Practice and procedure – Appeal
– Findings of fact – Appellate
court not to reverse findings of
fact in concurrent judgments in
the courts below except for
misdirection or wrongful
assessment of evidence.
The plaintiffs who claimed to be
royals of the Pankrono Stool,
instituted proceedings in the
judicial committee of the Kumasi
traditional council against the
defendants for declarations that
the 5th defendant was not a
royal and that his nomination by
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th
defendants for enstoolment on
the Pankrono stool was
uncustomary. They claimed also
perpetual injunction to restrain
the installation of the 5th
defendant on the stool. Both
sides testified on the tradition
as well as recent acts regarding
the stool. The plaintiffs
testified that originally
succession to the Pankrono stool
was matrilineal until one
Miawani, a member of the
matrilineal family, offered
himself and was sacrificed in a
ritual that led to the success
of an Ashanti war. Okomfo
Anokye, the fetish priest of
Ashanti decreed thenceforth that
succession to the stool should
be patrilineal and outlawed
matrilineal succession to the
stool as a taboo. By this
decree, the stool went to the
sons and grandsons of
Nkwantakesehene stool and the
descendants of the said Miawani.
The judicial committee of the
Kumasi traditional council
accepted the evidence of the
plaintiff, declared the
nomination of the 5th defendant
null and void and authorised the
queenmother of Pankrono to
nominate a fresh candidate for
enstoolment by the kingmakers of
the Pankrono stool. The
defendants (except the 2nd
defendant) appealed to the
Ashanti Region House of Chiefs,
which dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the decision of the
judicial committee of the Kumasi
traditional council. The
defendants appealed further to
the National House of Chiefs. In
allowing the appeal, the
National House of Chiefs held
that the plaintiff’s case was
improbable and that of the
defendants’ was probable. The
plaintiffs appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Held,
Amua-Sekyi and Aikins JJSC
dissenting, since both
judicial committees of the
Kumasi traditional council and
the Ashanti Regional House of
Chiefs found that originally
succession to the Pankrono stool
was matrilineal but, by the
decree of Okomfo Anokye, it
became patrilineal, it was not
open to the National House of
Chiefs to question the custom.
Where findings of fact had been
made in two concurrent
judgments, based on the evidence
and the credibility of
witnesses, an appellate court
had no power to make its own
findings contrary to the
findings of the tribunal of
first instance, which had the
advantage of seeing and hearing
the witnesses - an advantage
denied the appellate tribunal.
Short of misdirection or
wrongful assessment of evidence,
an appellate tribunal ought not
disturb findings of fact made by
the trial tribunal. The appeal
would therefore be allowed.
Yendi Skin Affairs; Yakubu II v
Abudulai [1984-86] 2 GLR 23,
Asibey III v Ayisi [1973] 1
GLR 102, Praka v Ketewa
[1964] GLR 423, SC,
Republic v Asafu -Adjaye (No 2)
[1968] GLR 567 applied.
Cases referred to:
Adjeibi-Kojo v Bonsie
(1957) 3 WALR 257, [1957] 1 WLR
1223, 101 SJ 972, PC.
Asibey III v Ayisi
[1973] 1 GLR 102.
Beng v Poku
[1965] GLR 167, SC.
Gyewu v Nana Nuaben Asare II
12 July 1990, SC.
Praka v Ketewa
[1964] GLR 423, SC.
Republic v Asafu A-djaye (No 2)
[1968] GLR 567, CA.
Yendi Skin Affairs Re, Yakubu II
v Abudulai
[1984-86] 2 GLR 239, SC.
APPEAL from the decision of the
National House of Chiefs to the
Supreme Court.
Obeng Manu
for the appellants.
Mmieh
for the respondents.
ARCHER CJ.
I have had the advantage of
reading beforehand the opinion
of my brother Ampiah JSC and I
agree that the appeal should be
allowed. However, there is one
aspect of this appeal which
should be stressed. There is an
established principle in
appellate courts, that where
findings of fact on the evidence
and on the credibility of
witnesses have been made in two
concurrent judgments, an
appellate court has no
unfettered licence and unbridled
discretion to make its own
findings contrary to the facts
found in the concurrent
judgments of the courts below.
In this particular appeal, the
judicial committee of the
National House of Chiefs ignored
this principle and embarked upon
speculating on what the probable
custom was. I do not think an
appellate court is entitled to
tread such a path. Where there
are concurrent findings of fact,
and there is sufficient evidence
to support them, those findings
of fact should not be disturbed.
This has been an established
principle since appeals were
heard by the Privy Council and
the West African Court of
Appeal. It is a sound principle
and has not, to my knowledge,
been relegated to the forensic
limbo of oblivion so far as the
courts in this country are
concerned.
FRANCOIS JSC.
I have had the privilege of
reading the judgment of my
brother Ampiah JSC beforehand
and I agree with his reasons and
conclusions and have nothing
useful to add.
AMUA-SEKYI JSC.
This was a claim for a
declaration that the fifth
defendant, Kwaku Nyamekye, was
not a royal of the stool of
Pankrono in Ashanti. The basis
of the claim was that following
the sacrifice of the occupant of
the stool to the gods for
success in war during the time
of Nana Osei Tutu and Okomfo
Anokye, it was decreed that no
member of the matrilineal family
should thenceforth occupy the
stool. This evidence and
contention was accepted by both
judicial committees of the
Kumasi traditional council and
the Ashanti Region House of
Chiefs, but was rejected
unreservedly by the National
House of Chiefs. While the
former accepted without question
that a person who was sacrificed
in the circumstances could have
such a penalty imposed on his
family, the latter thought that
such a person would be rewarded,
not punished, and the order more
likely to have been made was as
claimed by the defendants,
namely, that thenceforth no
person from Pankrono should
suffer death by decapitation.
In this appeal, we have been
told that the National House
erred because the issue was not
whether the alleged order of
Okomfo Anokye was reasonable,
but whether it was in fact made.
Osei Tutu and Okomfo Anokye
lived three hundred years ago.
There was no writing then, so
that all we have to go by is the
oral tradition of the people. In
the nature of things, this is
bound to be coloured by
self-interest. The temptation to
falsify facts and history are
much too great. Where facts of
antiquity cannot be conclusively
proved, the reasonableness or
otherwise of those facts ought
to be taken into account.
It seems to me that if we are to
look only at the admitted facts,
then the plaintiffs might well
be right if Miawani, as the then
chief was called, was seized
against his will and slaughtered
like a goat. This is hardly
likely having regard to his
status as occupant of a stool.
If however, Miawani offered
himself for sacrifice, the story
of the defendants would be the
more probable. Although no
evidence was offered by either
side to show the circumstances
under which Miawani was
sacrificed, that is, whether he
was a willing party to it, the
plaintiffs offered evidence that
since that time no member of the
stool family had succeeded to
the stool. They said that
instead, sons of the Pankrono
stool had occupied the stool
whenever it became vacant.
Unfortunately for the
plaintiffs, this is demonstrably
false. The record shows that
during his cross-examination,
Nyamekye was asked to give the
names of royals and sons of the
Pankrono stool who had occupied
the stool since the death of
Miawani. He gave two names; Nana
Brobbey Kwakye I and Nana Osei
Kwadwo as royals, and named four
other persons as sons of the
stool. So, at the end of the
day, all that the plaintiffs
were able to prove was that sons
have been permitted to occupy
the stool. This is by no means
unusual; for, even strangers
who were in a position to render
services to stools have been
known to be offered the stool on
condition that succession
remained the exclusive right of
royals. I make no comment as to
whether this practice is a
laudable one. The undisputed
fact is that it is to be found
in all parts of the country and
has, regrettably, sometimes led
to unnecessary litigation. In my
opinion, even if the contention
of the plaintiffs is true, the
so-called order of Okomfo Anokye
has been disregarded on at least
two occasions. It is much too
late in the day to declare it
sacrosanct. Like the taboo that
an Asantehene was not to cross a
certain river, it should now be
regarded as a relic of the past.
It comes as no surprise to me
that the Asantehene sent his
linguist to give evidence for
the defendants. I would dismiss
the appeal.
AIKINS JSC.
This is a case which I would
have wished we were able to
settle the rights of the parties
in a unanimous way. However, our
failure to do so vindicates the
independent and conscientious
spirit which pervades the
deliberations of justices of
this court. For my part, having
carefully studied the record of
proceedings and the divergent
histories of the parties I agree
entirely with the decision
contained in the opinion of my
brother Amua-Sekyi JSC that this
appeal must be dismissed.
I would like, however, to make a
few observations. The case for
each party was built on oral
traditional history. It was
generally agreed that at one
time the first Odikro of
Pankrono, Owura Miawani, was
used in a ritual by Okomfo
Anokye for the Ashanti nation.
The contention of the plaintiffs
is that after the success of the
Ashantis in the war in which
Owura Miawani was used in the
sacrificial ritual, Okomfo
Anokye decreed that it was a
taboo for the members of Owura
Miawani’s family to ascend the
stool of Pankrono. There is no
evidence that the then King of
Ashanti, Nana Osei Tutu,
consented to the decree of
Okomfo Anokye. This may well be
so otherwise there would not
have been so much noise about
it. However, this is of no
moment. The essence of this
assertion is that the decree
changed the succession to the
stool from matrilineal to
patrilineal thereby depriving
the maternal members of the
family of their right to occupy
the Pankrono stool.
The defendants, on the other
hand, assert that Okomfo Anokye
decreed that none of the
citizens of Pankrono should be
punished by decapitation as a
reward for Owura Miawani’s
bravery and love for Asanteman.
The plaintiffs assert that their
ancestor Boakye Yaw Panin, the
first Nkwantakesehene, brought
down his stool from Denkyira
Mmarayen followed by a large
retinue and settled at Dote near
Bukron. He then founded Pankrono
and created a stool there for
Owura Miawani, and later founded
Dome and appointed Owura Asie as
his Twafouhene and Odikro of
Dome. From there he founded
Abuakwa and Bukron. As against
this history, the defendants say
that their ancestors took leave
of Nkwantakesehene Boakye Yaw
who was then Kyidomhene of
Denkyirahene and migrated from
Denkyira Mmarayem and settled
at Dote. Their ancestors then
founded Pankrono and sent a
message to Nana Boakye,
Nkwantakesehene (at his request)
to join them at Pankrono. There,
Nkwantakesehene founded Abuakwa
and Bukron. The defendants deny,
therefore, that Pankrono was
founded by Nkwantakesehene.
It is not easy on the face of
the two historical accounts of
the parties to determine which
of the two traditional histories
is the more probable. In a
situation like this, a court of
competent jurisdiction dealing
with the matter must consider
other accomplished facts not in
dispute and accept the tradition
which is supported by
accomplished facts; see Beng
v Poku [1965] GLR 167
and Adjeibi-Kojo v Bonsie
(1957) 3 WALR 257. As I said in
my opinion in the case of
Kwame Gyewu v Nana Nuaben Asare
II dated 12 July 1990, SC,
both parties may be honest in
their beliefs, but the fact
still remains that the two
histories are in conflict, and
the demeanour of the witnesses
is of little guide to the truth.
When parties testify about
events of this nature which had
been handed down from generation
it must be recognised, if I may
borrow the language of the Privy
Council in the Adjeibi-Kojo
case, that in the course of
transmission from generation to
generation mistakes may occur
without any dishonest motives
whatever and witnesses of the
utmost veracity may speak
honestly but erroneously as to
what took place a hundred or
more years ago. In the instant
case the events took place more
than three hundred years ago.
The issue, as can be gleaned
from the evidence available
touching the decree of Okomfo
Anokye, is not so much the
sacrosanctity of the decrees of
Okomfo Anokye, which must be
accepted willy-nilly according
to Ashanti custom, as which of
the two divergent versions of
the decree was in fact made by
Okomfo Anokye. The confusion was
initiated by the judicial
committee of the Ashanti
Regional House of Chiefs, then
speaking in support of the
decision of the trial tribunal
that nobody from the matrilineal
family of Owura Miawani has
occupied the Pankrono stool
since the era of Miawani because
Okomfo Anokye decreed that they
should not. The House said:
“The question is not whether the
decree was reasonable or not,
but that Okomfo Anokye’s decree
is sacrosanct in Ashanti custom,
and the Tribunal was therefore
right in upholding the decree.”
In my view the judicial
committee of the National House
of Chiefs appreciated the
correct issue involved when it
observed:
“It is clear that what is in
dispute between the parties
relates to the order which was
made by Okomfo Anokye upon the
sacrifice of Owura Miawani, ie
was it an order that his
descendants should never ascend
the stool thereafter or that his
successor should never after
that be punished by
decapitation. One looks like a
deprivation, one was certainly a
privilege.”
I must venture to say that this
court can take judicial notice
of the fact that Ashanti custom
recognises that an animal (or
any animate creature) for ritual
sacrifice is first decapitated
before any other sacrificial
process takes place. So that if
a decree was being made in
respect of or in favour of a
chief who has been so sacrificed
to save a nation, it is most
probable that his descendants
would be rewarded by being
excluded from decapitation The
judicial committee continued in
their opinion:
“We understand the culture of a
people to include their custom,
beliefs etc. The people of
Ashanti believe that it is an
honour to die for your nation.
It was a privilege to be
sacrificed in defence of your
nation and so it was to be used
in a ritual sacrifice to ensure
victory for Asanteman in war. A
person who died in such
circumstances and his family
were rewarded with privileges
but never suffered
disqualification, disability or
degradation. We are aware of
examples of this, and we think
that was the more probable
case.”
The judicial committee of the
National House of Chiefs was
therefore right to reject the
invitation to find that because
no member of his family has
ascended the stool after the
death of Owura Miawani, the
irresistible inference was that
the order debarred his
descendants, and conferred no
privilege on them. The committee
rightly accepted the explanation
of the respondents that no
suitable member of their family
was available for enstoolment
and that on an occasion when the
stool was vacant the 5th
defendant, then 27 years did,
not contest because his family
preferred a more experienced
person to ascend the stool and
litigate on their behalf. The
committee held rightly that
these matters should not
adversely affect the case of the
respondents because “it is not
always the availability of a
candidate which matters but also
his suitability.” In actual fact
the record shows, and that is
the contention of the
respondents, that at least two
Pankrono chiefs hailed from the
maternal family of the 5th
defendant, namely, Nana Brobbey
Kwakye and Nana Osei Kwadwo, and
four from the 1st plaintiff’s
paternal family, Yaw Konko
(regent), Kwaku Oppong who
abdicated, Kofi Kontoh who also
abdicated and Kwakye Brobbey
Asare II.
The plaintiffs claim that
because these four chiefs hail
from their paternal family, they
were entitled to be enstooled on
the Pankrono stool, while the
respondents claim that they are
royals the absence of their
candidates on the stool for some
time is of no moment because
“once a royal always a royal.”
It should be noted that at
custom, patrilineal stools in
Ashanti do not normally have
queenmothers, and where such
queenmothers exist, their roles
are limited and do not include
nominating candidates to occupy
the stool, as was clearly
pointed out by DW3, Kyeame Antwi
Buasiako, delegated by Otumfuo
Opoku Ware II to represent him
at the trial. This witness
further stated that by Ashanti
custom when a stool is defunct
of royals or eligible royals, a
non-royal may be requested to
ascend the female stool as a
caretaker until such time that
eligible royals are available.
This, in my view, strengthens
the case of the respondents.
One other point that must be
considered is whether the
nomination of the 5th defendant,
in the words of the judicial
committee of the National House
of Chiefs, by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd
and 4th defendants was customary
and lawful. It is urged that if
he is a royal in the matrilineal
sense, he should have been
nominated by the queenmother,
and not by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and
4th defendants. What I have been
able to find out is that it was
the plaintiffs who claimed in
paragraph 16 of their statement
of claim that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd
and 4th defendants conspired,
connived and colluded together
and without the knowledge and,
or consent of the Obaapanin to
nominate the 5th defendant to
occupy the Pankrono stool. But
this was denied by the
defendants in paragraph 18 of
their statement of defence. The
plaintiffs led no evidence to
establish their claim; it was
rather the trial tribunal which
was mindful of this and
questioned the 5th defendant on
it.
In reply, the 5th defendant said
that he was nominated by the
Dome dikro in his capacity as
the head of family of Pankrono
stool. He admitted that by
custom it was the responsibility
of the Queenmother to nominate a
candidate, but in the event she
had exhausted all her chances as
custom demanded, and even failed
to satisfy the family with her
fourth choice, a magnanimous
gesture of the family, and so it
was incumbent upon the
Abusuapanin, as custom required,
to nominate a candidate, and so
he nominated the 5th defendant.
The plaintiffs did not question
the 5th defendant on this issue.
Evidence on the role of the 1st,
2nd, and 3rd defendants in the
enstoolment of a chief was given
by the third defence witness,
Kyeame Antwi Buasiako. He said:
“During the enstoolment of
Pankrono Chief, there arose
exchanges of oath between the
queenmother and the stool elders
of Pankrono. The issue was who
was right to nominate a
candidate. In the end,
Otumfuo made an order that the
queenmother was to nominate a
candidate with the support of
the stool elders. Nana
Nkwantakesehene was however
ordered not to involve himself
in the enstoolment process for
the chief of Pankrono.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
This evidence was not challenged
by the plaintiffs and when
answering questions put to him
by the trial tribunal, the 5th
defendant said that the elders
of Pankrono stool family are the
Gyasehene, Akwamuhene,
Akyeamehene (ie 1st, 2nd and 3rd
defendants herein) and
Obaapanin. With this evidence on
record I would say that even
though I agree with the judicial
committee of the National House
of Chiefs that the 5th
defendant’s nomination was
lawful, the committee’s order
must be straightened out to read
that the said Kwaku Nyamekye,
the 5th defendant is a royal to
the Pankrono stool and that his
nomination by the abusuapanin of
Pankrono stool with the support
of the stool elders, 1st, 2nd
and 3rd defendants was customary
and lawful, and I so hold.
I further agree with the
committee that the sons and
grandsons having ascended the
stool without question for this
long period of 300 years and
more, it will not be equitable
now to say that they are
ineligible to the stool, and for
that matter they are eligible to
the stool as the descendants of
Owura Miawani. For the above
reasons I would also dismiss the
appeal.
AMPIAH JSC.
This is an appeal from the
decision of the chieftaincy
tribunal of the National House
of Chiefs. On 22 August 1989,
the plaintiffs-appellants
(hereinafter referred to as the
“plaintiffs”) who claim to be
royals of the Pankrono stool,
initiated proceedings in the
judicial committee of the Kumasi
traditional council against the
defendants-respondents (also
hereinafter referred to as the
“defendants”) who also claim to
be royals of the same stool
aforesaid for:
“(1) A declaration that Kwaku
Nyamekye (5th defendant) is not
a royal to Pankrono Stool.
(2) A declaration that the
purported nomination of Kweku
Nyamekye by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd
and 4th defendants for the
Pankrono stool is uncustomary
and unlawful.
(3) Perpetual injunction
restraining the 1st, 2nd, 3rd
and 4th defendants their
servants, agents and or family
members from attempting to
nominate, elect and or install
the 5th defendant as Pankrono
Dikro.”
What had triggered off the
action was apparently an
oath-swearing incident in 1988,
when the parties or their
privies had claimed entitlement
to succeeded to the Pankrono
stool. The matter had come
before a meeting of the Kumasi
traditional council which had
presumed an amicable settlement
of the dispute. According to the
Buokronhene, Nana Owusu Bempah,
DW1:
“I invited Nana Nkosohene. At
the meeting, all the parties
agreed to settle the issues
amicably out of court. I
therefore withdrew the cases
from the court. I successfully
settled the issues amicably at
home. Drinks were paid to
confirm the settlement and the
share of Otumfuo was accordingly
paid to him. It was accepted
that the stool elders and the
Queenmother of Pankrono should
go back and enstool a suitable
candidate on the Pankrono stool.
This ended all the court cases.
I brought the terms of
settlement to the notice of
Otumfuo.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Unfortunately, the alleged
amicable settlement left
unresolved the main issue in the
dispute namely, which of the
parties was a royal to the
Pankrono stool and therefore
entitled to succeed to the
stool. To a question whether the
Pankrono stool is a royal or
patrilineal stool by
succession, Nana Buokrono (DW1)
answered: “No. I never went into
that issue.” It is quite clear
from the evidence that the
questions whether or not the
Pankrono stool is succeeded to
matrilineally or patrilineally
and which of the parties is
entitled to succeed to the
stool, were never settled
amicably. Following this
impasse, the plaintiffs brought
up the issue before judicial
committee of the Kumasi
traditional council for
determination. Akin to the main
issue was also the matter that
concerned the queenmother ie who
was entitled under customary law
to nominate a candidate for
enstoolment on the Pankrono
stool.
On 5 December 1989, the
defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the action. The judicial
committee refused the
application and ruled that
having considered the affidavits
and the pleadings filed so far,
the issues involved needed to be
resolved by evidence. The issue
was whether the Pankrono stool
was a “sons stool” (mmamadwa)
with patrilineal succession or a
royal stool (adehyedwa) with
matrilineal succession. Having
thus identified the real issues,
the committee then set down them
for trial. Both sides offered
both traditional evidence as
well as evidence on recent acts
in relation to the stool. The
committee accepted the evidence
of the plaintiff and held that
the Pankrono stool was
patrilineal by succession and
that the sons and grandsons of
either the Pankrono stool or the
Nkwantakese stool were the only
eligible persons to ascend the
stool. It therefore declared the
nomination of the 5th defendant
(Kwaku Nyamekye) null and void
and authorised the Queenmother
of Pankrono, Nana Ama Serwah to
nominate afresh a candidate for
the approval of the
Nkwantakesehene for enstoolment
by the kingmakers of the
Pankrono stool. It also
restrained Opanin Kweku Sekyere,
the Dome Dikro from posing as
the abusuapanin of the Pankrono
stool and involving himself in
the enstoolment of a candidate
to the Pankrono stool.
The defendants (excluding the
2nd defendant, the Akwamuhene of
Pankrono) appealed against the
decision of the judicial
committee to the Ashanti
Regional House of Chiefs. On 5
November 1990, the judicial
committee dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the decision of the
judicial committee of the Kumasi
traditional council. The
defendants appealed further to
the National House of Chiefs.
The chieftaincy tribunal of the
National House of Chiefs allowed
the appeal and set aside the
decisions of the lower
tribunals. The present appeal is
by the plaintiffs from the
decision of the chieftaincy
tribunal of the National House
of Chiefs.
The grounds of appeal, as set
down in the notice of appeal,
are contained in the statement
of the plaintiffs’ case, filed
on 14 January 1993. The
defendants also filed a
statement of their case in reply
to the plaintiffs. Both sides
relied on their statements and
offered oral submissions based
on the statements.
In allowing the appeal, the
chieftaincy tribunal observed,
among other things, that:
“We understand the culture of a
people to include their custom,
beliefs etc. The people of
Ashanti believe that it is an
honour to die for ones tribe. It
was a privilege to be sacrificed
in defence of ones tribe and so
it was normal to be used in a
ritual sacrifice to ensure
victory for Asanteman in war. A
person sacrificed in such
circumstances and his family
were honoured and accorded
privileges, not condemned to
disqualification, disability or
degradation. We are aware of
examples of this and think that
was more probable.”
In coming to this conclusion,
the tribunal laid down two
principles which according to
it, must always be in the mind
of the tribunal. These are:
“(a) Where in a chieftaincy
matter, the parties rely only or
mainly on oral traditional
history in support of their
rival claims, it is very
essential to consider evidence
of recent events of facts and
(b) Where in such a case the
version of one side is supported
by or is in accord or consonance
with, the culture of the people,
whilst that of his rival is not
supported or is at variance with
the culture, the version which
is so supported ought, except in
exceptional circumstances, to be
preferred.”
The first principle accords with
the accepted principle laid down
in Adjeibi-Kojo v Bonsie
(1957) 3 WALR 257 and other
authorities. The culture of the
people, as the tribunal properly
stated consisted of the custom,
beliefs etc. of the people. Both
the trial committee and the
judicial committee of the
Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs
found that though originally,
succession to the Pankrono stool
was matrilineal, it has since
the decree of Okomfo Anokye
become patrilineal. The trial
committee found that apart from
Miawani, who belonged to the
matrilineal family, only the
sons and grandsons of the stool
have since succeeded the
Pankrono stool. Asked who had
succeeded the Pankrono stool
since Nana Owusu Miawani, the
5th defendant (Kwaku Nyamekye)
answered:
“Royals were:
1. Nana Owusu Miawani
2. Nana Brobbey Kwakye
3. Nana Osei Kwadwo
The non-royals were:
1. Nana Kweku Oppong
2. Nana Kwaku Konto
3. Nana Kwabena Asubonten alias
Nana Brobbey Kwakye Asare II
4. Nana Yaw Konto.”
In his evidence-in-chief, the
1st plaintiff, Charles Boakye
Yiadom, speaking for himself and
the other plaintiffs stated in
clear terms, those who had
ascended the stool and showed
what relationship they had with
the stool. He said:
“Originally the Pankrono stool
was created for the members of
the family; that is succession
to the stool was matrilineal but
then after Owusu Miawani had
offered himself for the
sacrificial ritual and after the
success of the Ashanti in the
war, Komfo Anokye decreed that
it was a taboo for the members
of the family to ascend to the
stool of Pankrono and if they
did they would all perish. By
this decree or oracle the stool
was given to the sons and
grandsons of Nana
Nkwantakesehene stool and the
descendants of Owusu Miawani.
Thus, the Pankrono stool changed
to patrilineal succession. Soon
after the arrangement the son of
Owusu Miawani called Nana Kofi
Appeagyei succeeded his father,
Owusu Miawani. The grandson of
Nana Nkwantakesehene called
Kwadwo Adjei succeeded Nana Kofi
Appiagyei by paternal
succession. Brobbey Kwakye
Asare, the grandson of Nana
Nkwantakesehene succeeded Nana
Kwadwo Adjei. All these chiefs
hailed from Pankrono. My father
Osei Kwadwo, also a grandson of
Nkwantakesehene succeeded Nana
Brobbey Kwakye Asare II.
Unfortunately my father
misconducted himself by
committing adultery with the
wife of Atipinhene. He then fled
from Pankrono and one Yaw Konto
was appointed regent of
Pankrono. Sometime later my
father Nana Osei Kwadwo returned
to Pankrono and took over the
administration of Pankrono from
the caretaker, Yaw Konto. He was
succeeded by his other brother
Kwaku Oppong. Nana Kwaku Oppong
abdicated the stool after a
short reign. The Pankrono stool
remained vacant for a long
period until Nana
Nkwantakesehene enstooled one of
his grandsons from Tafo, called
Konto. Nana Konto also abdicated
the stool leaving the Pankrono
stool vacant for a long period.
Sometime later, Nana Kwakye
Brobbey Asare II, from Pankrono
was enstooled in succession of
Nana Konto. He died on the stool
about two years now.”
Nana Kwakye Brobbey Asare II,
from the evidence, was the son
of Madam Yaa Adowaa, a
granddaughter of the stool. The
defendants accepted all these
persons as having ascended the
stool. Nana Brobbey Kwakye and
Nana Osei Kwadwo whom they
admitted ascended their stool
were, on the evidence, shown to
be the grandsons of the
Nkwantakesehene; they were not
able to disprove this.
On this cogent evidence given by
the plaintiffs, the defendants
could not be said to have
displaced the fact that since
Owusu Miawani only sons and
grandsons had succeeded to the
Pankrono stool. Their feeble
excuse that there were either no
eligible candidates from their
side to succeed or that they
were not interested at the time,
could not find favour with the
trial committee. For all that
period, the decree by Okomfo
Anokye had been adhered to. It
has become the belief of the
people of Pankrono and by that
belief, they had permitted the
sons and grandsons of the stool
to occupy the stool for over 300
years without any protest. It
did not lie in the mouth of the
tribunal to say what the
probable case was. In fact, the
tribunal had itself accepted
that the culture of a people
includes their customs, beliefs
etc. If it was the belief of the
people of Asante that the
descendants of a person who had
been sacrificed should not
ascend the stool, it was not the
duty of the appellate tribunal
to rely on probabilities when
the trial tribunals had made
findings on those facts. After
all, by that decree, if the
defendants’ story is to be
believed, apart from not
ascending the stool, they were
privileged not to suffer death
by decapitation.
The law is that an appellate
court should not disturb
findings of fact made by the
trial tribunal; see the case of
in re Yendi Skin Affairs;
Yakubu II v Abudulai
[1984-86] 2 GLR 239, Asibey
III v Ayisi [1973] 1GLR 102.
In Praka v Ketewa [1964]
GLR 423, SC, Ollennu JSC,
reading the judgment in the
case, observed:
“It is true that an appeal is by
way of rehearing, and therefore
the appellate court is entitled
to make up its own mind on the
facts and to draw inferences
from them to the same extent as
the trial court could; but where
the decision on the facts
depends upon credibility of
witnesses, the appeal court
ought not to interfere with
findings of fact except where
they are clearly shown to be
wrong or where those facts are
wrong inferences drawn from
admitted facts or from the facts
found by the trial court.
Therefore if in the exercise of
its powers an appeal court feels
itself obliged to reverse
findings of fact made by the
trial court, it is incumbent
upon it to show clearly in its
judgment where it thinks the
trial court went wrong. It goes
without saying that if an appeal
court sets aside the findings of
a trial court without good
ground, or upon grounds which do
not warrant such interference
with the findings made by the
trial court a higher court will
set that judgment aside.”
Where the findings of fact are
supported by the evidence, it
did not require that the
reviewing or appellate tribunal
should place itself in the
position of the tribunal of
first instance which had the
advantage of seeing and hearing
the witnesses, an advantage
which was denied the reviewing
or appellate tribunal, and to
arrive at its own conclusions of
fact when there was no
misdirection by the tribunal of
first instance or a wrong
assessment of the evidence; see
Republic v Asafu-Adjaye (No
2) [1968] GLR 567. In the
instant case, the judicial
committee of the Kumasi
traditional council, having
heard evidence from both sides
on the tradition and recent
events of facts came to a
conclusion that the stool was
for by sons and grandsons only
of the stool, the culture having
been changed by the decree of
Okomfo Anokye. Similarly it held
that the queenmother-stool
became a male stool, which could
be succeeded to by the daughters
and granddaughters of the male
side. Applying the principles
used by appellate tribunal in
assessing evidence, I think the
judicial committee’s findings
were amply supported. The
judicial committee of the
Ashanti Region House of Chiefs
had no difficulties in affirming
the findings by the lower
tribunal. Thus, these findings
became concurrent findings of
fact. The National House of
Chiefs did not allow the appeal
on the ground that the findings
were not supported by the
evidence or that the judgment
was perverse. After stating that
it had read the evidence on
record, it relied on the
probable consequences of the
Okomfo Anokye decree. The two
lower committees which heard the
matter had a panel of Ashanti
Chiefs who are presumed to know
the custom of the tribunal area.
It is not being suggested that
the chieftaincy tribunal of the
National House of Chiefs could
not in a proper case disturb
findings of fact from a
traditional area to which none
of the panel members of the
tribunal belongs. As stated
above, the tribunal had power to
disturb these findings if they
were either perverse or
unsupported but where there has
been concurrent and supportable
findings of fact by courts which
are supposed to be the
custodians of their custom, an
appellate tribunal which did not
have the advantage of such
knowledge, should not easily or
readily disturb the findings on
mere probabilities. To ignore
the findings and rely on
probabilities amounts to
conjecturing and this cannot be
accepted in place of the factual
evidence.
In the particular circumstances
of this case, I think the
appellate tribunal erred in
substituting its own findings on
mere probabilities. Its decision
to create a rotational system of
succession for a group which, on
the evidence, did not practice
such a system amounted to the
exercise of excess jurisdiction
and an imposition of a system
alien to the people. There was
no claim for this and no
evidence was led to establish
that. For the above reasons, I
would allow the appeal and set
aside the decision together with
the orders made under it by the
chieftaincy tribunal of the
National House of Chiefs. I
would affirm the decisions of
the Kumasi Traditional Council
and the Ashanti Regional House
of Chiefs.
Appeal allowed.
S Kwami Tetteh, Legal Practioner
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