The applicant mortgaged her
property to the Labadi Community
Bank Limited as security for a
loan to Kotex Limited. The
mortgage deed provided that as
between the mortgagor and the
bank, the mortgagor was deemed a
principal debtor for the moneys
secured. The company defaulted
in payment and the bank filed an
originating summons in the High
Court, Accra for judicial sale
of the mortgaged property. No
demand of the debt was made on
the applicant nor was she
notified of the action.
Throughout the proceedings, the
company was held out as the
owner of the property and the
court proceeded to order
judicial sale of the property.
The applicant therefore applied
to the Supreme Court for an
order in the nature of
certiorari to quash the order
for judicial sale. Counsel for
the applicant contended that the
proceedings leading to the order
for judicial sale were null and
void since the mortgagor, the
owner of the property, who stood
to be affected by the
proceedings was not made a
party.
Held:
Under section 15 of the
Mortgages Decree 1972 (NRCD 96),
where there was default and the
mortgagee decided to apply for
judicial sale of the mortgaged
property, such action could not
be properly instituted without
joining the mortgagor as a
party. Under s 6 of the Decree,
the mortgagor was personally
liable for the debt as well as
the mortgage security. When the
bank elected to realise the
security by judicial sale, the
mortgagor who had an interest in
the equity of redemption was an
essential party to the suit. For
that matter he ought to be a
party or be sufficiently
represented by persons who were
parties. The applicant was not
given a hearing before the order
depriving her of her property
was made; this amounted to a
flagrant violation of the
principles of natural justice.
The application would therefore
be granted. Tylee v Webb
(1843) 6 Beav 552, Gedye v
Matson (1858) 25 Beav 310,
Caddick v Cook (1863) 32
Beav 70, Griffith v Pound
(1890) 45 Ch D 553, Moore v
Morton (1886) WN 196,
Martins Bank v Kavanagh
[1948] 2 All ER 448,
Temperance Permanent Benefit
Building Society v Nevitt
[1940] 3 All ER 273, and R v
Wandsworth Justices ex parte
Read [1942] l KB 281
followed.
Cases referred to:
Caddick v Cooke
(1863) 32 Beav 70, 1 New Rep
463, 32 LJ Ch 769, 7 LT 844, 9
Jur NS 454.
Darbah v Ampah
20 February 1990, SC.
Gedye v Matson
(1858) 25 Beav 310.
Griffith v Pound
(1890) 45 Ch D 553, 59 LJ Ch
522.
Martins Bank v Kavanagh
[1948] 2 All ER 448.
Moore v Morton
(1886) WN 196.
R v Wandsworth Justices, ex
parte Read
[1942] 1 KB 281, [1942] 1 All ER
56, CA.
Temperance Permanent Benefit
Building Society v Nevitt
[1940] 3 All ER 273, 163 LT 234.
Tylee v Webb
(1843) 6 Beav 552, 1 LTOS 408.
APPLICATION to the Supreme Court
for order in the nature of
certiorari to quash an order for
judicial sale by the High Court,
Accra.
James Ahenkorah
for the applicant.
E V A Adjetey
for the respondents.
AIKINS JSC.
This is an application by Diana
Chochoo Chinto for an order of
certiorari to bring up and quash
the proceedings in the suit
instituted in the High Court,
Accra bearing the number OS
1955/91 and titled “Labadi
Community Bank Ltd v Messrs
Kotex Limited” and the
resultant judgment therein dated
8 November 1991 ordering a
judicial sale of all that piece
or parcel of land with a
building or buildings thereon,
the property of Diana Chochoo
Chinto, the applicant herein,
situated at North Labadi, Accra,
and mortgaged to secure the
indebtedness of Messrs Kotex
Limited to the Labadi Community
Bank Limited. Sometime in 1990
the applicant guaranteed the
indebtedness of a registered
limited liability company,
Messrs Kotex Limited based in
Labadi, Accra to the Labadi
Community Bank Limited, and by
way of further security,
mortgaged her land with a house
thereon in which she lived to
the said bank by an indenture of
mortgage dated 20 June 1990 and
registered in the Land Registry
as instrument No 1796/1990. When
the company failed to repay the
loan as agreed upon, the bank
instituted proceedings by way of
originating summons in the High
Court, Accra for the substantive
relief of judicial sale of the
mortgagor’s house, which she had
mortgaged to the bank to secure
the debt of Kotex Limited. On 8
November 1991, the High Court
gave judgment for the judicial
sale of the house. To enforce
the order for judicial sale, the
bank caused a writ of fi: fa. to
be issued against the property,
and as a result a notice of
attachment and sale were issued
by the Deputy Sheriff.
Counsel for the applicant, Mr
James Ahenkorah, has urged that
the originating summons leading
to the order for judicial sale
of the mortgaged property was
legally null and void since the
mortgagor who was the owner of
the property and the person who
stood to be affected by the
outcome of the proceedings which
would destroy the equity of
redemption was not a party to
the suit before the High Court,
Accra. I think the argument of
counsel for applicant is quite
tenable and well-founded because
an order for judicial sale
cannot, in my view, be properly
made without ensuring that the
mortgagor who has interest in an
equity of redemption, is a party
to the suit. I must confess that
I do not see how the action
leading to the order for
judicial sale of the mortgaged
property can be said to have
been properly instituted unless
all persons interested in the
equity of redemption are brought
before the court. I am
buttressed in this view by the
contents of the notice of
attachment dated 31 August 1992
and the notice of intention to
sell by public auction of even
date, issued by the Deputy
Sheriff of the High Court, Accra
(exhibits VKA 2 and 3
respectively) both of which were
fixed on the mortgaged property,
which indicates the mortgaged
property as belonging to the
judgment debtor, Kotex Limited
even though it does not own it.
It is therefore a
misrepresentation of fact. The
proper person to have been sued
was the mortgagor.
Under section 15 of the
Mortgages Decree 1972 (NRCD 96),
where there is failure of
performance of any act secured
by the mortgage, the mortgagee
is entitled to take any of the
following two steps, namely: (a)
sue the mortgagor or obligor or
both on any personal covenant to
perform or (b) realise his
security in the mortgaged
property in any of the ways
prescribed in Part II of the
Decree. With respect to (b)
above, the mortgagee may (i)
apply to the court for the
appointment of a receiver who
may be empowered by the court to
take possession of the mortgaged
property and act in accordance
with any directives that the
court may issue, or (ii) enter
and take possession of the
mortgaged property, if that may
be done peaceably, or assert his
right by an action for
possession, or (iii) apply to
the court for an order for
judicial sale of the mortgaged
property, in which case the
court will have to consider what
opportunity, if any, the
mortgagee has offered the
mortgagor or obligor or both to
remedy the failure of
performance - see sections 15,
17(1) and (2) and 18(1) and (2)
of the Decree. As regards option
(a) above, it is my view that if
the mortgagee decides to take
action upon failure of the
mortgagor to perform any act
secured by the mortgage, the
mortgagor must be a party to the
action. In the same vein if the
mortgagee elects to apply for an
order for judicial sale of the
property in option (b), such
action cannot be properly
instituted without ensuring that
the mortgagor is a party to the
proceedings.
A judicial sale ordered by the
court under section 18 of the
Decree entitles a mortgagee to
foreclose the rights of the
mortgagor to redeem the
mortgaged property - see section
18(9) of the Decree. The legal
position is that since the
mortgagor is interested in the
equity of redemption, a judgment
in a foreclosure action gives
him the opportunity to redeem.
If he fails to do so he is
foreclosed, and for that matter,
he must be a party or be
sufficiently represented by
persons who are parties. See
Tylee v Webb (1843) 6 Beav
552 at 557; Gedye v Matson
(1858) 25 Beav 310;
Caddick v Cook (1863) 32
Beav 70; and Griffith v Pound
(1890) 45 Ch D 553 at 567.
Griffith v Pound
was a case where summons was
originally taken out for the
foreclosure of three mortgages
dated 1876, 1882 and January
1888. The summons was later
amended by adding three other
parties who claimed under three
mortgages which were not
originally included in the
summons. An application was made
to the judge in chambers to add
two out of a large number of
debenture holders pursuant to
Order 16 rule 9 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court 1883. This
rule provides for the
representation of numerous
persons having the same interest
in a cause or matter to sue or
be sued or authorised by the
court or judge to defend in such
cause or matter - similar in
content to Order 16 rule 9 of
our High Court (Civil Procedure)
Rules 1954 (LN 140A). The judge
appointed two of them to defend
in the action on behalf and for
the benefit of the other
mortgagees and debenture holders
of the company. An objection was
taken that an order for
foreclosure could not be made in
an action so constituted. In
response to this the judge said:
“In my opinion that objection is
well-founded, and that an order
for foreclosure cannot be made
without having here all the
persons interested in the equity
of redemption.”
He continued:
“In an action for foreclosure,
unquestionably according to the
rules of the Chancery Division
all persons interested on the
equity of redemption ought to be
defendants.”
I think I agree with the judge,
Stirling J, in his proposition
of the law, and I would hold
that according to our statute
also, i.e. the Mortgages Decree,
all persons interested in the
equity of redemption, such as
the applicant herein, ought to
be defendants in any summons for
the relief of judicial sale of a
mortgaged property.
In Moore v Morton (1886)
WN 196, it was held that as long
as the mortgagor remains the
owner of the equity of
redemption in the whole or any
part of the mortgaged estate, he
was a necessary party to any
action in respect of the
mortgaged property. I think I
agree with this holding, and I
adopt it. The very wording of
paragraph 4(b) of the indenture
of mortgage, exhibit VKA1, in my
view makes it imperative that
the mortgagor should be a
necessary party to any such
action. The sub-paragraph
states:
“(b) Although as between the
customer and the mortgagor the
mortgagor is only a surety for
the customer yet as between the
mortgagor and the bank the
mortgagor shall be deemed to be
a principal debtor for the
moneys hereby secured
accordingly and the mortgagor
and the mortgaged premises
respectively shall not be
released by time being given to
the customer or by any act
matter or thing whereby the
mortgagor as a surety only or
the premises comprised in this
security might have been
released.”
Counsel for the applicant has
argued that no proper notice of
demand was given to the
applicant as the mortgagor under
the mortgage deed, exhibit VKA1,
neither was any notice of the
action in court for the judicial
sale of the mortgaged property
given her. This contention seems
to be well-founded. The exhibit
provides:
“A notice may be served by the
mortgagor and/or the customer
upon the bank by sending it
through the post in a prepaid
envelope addressed to its
registered office and any demand
or notice to be made or given by
the bank may be made by letter
signed by any manager or other
duly authorised officer of the
bank sent through the post in a
prepaid envelope addressed to
the mortgagor and/or customer at
his/its last known address but
in the case of a company at its
registered office and any notice
served by post on the mortgagor
and the customer shall be deemed
to have been served at the
expiration of four (4) clear
days after it is posted in Ghana
and in proving such service it
shall be sufficient to prove
that the notice was so posted.”
No final demand note from the
bank appears to have been sent
to the mortgagor, nor is there
any indication, from the
affidavits filed, that any
notice was posted to the
mortgagor with respect to the
action in court for the judicial
sale of the property. The
applicant can therefore safely
be said to have been taken by
surprise when she found the
notice for judicial sale fixed
to her property. The fact that
some relatives of the mortgagor
were said to have had
information about the
institution of the suit against
Kotex Limited by the
plaintiff-bank cannot be said to
be proper notice to the
mortgagor to entitle the bank to
proceed to execute the judgment
of the High Court against the
mortgagor. In this connection,
Kotex Limited is not the agent
of the applicant.
In the result since the
mortgagor was not a party to the
proceedings in the High Court,
Accra in suit numbered OS
1955/91 and bearing the title
“Labadi Community Bank Ltd v
Kotex Limited” and since the
defendant in that suit is not
the owner of the mortgaged
property, as is contained in the
notice of attachment, and the
notice of intention to sell by
public auction both dated 31
August 1992, the mortgaged
property cannot properly be sold
as ordered by the High Court in
the judgment of the court dated
8 November 1991. I would
accordingly allow the
application.
FRANCOIS JSC.
I agree.
AMUA-SEKYI JSC.
I also agree that the
application be allowed.
BAMFORD-ADDO
JSC. I agree with my
brothers that certiorari would
lie to quash the order and
proceedings of the High Court in
suit No OS 1955/91 titled
Labadi Community Bank v Messrs
Kotex Limited. When in March
1991 the customer of the Labadi
Community Bank failed to repay
the loan as agreed upon, the
said bank elected to institute
proceedings by way of
originating summons for an order
of judicial sale of the
mortgaged property of the
applicant herein, under s 15(b)
of the Mortgages Decree 1972
(NRCD 96). Instead of suing the
mortgagor herself or joining her
in the suit, the said bank sued
only the customer who had no
interest in the mortgaged
property. The applicant was
therefore not given any
opportunity to raise any
objection to the application for
a judicial sale of the property
or to raise any other defence
open to her. Throughout the
proceedings in the High Court,
as evidenced in the issues set
out to be determined in the
originating summons, exhibit VKA
4 and also in the notice of
amendment, exhibit VKA3, the
defendant customer, was
mistakenly held out as the owner
of the property. This in my view
confused the judge into making
the order for judicial sale in
the absence of the actual
mortgagor in the suit.
Under s 6 of NRCD 96, the
mortgagor is personally liable,
as well as liable on the
mortgage security, for the
performance of the act or acts
secured by the mortgage; so that
when the bank elected to realise
the security by judicial sale,
the mortgagor who had an
interest in the equity of
redemption was an essential
party to the suit.
In Martins Bank v Kavanagh
[1948] 2 All ER 448, the
defendant charged her farm by
way of legal mortgage to the
plaintiff. She was later
adjudged a bankrupt but remained
in possession of the farm. The
plaintiff issued originating
summons claiming possession of
the farm but did not add as a
defendant, the trustee in
bankruptcy in whom the equity of
redemption was vested. The court
held:
“The application was properly
made by originating summons but
as it involved a step in the
enforcement of the security
which might prejudice the person
entitled to the equity of
redemption the Trustee in
Bankruptcy should have been
joined and therefore the summons
was defective.”
Similar decisions were given in
the case of Griffith v Pound
(1890) 45 Ch D 553 and
Caddick v Cook (1862) 32
Beav 70. In the Appeal case of
Temperance Permanent Benefit
Building Society v Nevitt
[1940] 3 All ER 273, the husband
of the respondent, Nevitt
mortgaged his house to the
appellant building society and
had fallen into arrears with
payments under the terms of the
mortgage deed, whereupon the
society became, under the
mortgage, entitled to
possession. It was a period
during the war and the husband
had been called up and was
serving with His Majesty’s
forces. The Society issued a
writ for possession against the
wife who was living in the
house. She did not enter
appearance and the Society
applied to court to sign
judgment in default of
appearance. The application was
refused since the
husband-mortgagor was not made a
party to the writ which claimed
against the wife alone. It was
held by Farewell J that the
proceedings from start to finish
had been an abuse of the court;
that the Society knew that the
proper person to make defendant
was the husband-mortgagor and
accordingly directed that the
writ and all subsequent
proceedings be set aside
altogether. The Society appealed
but the decision of Farewell J
was affirmed. Per Scott LJ:
“In my opinion not only must we
affirm the judgment by Farewell
J. but we must direct that the
writ and all subsequent
proceedings be set aside
altogether … I may say this
further. In my opinion the costs
of this litigation cannot
constitute any proper charge to
be added to the mortgage and I
hope the plaintiff society will
make no attempt to take that
course.”
The conclusion, as I see it, is
that an order for judicial sale
made by the High Court in the
absence of the applicant who had
an interest in the equity of
redemption is void. Further the
applicant was not given the
opportunity of being heard
before the order depriving her
of her property was made; this
amounted to a flagrant violation
of the principles of natural
justice.
In the case of R v Wandsworth
Justices, ex parte Read
[1942] l KB 281 the court held,
per Humpheys J:
“If a person can satisfy this
court that there has been a
complete disregard by an
inferior tribunal of the laws of
natural justice he is entitled
to the protection of the court.
I entirely agree with my Lords’
description of the proceedings
before the justices here as a
denial of justice to the
applicant
who was prevented from taking
any part in any discussion, if
there were any regarding the
rights and wrongs of the matter
and was never heard in his own
defence.”
In that case, the order for
certiorari was granted. In
similar circumstances as this
case, the applicant is entitled
to an order of certiorari to
quash the proceedings and
judgment of the High Court in
suit no OS 1955/91 titled
“Labadi Community Bank Limited v
Messrs Kotex Limited.”
HAYFRON-BENJAMIN JSC.
I have read the respondent’s
affidavit in opposition with
great interest. I gain the
impression that Madam Diana
Chochoo Chinto who, to the
knowledge of the respondent, is
an illiterate old woman, was
inveigled into executing a
document purporting to be a
mortgage on 28 June 1990, to
secure the defendants, Kotex
Limited, in the original action
in the High Court, Accra. How
such an expression in the
alleged mortgage deed as:
“AND WHEREAS the customer has or
may have accounts with the bank
and has requested the bank to
allow it to overdraw the same
and give it banking
accommodation on the usual
banking terms and has agreed
with the bank that if the bank
shall provide any such
facilities or accommodation the
same shall be secured in manner
hereinafter appearing…”
was properly interpreted to her
in the Ga language, I cannot
fathom. The interesting thing
however, about the mortgage was
that it was not even stated in
the recitals thereof that Madam
Chochoo Chinto was agreeable
that her property shall be used
a security for the accommodation
which the defendant, Kotex
Limited, was to be granted by
the respondent. If the contents
of the mortgage document are
correct, there is nothing to
show that as at 28 June 1990,
Kotex Limited owed any monies to
the respondent for which Madam
Chinto’s property was to be used
as security. In spite of the
respondent’s declaration that
they would give Kotex Limited
“accommodation on the usual
banking terms” they imposed a
covenant that overdrafts were to
attract interest of 27 percent
per annum. Barely a year after
the execution of this mortgage
deed by the applicant, the
respondents, then plaintiffs in
the High Court, commenced an
originating summons against
Kotex Limited praying for an
order of judicial sale under the
Mortgages Decree of the
applicant’s property. In their
affidavit in support of their
originating summons, the
respondents, then plaintiffs in
the High Court, deposed as
follows:
“In February 1991, it was agreed
between the plaintiffs and the
defendant that an outstanding
amount in respect of a temporary
facility should be amalgamated
with the
outstanding loan to be repaid
at the rate of 550,000 cedis per
month with effect from 15
February, 1991.”
The averment does not say that
the applicant was informed of
this “amalgamation” of loans and
whether she agreed that it
should be so done. In the High
Court, only Kotex Limited was
sued and judgment for the
judicial sale of the applicant’s
property was given on 8 November
1991. I do not intend to pursue
the legal consequences of this
so-called amalgamation of debts,
but it will suffice to say that
the respondents, then
plaintiffs, chose their victim,
pursued it and even compromised
with it. In exasperation, they
turned to the order for judicial
sale which, in my view, they had
erroneously obtained in respect
of the applicant’s property and
on 31 August 1992, the Deputy
Sheriff granted an order that
the sale of the applicant’s
property should proceed on 25
September 1992. It was when the
notice of sale was posted on her
premises that the applicant
bestirred herself. She went to
the High Court and did not
obtain relief. She therefore
invoked the supervisory
jurisdiction of this court.
Before us, the respondents, by
their paragraph (xii) of their
affidavit in opposition, contend
that the application is “odd,
irregular, frivolous, belated,
misconceived and unmeritorious.”
With respect, learned counsel is
wrong on all the points. This
court in Darbah v Ampah
dated 20 February 1990, where
the applicant wanted to
circumvent the appeal process by
resort to an application for a
prerogative writ conceded that:
“There are situations in which
the courts show anxiety to deal
with cases by adopting methods
which are faster than the usual
processes of normal appeals by
resorting to the remedies being
sought in the present
application.”
In the Darbah case supra,
the court reiterated the two
grounds upon which prerogative
writs of this nature may be
entertained as being (i) excess
or want of jurisdiction in the
court and (ii) error of law
appearing on the face of the
record. In rejecting the
application in the Darbah
case supra, this court concluded
that:
“The application is only a
desperate attempt to obtain the
help of the Supreme Court to
avoid the consequences facing a
litigant who has twice lost his
appeal and has neglected to
observe the rules of court
regarding appeals to the Supreme
Court.”
The Darbah case supra, is
clearly distinguishable from the
present application. The
applicant in this case has never
litigated with the respondent.
Her only foray into the judicial
system was when she went to have
the High Court set aside the
order for judicial sale which
was wrongly dismissed. The
question to be asked is, if she
had a right of appeal, and I
have my doubts about her
capacity in that regard since
the application was
interlocutory, would she be able
to protect her property during
the pendency of her appeals
through the hierarchy of our
courts? In my respectful
opinion, I think the applicant
was right in approaching this
court in the exercise of its
supervisory jurisdiction. I
think the applicant’s case comes
within the first part of the
dictum in the Darbah
case, supra and she is properly
before us.
In argument before us this court
directed the attention of
learned counsel for the
respondent to section 15 of the
Mortgages Decree and enquired
whether it was not an oversight
that in the original proceedings
before the High Court only the
obligor had been sued and not,
as permitted by that section,
that both the obligor and the
mortgagor could be sued. Learned
counsel replied that the
plaintiffs in the High Court had
deliberately sued only the
obligor. This to me was a
strange answer having regard to
the order which was made by the
High Court for the sale of the
applicant’s property. Again, I
would not like to pass any
comment on the respondent’s
deliberate choice of only the
obligor, Kotex Limited, as the
respondent to that application
in the High Court. To me the
legal consequence of a choice as
it is envisaged in section 15 of
the Mortgages Decree is clear.
The mortgagee is put to his
election. He may choose to
pursue the borrower or the
mortgagor (surety) or he may sue
both the borrower, in this case
the obligor, and the mortgagor.
If the mortgagee sues the
borrower (obligor) only, the
action is on the personal
convenant to pay the debt
contained on the document under
consideration. The mortgagee
cannot obtain an order for
judicial sale against a
mortgagor when he is not a
party. An order for judicial
sale therefore can only be
obtained against a mortgagor who
has been sued. Whether the
mortgagee may pursue the obligor
to the limit and if he does not
obtain satisfaction, follow the
mortgagor, will certainly depend
upon whether, on a true
interpretation of section 15 of
Mortgages Decree, the mortgagee
is put to his election.
I have had the pleasure of
reading the able lead judgement
of my learned and respected
brother Aikins JSC and I agree
entirely with his reasoning and
the conclusions to which he has
arrived. I wish however to make
a short contribution of my own
to the law on the subject of
mortgages within our
municipality as with the
increase in commercial activity,
the ability to recover on
mortgages and hypothecations
come into focus. Our Law Reports
are replete with cases on the
contest of wills, between
lenders and borrowers,
mortgagors and mortgagees and
all types of transactions
affecting land in which one
party is given a “power of sale
without resort to an action in
court.” Invariably the security
offered for such loans are
mainly farms especially cocoa
farms and in these modern times,
buildings and other landed
property. Litigation always
rears its head when the time for
payment arrives and, almost
invariably, the borrower cannot
pay. Then the power of sale
arises.
The concept of a legal mortgage
affecting land was, until the
passing of the Mortgages Decree,
part of the legal system within
our municipality. Of course, it
is well known that the powers of
a legal mortgagee are, inter
alia, the powers of sale,
forfeiture, possession and
appointment of a receiver. In
collusion with auctioneers, the
power of sale was applied with
devastating effect. The
ingenuity of lawyers countered
this devastation by resort to
claims that secured property was
in fact family property and to
the strict and harsh
applications of the Loans
Recovery Ordinance (Cap 175) and
the Moneylenders Ordinance (Cap
176). It must be mentioned that
for the protection of borrowers
the courts strictly applied the
provisions of these two last
mentioned Ordinances. In answer
to the cries of cocoa farmers
who were losing their properties
to the combination of rapacious
moneylenders and “crooked”
auctioneers, the Agricultural
Credit and Co-operative Bank Act
1965 (Act 286) was passed and
received the Presidential Assent
on 9 April 1965. Sections 28, 29
and 30 of this Act were intended
specifically to protect cocoa
farmers from molestation by
moneylenders and placed a
ten-year clog on the right of
the moneylender to recover his
money provided the borrower or
mortgagor registered his loan
transaction with the bank. The
Act was amended by NLCD 182.
The passing of the Mortgages
Decree 1972 thus put an end to
the distinction between a legal
mortgage and an equitable
mortgage. Henceforth the courts
were to have control over all
mortgages and hypothecations.
The reliefs which could be
sought were also specifically
stated in the Decree. In my
view, the history of mortgages
in this country shows that the
Mortgages Decree was passed in
answer to the crying need of
borrowers for protection. A
court ought not therefore rush
to grant an order for judicial
sale if other alternatives exist
which may with advantage be used
in the protection of borrowers.
Madam Diana Chochoo Chinto was
most unfortunate. She did not
litigate, yet stood to lose her
property. The judgment ordering
the judicial sale of her
property was null and void and
she was entitled ex debito
justitiae to have it set aside.
The application succeeds and the
property of the applicant Madam
Chochoo Chinto more particularly
described in the notice of sale
dated 31 August 1992, signed by
the Deputy Sheriff, High Court
Accra is to be released from
attachment forthwith.
Application granted.
S Kwami Tetteh, Legal
Practitioner |
