paramountcy and that since that
declaration by the Traditional
Council in 1951 only the Nakpaha
gate had not had its turn in
providing a chief for Wa. He
contended therefore that, in
fairness, it was now the turn of
the Nakpaha gate to present a
candidate to the vacant Wa skin.
After the
presentations by the candidates,
the Kingmakers retired into an
inner room. At this point, the
Froko, Alhaji Iddrisu, delegated
his brother (Hamaru Froko) to
act for him in the proceedings
in the inner room.
The central
controversy in this case
revolves round what took place
in the inner room. The
Petitioner averred that in the
inner room he was elected by the
Tendaana and this was concurred
in by the Yeri Na and Froko. He
further averred that the
Tendaana made it plain that his
election of the Petitioner was
based on the fact that it was
now the turn of Nakpaha gate's
nominee to be elected Wa Na in
the interest of fairness. The
Petitioner's contention was
that, since he was the nominee
of Nakpaha Gate and had their
vote, in addition to the three
other Kingmakers already
referred to, he had the majority
support of the Kingmakers. The
Petitioner claimed that he
emerged from the inner room to
where the observers of the
election were seated and clapped
his hands and started
jubilating. The Tendaana also
came out and made the
declaration that the Petitioner
had been chosen as Wa Na.
Next,
according to the Petitioner, to
his utter shock and disbelief,
the Second Respondent announced
to the observers that five of
the Kingmakers had elected the
Busa Na, who had, in turn,
transferred his election to the
First Respondent and that the
Second Respondent had further
announced that two of the
Kingmakers were not sure of
which candidate to choose. The
Petitioner contended that the
Busa Na was not a candidate for
the Wa skin and therefore his
purported election was null and
void.
In response,
the Respondents' case was as
follows: they contended that the
system of providing a candidate
for the vacant Wa skin was not
exclusively rotational. They
argued further that, even
assuming that the system for
filling a vacancy in the Wa skin
was exclusively rotational, if
the Nakpaha gate were to provide
the Wa Na now this would break
the order of rotation. They
contended that the declaration
by the Tendaana that the
Petitioner had been elected Wa
Na was false. They claimed that
at the proceedings in the inner
room at the Princes' Grounds,
the First Respondent was duly
nominated and elected by three
gates (Nayiri, Yijihi and
Jonyuobi) and that the Yeri Na
and Froko group had also elected
the First Respondent. They
averred that the Registrar of
the Wala Traditional Council,
Mr. Salifu, was present at the
proceedings in the inner room
and later communicated the
outcome of the proceedings to
the Regional Minister and the
Assistant Commissioner of
Police. They further averred
that the Second Respondent, as
Head Prince and leader of the
seven Kingmakers of the Wala
Traditional Area, sent a copy of
the minutes recorded by one Mr.
Ahmed to the Registrar of the
Wala Traditional Council to be
communicated to the relevant
institutions and individuals.
In the light
of these conflicting
contentions, the trial Regional
House of Chiefs was called upon
to make a determination on a
petition filed by the Guli Na
seeking the following remedies:
"(i) A declaration that
the Petitioner has been duly
nominated and elected WaNa.
(ii) A declaration that
the Busa Na has never been duly
nominated and elected Wa Na.
(iii) A declaration that
there has been no valid transfer
of the chiefship of Wa to the
Busa Na to the I st Respondent
(iv) A
declaration that 1st Respondent
has not been duly nominated and
elected Wa Na.
(v)
A declaration that the purported
declaration by 2nd Respondent
that the 1st
Respondent has been duly elected
Wa Na, is false.
(vi) Perpetual
injunction restraining the 1st
Respondent from holding himself
out as the Wa Na elect.
(vii) Perpetual
injunction restraining all the
Respondents, whether by
themselves or agents or
howsoever from installing 1st
Respondent as the WaNa.
(viii)
A declaration that it is the
turn of the Nakpaha gate to
provide a
candidate to occupy
the vacant Wa skin."
The Judicial
Committee of the Upper West
Regional House of Chiefs gave
judgment on 27th
June, 2000 in favour of the
petitioner, granting him the
following reliefs:
1. That he was duly
nominated and elected Wa Na.
2. That Busa Na was not
nominated and elected Wa Na.
3. That there was no
valid transfer of the chiefship
of Wa from the Busa Na to the
First Respondent.
4. That the First
Respondent was not nominated and
elected Wa Na.
5. That the purported
declaration by the Second
Respondent that the First
Respondent was elected Wa Na is
not valid.
6.
That
it is now the turn of the
Nakpaha gate to provide a
candidate to
occupy the
vacant Wa skin.
The Judicial
Committee also granted the
petitioner an order of perpetual
injunction restraining the
Respondents whether by
themselves or agents from
installing the First Respondent
or any other person as Wa Na.
The trial preceding this
judgment was a full one with the
Petitioner testifying on his own
behalf and calling four
witnesses in support of his
averments. Similarly, the Second
Respondent gave evidence on his
own behalf and also led evidence
from several witnesses in
support of his case.
It was from
this judgment that the
Respondents appealed to the
Judicial Committee of the
National House of Chiefs. In a
judgment delivered on 21st
January 2002, the Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs dismissed the appeal
and upheld the judgment of the
trial Regional Judicial
Committee. With leave from the
Supreme Court, an appeal was
brought against the judgment of
the National House of Chiefs on
the following grounds:
1. The judgment was
against the weight of the
evidence led at the trial.
2. The Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs misdirected
itself in law when it held that
because Hamidu Yakubu, Katua-Na
(the first Defendant) had died,
it was pointless considering the
case for B.K. Adama, the
Appellant.
3. The Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs erred in law by
relying on hearsay evidence on
the issue of who was chosen by
the kingmakers in the inner
room.
4. The judicial
committee further erred in law
by upholding the self-serving
affidavit filed by some of the
kingmakers on the ground that
"they were deposed to in
contemplation of imminent
litigation between the
Petitioner on the one hand and
the Defendants on the other",
which said statement was itself
factually incorrect.
5. The Judicial
Committte again erred in law
when it decreed, contrary to the
evidence on record, how the
rotational system of succession
to the Wa Skin should be
implemented when the Committee
itself had held that the system
was "to be allowed to fine tune
itself through contest whenever
the Skin becomes vacant."
6. The Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs seriously misdirected
itself on the facts and in law
when it held that "a rotation
system had been established
among the four royal gates and
since the other three had had
their turns, only Princes from
the Nakpaha gate could
legitimately and lawfully
contest for succession to "the
vacant Skin after the death
ofNaa Momori Bondiri II".
7. The Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs erred in law by
relying heavily on the so-called
orders of the Supreme Court in
the case of Assan Zie v
Yakubu Seidu (1985) when the
said court never delivered any
judgment in the matter apart
from the orders it proclaimed.
It is contended that that
judgment was a nullity.
These grounds
were expatiated upon in the
Statement of Case filed on
behalf of the Respondent and we
will shortly consider the case
presented on behalf of the
Respondent. However, what we
would like to highlight, at the
outset, is the admission made in
the first paragraph of the
Respondent's submission in the
following terms:
"1. The issue in the
appeal is who was elected as
successor Wa Na to the late Wa
Na Boudiri Momori who died on 16
January 1998. The same central
issue of fact confronted the
judicial committees of the trial
Upper West Region House of
Chiefs and the Appellate
National House of Chiefs. At
both levels the finding was in
favour of the
PetitionerlRespondent/Respondent
(herein-after called "the
Petitioner")."
This is a
telling and correct admission
that the determinative issue in
this case is one of fact. As
pointed out at the beginning of
this judgment, where there have
been two concurrent adverse
findings by two lower courts on
such an issue of fact, it is
difficult to persuade an
appellate court to reverse that
finding of fact, since an
appellant needs to rebut, with
compelling cause, the
presumption that the two lower
courts made the right decisions
of fact. The appellant needs to
show an overwhelming reason for
the concurrent findings of fact
to be set aside. Is there such
compelling reason in this case?
The first
ground argued in his Statement
of Case by the Respondent (who,
it will be remembered is the
appellant before us) was the
fifth ground set out above. The
Respondent contends that the
National House of Chiefs made an
error by amalgamating two
different systems of rotational
succession to the Wa Skin. The
first system was the
three-cornered system confined
to the three princely gates:
namely, Yijihi, Najeri and
Jouyounsi. This was established
in 1933 during Na Pelpuo Ill's
reign and was binding as res
judicata. The second system was
that established in 1951 when Na
Mumuni Koray (who reigned from
1949 to 1953) conferred gate
rank on the Nakpaha clan or
family. The Respondent points
out that neither in 1951 nor
since has the order or sequence
of the four-cornered rotation
system been established. It is
argued on his behalf thus that
the National House of Chiefs
made an error in boldly
pronouncing that after the death
of Wa Na Momori it was now the
turn of Nakpaha gate to succeed
to the Skin. The Respondent's
Statement of Case concludes, on
this point, as follows:
"But by what criterion? The
Supreme Court never said that by
reason of the deprival
ofNakpaaha since as far back as
1706, it was therefore the turn
of the Petitioner to occupy the
Skin. Nakpaaha Gate was entitled
to contest for the Skin, but on
the same level ground as the
remaining 3 princely Gates. Even
so the kingmakers had every
right to by-pass the Petitioner
in particular if they did not
think he was to fit and proper
candidate on his personal merits
or otherwise.(sic) It is
submitted that whatever went on
in their minds the Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs was simply wrong in
logic, on principle or on the
sheer misinterpretation of the
Na Mumuni Koray 4-cornered
rotation system and of the
Supreme Court's 1985 judicially
based but flamed (sic)
4-cornered rotation system. The
error of misrepresentation was
specially noticeable when the
National House of Chiefs went so
far as to read the cautious,
precatory suggestion of the
Supreme Court at p. 430,
paragraph 5(IV) "we view with
favour" ... "it will be a good
thing if (the 4 Gate rotation)
...is carefully considered and
adhered" as positive mandatory
directions. Even so how does one
derive from the
misrepresentation, a finding
that it is now the turn of the
Nakphaaha Gate alone to occupy
the Skin. And finally how does
the idea of the immediate turn
of Nakpaaha fit in with
Nananom's own finding that the 4
Gate rotation was "to be allowed
to find time (sic) itself
through contests wherever the
Skin becomes vacant." It is
submitted that the bottom has
fallen out of the whole judgment
of the National House of
Chiefs."
Our
understanding of the
Respondent's argument on this
ground is that he is challenging
the interpretation put by the
National House of Chiefs on Wala
customary constitutional law. He
is not raising an issue of fact
but rather of law. He does not
appear to dispute the existence
of a rotational system of
succession to the Wa Skin nor
does he appear to challenge any
particular finding of fact under
this ground. What he does
challenge is the interpretation
put by the National House of
Chiefs on the customary practice
of rotation in the Wala
Traditional Area. The relevant
passage from the judgment ofthe
National House of Chiefs on this
matter is the following (see pp.
689 - 690 of the Record).
"In conclusion, we hold that a
rotation system had been
established among the four royal
gates and that since the other
three had had their turn, only
princes from the Nakpaha gate
could legitimately and lawfully
contest for succession to the
vacant skin after the death of
Naa Momori Bondiri II. We
therefore make bold and hold
that any contestant not hailing
from Nakpaha Gate and who
purported to have taken part in
the said contest had engaged in
a futile exercise as it was not
his turn to do so.
The custom as we understand is
that where ascension to a stool
or Skin is rotatory and the
family or gate whose turn it is
to provide a candidate is unable
to do so due to lack of a
suitable royal, that right is
passed unto the next family or
gate. And that family because it
is not yet its turn to ascend
the stool or skin, it is made
known to all and sundry that the
prevailing system of rotation
hitherto established be not
thereby disturbed in future by
that intervention. In the
instant case however there is no
evidence that the Nakpaha Gate
for whatever reason had forgone
its right to provide a candidate
so as to entitle any of the
other three gates to nominate or
select a candidate for election
to succeed the late Wa Naa
Momori Bondiri II. The customary
and legal right to nominate or
select a candidate for election
to the vacant Wa Skin remain for
the time being the prerogative
of the Nakpaha Gate.
As noted earlier in Counsel's
argument, he also contended that
the Supreme Court's decision on
this matter was not mandatory
but rather persuasive. In that
case of Asani Zei v Yakubu Seidu
and another (supra) the
Petitioner who incidentally is
the instant Petitioner sought
and was granted relief that
nullified the enskinment of the
then Respondent 1. M. Momori as
Wa Naa. The order that followed
and which has been the subject
of controversy between Counsel
for the parties herein was
couched as follows:
"4(iii) We order that the
parties do take steps in
accordance with customary
practices pertaining in the Wala
Traditional Area to nominate,
elect and install a Wa Naa from
among the Princes (Nabisi) ofthe
four gates viz. Paris, Busa,
Sing and Nakpaha".
"4(iv) In carrying out this
order, it is only proper to
observe that we view with favour
the rotational process of
election established among the 4
gates. We think it is just and
convenient way of resolving
problems of succession to the Wa
Skin and it will be a good thing
if it is carefully considered
and adhered to."
To us the Supreme Court has made
some explicit and undeniable
decisions which in themselves
are tantamount to orders. The
first is that there are four
gates to the Wa Skin namely,
Paris (Perisi) Busa, Sing and
Guli (Nakpaha). The second
finding is that a rotational
system of election has been
established among the four
gates.
Perhaps we have to add that
since these findings of fact had
not been reviewed they are
enforceable should there be a
breach in the nomination,
election and enskinment of a Wa
Na as stated above. Once more,
we must point out that since the
Supreme Court has decided that a
rotational system has been
established among the four gates
and the evidence before us is
that three of them had had their
turns, the remainder, the
Nakpaha gate is now the only
gate entitled to have its turn."
We consider
the above to be an
unexceptionable statement of the
customary law on the issue. Wala
state practice, according to the
evidence on record, had not
established a particular
sequence for the rotation
between the gates. There was
thus a gap in the customary law
which it was legitimate for the
National House of Chiefs to fill
by a logical inference from the
evidence on record. If there is
supposed to be rotation between
four gates and one gate has
never been given the opportunity
to occupy the Skin, then logic
and fairness would require that
that gate be given the
opportunity to occupy the Skin
at the first opportunity. we
would accordingly dismiss the
Respondent's ground 5 as being
unmeritorious.
The next
ground argued in the
Respondent's Statement of Case
is ground 6. In dismissing the
Respondent's ground 5, we have
in effect also dismissed this
ground. The Respondent argued
that it was erroneous to
interpret Na Mumuni Koray's 1951
dispensation and the Supreme
Court judgment in 1985 as
vesting an immediate and
exclusive right in the
Petitioner to occupy the Skin,
exempt from the kingmakers'
right either to elect or bypass
him. We do not consider that
that was what the National House
of Chiefs held. No right to
enskinment was declared to be
vested in the Petitioner by
virtue of the custom of
rotation. Rather, the Judicial
Committee asserted, in effect,
that for the rotational system
to be meaningful, the
Petitioner's gate should be
given the exclusive right, this
time round, to provide a
candidate for the Wa Skin. That
was a reasonable interpretation
to put on the customary practice
in the Wala State. In any case,
as the Petitioner's Statement of
Case before this Court
demonstrates, this issue is one
of the peripheral ones that
emerged during the suit.
The central
issue remains one of fact and
relates to who was in fact
elected Wa Na on the day in
question. That issue is
addressed in ground 1 of the
Respondent, which is addressed
last in his Statement of Case,
namely, the ground that the
judgment of the National House
of Chiefs was against the weight
of the evidence.
Ground 7 was the next one argued
in the Respondent's Statement of
Case. On this ground, let us
state, from the outset, that we
do not consider the Supreme
Court's judgment in the Azane
Zei and IN Momori v
Yakubu Seidu (1985) case
(supra) to be a nullity because
the Court gave no detailed
reasons. By the practice of the
Supreme Court, the orders
entered into its record book
represent what count the most
inter partes. Those orders
were made and are binding and
valid. It was therefore
legitimate for the National
House of Chiefs to rely on the
decision of the Court. Whilst it
is admitted that the Supreme
Court did not decide that it was
now the turn of the Nakpaha Gate
to succeed to the vacant Wa
Skin, it was nevertheless
legitimate for the National
House of Chiefs to develop Wala
customary law further through
interpretation. Interstitial
gap-filling through constructive
and purposive interpretation of
customary practice is a
legitimate part of their
judicial function and we are not
willing to reverse their
decision on this issue. Indeed,
this Court should positively
endorse this decision in the
interest of certainty. In any
case, in similar vein to the
point made in relation to ground
6, this issue also is peripheral
as compared to the central issue
of who was actually elected by
the kingmakers on the day in
question.
The next
ground that the Respondent
purports to argue is Ground 8,
which is not part of the grounds
set out in Notice of Civil
Appeal filed (see p.716 of the
Record). The Respondent
describes this ground 8 as
"erroneous finding by the
National House of Chiefs that
the 2nd Respondent announced an
improper transfer of votes for
Busa Naa to 1st
Respondent." An inquiry made of
the Registrar of the Supreme
Court revealed that this was not
an additional ground, in respect
of which leave had been sought
and granted. We will
accordingly not consider this
ground separately. It seems to
us, however, that it is probably
a subissue under the ground that
the judgment is against the
weight of evidence, which is
dealt with below.
Under ground
3, the next to be dealt with by
the Respondent, he argues that
the National House of Chiefs
erred by relying on hearsay
evidence on the issue of who was
chosen by the kingmakers in the
inner room. His contention is as
follows (see para. 11 of his
Statement of Case):
"This aspect of the Appellant's
case is not so much based on the
construction of section
24 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971
(Act 370) as upon the impact
of section 24 of the Act on
section 117 of the Evidence
Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323). Where
there was ample direct evidence
of what happened in the inner
room, was the trial Regional
House entitled to pray in aid
section 24 of the Chieftaincy
Act (the rule as to accepting
hearsay evidence without relying
solely on the hearsay evidence)?
It is submitted that on
principle hearsay evidence
cannot be applied where a
relevant issue can be resolved
by direct and/or circumstantial
evidence exclusively. On any
particular issue already
established by direct and/or
circumstantial evidence hearsay
evidence is irrelevant anyway
and furthermore cannot carry any
or as much weight as the direct
and/or circumstantial evidence.
The use made by the trial
Regional House of Chiefs,
followed by the National House
of Chiefs was with respect
plainly mischievous in the
result. For the result was that
the hearsay evidence especially
from PW 2 and PW 4 and even CW 5
all of whom were never in the
Inner Room was used to
contradict the direct evidence
of the Appellant and the 1st
Defendant's witnesses who were
unquestionably in the Inner Room
and voted for or elected 1st
Defendant by a clear majority of
5 to 2."
Our
impression is that the
Respondent's argument on this
ground confuses the
admissibility of evidence with
the weight to be attached to
evidence which has been duly
admitted. In spite of the
general rule stated in section
117 of the Evidence Decree, 1975
that hearsay evidence is not
admissible, that very section
provides for the exceptions to
the rule in the following terms:
"except as otherwise provided by
this Decree or any other
enactment or by agreement of the
parties." There are in fact many
exceptions provided for by the
Decree under which hearsay
evidence is admissible. So many
are the exceptions that the
general rule is to a degree
misleading. Section 118 of the
Evidence Decree makes first-hand
hearsay evidence admissible on
two conditions specified in the
section. First-hand hearsay
refers to a statement by a
declarant made in relation to
facts knowledge of which the
declarant has come by through
his own senses. In any case,
quite apart from the relaxations
in the rule against the
admissibility of hearsay
evidence that are introduced by
the Evidence Decree, 1975, the
Judicial Committee of the
National House of Chiefs was
right to point out that section
24(1) of the Chieftaincy Act
1971 (Act 370) allows Judicial
Committees under the Act to
admit hearsay evidence, so long
as it tends to prove or disprove
any fact relevant to the subject
matter before the Committee. The
critical issue in chieftaincy
matters is thus not the
admissibility of a particular
piece of hearsay evidence, but
rather the weight to be given to
it. In our view, the passage
from the Respondent's Statement
of Case quoted above contains a
fallacy, namely that where a
relevant issue can be resolved
by direct and/or circumstantial
evidence exclusively, hearsay
evidence cannot be "applied"
(presumably meaning admitted in
this context) in relation to it.
This is a misstatement of the
law, because the statutory
provision in section 24(1) of
the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 cannot
be ignored. Once hearsay
evidence has been admitted, it
is for the trier of fact to
assign whatever weight the trier
considers appropriate to the
particular evidence.
Accordingly, we find this ground
of appeal to be unmeritorious.
Finally, we
come to the central issue of
this appeal, which is contained
in ground 1: namely, whether the
judgment of the Judicial
Committee of the National House
of Chiefs was against the weight
of the evidence. The Respondent
argued that since it was
admitted that the late Mr. B K
Adama was the senior Prince who
presided over the nomination and
the election of the Wa Na in the
inner room, he alone was
qualified to announce the
official result, in the absence
of any fraud or irregularity on
his part. The Respondent
contended that there was a
presumption of regularity in
favour of Mr. Adama and that
thus the onus was on the
Petitioner to prove the falsity
of Mr. Adama's announcement of
the result of 5 to 2 in favour
of the First Respondent.
The treatment of the issues of
fact raised under this ground
falls squarely within the
authorities already referred to
in this judgment which have held
that where two lower courts have
made concurrent findings of
fact, there is to be restraint
by an appellate tribunal from
overturning those findings of
fact, unless there is compelling
reason so to do. We are
satisfied that there was
abundant evidence on record to
justify the finding of fact made
by the trial Regional House of
Chiefs and by the National House
of Chiefs that four of the seven
kingmakers voted for the
Petitioner and that therefore he
was duly elected Wa Na. Although
there was also contrary evidence
on record, the weight to be
given to that evidence was the
prerogative of the trial
Committee, subject to the
Committee not committing "some
blunder or error resulting in a
miscarriage of justice" (Per
Acquah JSC, as he then was, in
Koglex (No.2) v Field
[2000] SCGLR 175 at p. 185).
We are not persuaded, after a
careful perusal of the record
and the Respondent's Statement
of Case before this Court, that
the Respondent has demonstrated
any such blunder or error in the
way that the trial Committee
dealt with the facts of this
case. Consequently, we find no
reason why their finding should
be disturbed by this Court.
We would thus dismiss this
appeal as being without merit.
MISS S.A.B. AKUFFO
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
MRS. G.T. WOOD
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
DR. S. K.
DATE-BAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
PROF. T. M. OCRAN
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
R. T. ANINAKWAH
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
COUNSEL:
Mr. W.A.N Adumoah Bossman for
the Appellant.
Mr. Thadeus Sory for the
Respondent.
gso*
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